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Justice is an abstract ideal.  To administer it is a concrete problem. 
William S. Fort, Facilities for the Administration of Justice 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the architectural significance of a recent exemplar of judicial 
architecture, the New Zealand Supreme Court complex (2010), in order to assess the 
complex’s design as an embodiment of judicial aspirations.  The underlying assumption of 
this study (based on the works of Goodsell, Edelman, Garapon and others) is that the 
architecture of the Supreme Court complex legibly responds to its layered (but not always 
publicly accessible) briefing process, a process which expresses the aspirations of the New 
Zealand justice system at the beginning of the 21st century.  By way of background, the study 
describes the history of the New Zealand judicial system, outlining the evolution of New 
Zealand’s court hierarchy (including the genesis of the Supreme Court as New Zealand’s 
court of final appeal) and of New Zealand’s judicial architecture.  The role of the Supreme 
Court within New Zealand’s constitutional and legal framework is also examined, particularly 
in relation to recognising and supporting the rule of law and Treaty of Waitangi in New 
Zealand jurisprudence.  The judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court are evinced through 
analyses of the Supreme Court Act 2003 and the Supreme Court project’s briefing process.  
These aspirations are coupled with an analysis of the Supreme Court complex’s built form to 
enable an assessment of architectural expressions in the Supreme Court complex of concepts 
of judicial independence, history and tradition; the indigenous nature of the Supreme Court; 
and the Court’s role in upholding the rule of law and sovereignty of Parliament.  The 
outcome of this research is a greater understanding of the function of the Supreme Court 
complex as a symbol of the judicial values and aspirations for New Zealand’s justice system 
in the early 21st century.  The significant findings of this study are that the Supreme Court 
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complex is legibly successful in terms of its architectural engagement with New Zealand’s 
judicial heritage and the contemporary approaches of openness, transparency and access in 
the judicial system, but that the architecture the Supreme Court fails to appropriately engage 
with the significance of the on-going M ori–Crown constitutional relationship embodied in 
the Treaty of Waitangi, evincing a disconnect between the judicial aspirations expressed at 
the establishment of the institution and those expressed in the Court’s built form.  It is 
suggested that this discrepancy highlights a layering of aspirations that occurred in the 
Supreme Court complex’s briefing process. 
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I.  
Introduction 
 
To address fundamental democratic principles, the citizen needs to be confident that the civic 
infrastructure contains an adequate courthouse where a dispute against another citizen may be taken 
for determination.  The citizen also needs to know that there is a courthouse where that citizen’s 
dispute with the government of the day, the state, may be addressed.  In other words, court buildings 
are places where justice is played out.  The courthouse lies at the heart of democratic government 
structures. [...] In democratic societies, courthouses are symbolic of the power of the courts and the 
rule of law over all citizens and, significantly, governments.1 
As the Hon. Marilyn Warren AC, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria, 
impassionedly identifies in the above quotation, courthouses are essential infrastructure in 
societies that embrace democracy and the rule of law.  They are sites of great constitutional 
and social importance, manifestations of the judicial branch of our system of government, 
and symbols of the value and importance in our societies of that intangible ideal we call 
“Justice.”  Community faith in the justice system is essential to the operation of the rule of 
law; as one New Zealand High Court judge has stated: “Lawyers and judges know that the 
law only works for the community because most of the community obeys the law, and 
traditionally, a courthouse had been built as a statement of the importance of the law.”2  It is 
judicial architecture’s fundamental role in enabling and supporting the rituals of public justice 
                                                
1 Marilyn Warren, The Politics of Court Architecture.  Paper presented at the Third Justice Environments 
Conference, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, Australia, May 2010.  
http://www.uws.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/138295/The_Politics_of_Court_Architecture.pdf. 
2 Clare Allison, “High Court sits for last time in old building” The Timaru Herald (8 April 2009). 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/timaru-herald/news/2322073/High-Court-sits-for-last-time-in-old-building 
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that makes the investigation and understanding of the courthouse typology so important.  As 
Chief Justice Warren identifies above, courthouses are a requisite component of a justice 
system.  Justice systems are constantly evolving, motivated by political, social, cultural, 
economic, and judicial aspirations to develop in a certain direction, to take on a certain form, 
or evolve at a certain rate.  Judicial architecture expresses the judicial aspirations of a justice 
system in order that those aspirations are communicated to the public at large.  In this way 
judicial architecture plays a significant role in influencing public perceptions of (and 
confidence in) the justice system. 
The Supreme Court Act 2003 (SCA) determined that the court of final appeal should be a 
New Zealand institution situated in New Zealand.  Internationally New Zealand is thus in 
the very rare position of having recently instituted a Supreme Court as the court of final 
appeal within an existing judicial hierarchy.  Moreover, this evolution of New Zealand’s 
judicial system has taken place within a post-colonial and bicultural social, political and legal 
context and with the benefit of substantial political and public debate concerning the 
desirability and constitutional, legal, and political ramifications of establishing a new court.   
Prominently sited in Wellington, the Warren and Mahoney (WaM) designed Supreme Court 
complex is singular, and not without controversy.  In light of Chief Justice Warren’s 
comment above, the Supreme Court courthouse is necessarily a statement of the importance 
of the law.  In addition, it is an expression of the importance of the role of the court to the 
state, to the judiciary, and to the community at large.  This situation provides a unique 
opportunity to assess an important work of judicial architecture against the express 
aspirations of the judicial system it represents and contains, thus providing a better 
understanding of how judicial architecture is mobilised to such ends.  This is possible as the 
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aspirations of the institution which informed the design are enshrined in the Court’s 
constituting legislation, supplemented by formal and verbal briefings, and responsive critique 
from within the architects’ practice and the project’s judicial and political advisors. 
The aim of this study is to assess the design of the New Zealand Supreme Court complex as 
the embodiment of judicial aspirations.  The study’s underlying assumption is that the 
architecture of the Supreme Court complex legibly responds to its layered (but not always 
publicly accessible) briefing process, a process which expresses the aspirations of the New 
Zealand justice system at the beginning of the 21st century.  This study analyses the New 
Zealand Supreme Court complex through legislation, briefing documents, archival research, 
interviews and built form in order to assess the judicial aspirations legible in the design. 
A Note on Legal Terminology 
As readers may not have a detailed understanding of the New Zealand judicial system, an 
explanation some of the legal terms used throughout this thesis is provided. 
This study engages with judicial architecture, that is, the built environment that supports the 
functioning of the judicial system, particularly courthouses and their courtrooms.  A courthouse 
is a building which houses one or more courtrooms and judges’ chambers, and 
administrative and support functions.   Within a courthouse, a courtroom is the physical space 
in which judges hear evidence and legal arguments and deliver judgments, while a judge’s 
chamber is her or his private office.  This study is concerned particularly with judicial 
aspirations expressed in the architecture of the New Zealand Supreme Court complex, which 
comprises the Supreme Court building (i.e. the Supreme Court courthouse) and its ancillary 
building, the restored Old High Court building (OHCB) (i.e. the former Wellington High 
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Court courthouse), as an example of judicial architecture within the context of the New 
Zealand judicial system.  Judicial aspirations are aspirations promoted by those responsible for 
the maintenance of the judicial system (including the judiciary, the executive, Parliament, and 
legal community) for that system.  The legal or justice system is the broad system of law making 
and enforcement within a jurisdiction, of which the judicial system is a part, comprising the 
judiciary and hierarchy of courts that is empowered (inherently or by statute) to justiciate on 
legal matters.  A statute or Act is a law enacted by Parliament, as opposed to the common law, 
which is that body of law declared by the courts in the course of deciding disputes before 
them.  Common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the United 
States and New Zealand all have the common law as a part of their legal systems (via their 
common English legal heritage); civil law jurisdictions such as Germany and France do not.  
The judiciary is the branch of government responsible for administering justice and is made 
up of judges appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the Attorney-General.  The 
Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary (and the most senior of the New Zealand Supreme 
Court judges).  The other two branches of government are the legislature (Parliament) and 
the executive, being the monarch and ministers of the Crown in respect of New Zealand, 
commonly called the government.  At the apex of the New Zealand court hierarchy is the 
Supreme Court (M ori: Te K ti Matua o Aotearoa), the court of final appeal.  The Supreme 
Court only hears appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeal to which it has granted its 
leave to appeal.  A court of final appeal is the final forum for legal redress within a judicial 
system.  The Privy Council (formally: the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, established 
pursuant to the Judicial Committee Act 1833 (UK) to hear legal petitions to the Monarch in 
Council) served as New Zealand’s court of final appeal from the assumption of sovereignty 
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over New Zealand by the British Crown until 1 July 2004, when (pursuant to the SCA) the 
Supreme Court replaced the Privy Council as New Zealand’s court of final appeal. 
Research Design 
As stated above, the aim of this study is to assess the design of the New Zealand Supreme 
Court complex as an embodiment of judicial aspirations.  This aim is based on the 
assumption that, in response to its briefing process, the architecture of the Supreme Court 
complex is a legible expression of the aspirations of the New Zealand judicial system at the 
beginning of the 21st century, an assumption based in turn on the theories of Goodsell, 
Edelman, Lasswell, Arnheim and Gusfield.  Accordingly, this study’s predominant mode of 
investigation is a qualitative case study of the Court’s architecture.  The Supreme Court 
complex provides a valuable opportunity to evaluate this study’s underlying assumption 
given the clear expression of the judicial aspirations for the Court within the SCA, the court’s 
recent design and construction, and the accessibility of documentation and persons 
connected with the briefing and design of the project.  This approach has been chosen due 
to the following salient characteristics of case studies: 
1. A focus on a single case in its real-life context; 
2. A capacity to explain (possibly multiple) causal links leading to a particular outcome; 
3. The importance of theory development in the framing of the study; 
4. The use of multiple sources of information in order to investigate the study’s aim 
from a number of angles; and 
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5. The ability for findings from the case study to inform a more generalised theoretical 
position.3 
The strategy employed in this research is qualitative in nature in that it seeks to interpret 
information gathered via the case study analysis together with archival documentation and 
interviews with key informants in order to assess the expression of judicial aspirations in the 
Court’s architecture.  However, given the nature and dynamic complexity of the institution 
and building studied, there are a number of limitations on the information available to the 
researcher and thus the extent to which conclusions can be drawn.  For example, the impacts 
of personal design preferences, confidential security considerations, budgetary constraints, 
and matters of political expediency on the design of the Court were not able to be explored. 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. 
Chapter I  – Introduct ion 
Chapter I introduces the problem of understanding judicial architecture’s role in 
communicating the aspirations of the justice system.  It identifies the New Zealand Supreme 
Court complex as the object of study, the assumption the aspirations of the New Zealand 
justice system at the beginning of the 21st can be discerned through an analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s briefing process and built form, and the design of the research undertaken.  
Chapter  II – The New Zealand Judic ia l  System 
Chapter II provides a brief history of the New Zealand judicial system, outlining New 
Zealand’s judicial growth from a colony with one court and one judge to a fully independent 
                                                
3 See Linda Groat & David Wang, Architectural Research Methods (New York: Wiley, 2002), 346. 
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state with a mature and complex judicial system.  The genesis of the Supreme Court as New 
Zealand’s court of final appeal is described in detail before briefly examining the role of the 
Supreme Court in New Zealand’s constitutional and legal framework, particularly in relation 
to the rule of law and Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi in New Zealand jurisprudence.   
Chapter  III – Express ive  Meaning in Judic ia l  Archi tec ture 
Chapter III introduces a number of concepts and theoretical positions relating to the study 
of judicial architecture which support the assumption that judicial architecture communicates 
judicial aspirations, including Goodsell’s study of the social meaning of civic architecture, the 
work of Edelman, Lasswell, Arnheim and Gusfield on the use of symbolism in architecture, 
and studies on the role judicial architecture plays within the justice system by Garapon and 
the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia.   
Chapter IV – Brie f ing the Supreme Court  Projec t  
The aim of Chapter IV is to assess the judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court as these are 
evinced through the SCA and the translation of the judicial aspirations expressed in that 
legislation into requirements within the Supreme Court complex’s briefing documents.   
Chapter V – The Architec ture o f  the Supreme Court  Complex 
Chapter V describes the architecture of the Supreme Court complex, drawing on the built 
form, archival research, and interviews with the complex’s architects, Warren and Mahoney.   
Chapter VI – Represent ing Just i ce  
With the understanding of the role judicial architecture plays in communicating judicial 
aspirations garnered in Chapters II and III, drawing on the understanding of the Supreme 
Court’s judicial aspirations expressed in the SCA and ancillary documentation gathered in 
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Chapter IV, and utilising the Supreme Court complex case study described in Chapter V, 
Chapter VI of this thesis assesses the Supreme Court complex as embodiment of judicial 
aspirations.  The works of a number of theorists assist in understanding the Supreme Court 
complex’s architectural expressions of concepts of judicial independence, history and 
tradition; the indigenous nature of the Supreme Court; and the Court’s role in upholding the 
rule of law and sovereignty of Parliament, including: 
• Trapeznik & McLean (in relation to built heritage conservation and national identity); 
• Bell & Lyall (landscape and national identity); 
• Pati, Bose & Zimring (“openness” in judicial architecture); and 
• Barnstone and Resnik & Curtis (both relating to transparency in architecture). 
Chapter VII -  Conclusion 
Chapter VII concludes this work, drawing together the study’s key findings and identifying 
areas warranting further investigation. 
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II.  
The New Zealand Judicial System 
 
In a study aiming to better understand how judicial aspirations are expressed in judicial 
architecture, some knowledge of the New Zealand judicial system and its architecture is 
necessary.  The aim of Chapter II is to provide that background by sketching the history of 
New Zealand’s judicial system and describing in detail the establishment of the Supreme 
Court as New Zealand’s court of final appeal.  A brief explanation of the role of the Supreme 
Court in New Zealand’s constitutional and legal framework follows, particularly in relation to 
the rule of law and Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand jurisprudence.  A summary of the 
extant knowledge relating to judicial architecture in New Zealand is provided, illustrating the 
parallels between the development of the hierarchy of courts and the architecture of 
courthouses in New Zealand.   
The New Zealand Court System 
The model for New Zealand’s judicial system was part of the system of government 
imported directly from England with the cession of sovereignty to the British Crown under 
the Treaty of Waitangi.  The New Zealand judicial system is, for the most part, a creature of 
statute; although the High Court enjoys what is known as an inherent jurisdiction, the 
balance of the court hierarchy was created by Parliament to fulfil subservient and appellate 
roles within the constitutional separation of powers.4  While the British Crown initially 
sought to regulate and police the activities of European settlers from its New South Wales 
                                                
4 See the discussion regarding the constitutional role of the Supreme Court beginning on page 40. 
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colony, the challenges of distance and time involved in doing so precluded the efficient 
administration of justice in New Zealand.  As early as 1841 New Zealand’s first permanent 
sitting court, the Supreme Court (forerunner to today’s High Court), was created by colonial 
Government ordinance (Ill. 1) with Chief Justice William Martin being New Zealand’s first 
(and at that time only) appointed judge (Ill. 2).  A second judge, Mr Justice Henry Chapman, 
was appointed in 1844.  The Supreme Court sat initially only in Auckland (Ill. 3), travelling to 
other settlements on circuit, but Supreme Courts were later established in other significant 
settler locales.  From the very beginning, the Privy Council sat at the apex of our judicial 
system as court of final appeal to hear appeals from the Supreme Court.  
Courts inferior to the Supreme Court were established by the colonial Legislative Council as 
they became necessary.  The Court of Requests and Court of Petty Sessions were established 
in 1842 and a temporary Court of Appeals (comprising the Governor and members of the 
Executive Council sitting on an ad hoc basis) was established in 1846.  Resident Magistrates’ 
Courts (the forerunners to today’s District Courts) were also established in 1846, being the 
first New Zealand courts with permanent seats in the nascent provinces.  Within 20 years of 
the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi the legal landscape had evolved considerably.  In 1858 
the Court of Requests and Court of Petty Sessions were dissolved and replaced by District 
Courts pursuant to the District Courts Act 1858.  A Court of Appeal comprised of Supreme 
Court judges replaced the Court of Appeals in 1862 but was still convened only when the 
case load required.  Residents Magistrates’ Courts became known simply as Magistrates’ 
Courts in 1893 and District Courts (which became redundant due to jurisdictional overlaps 
with the Supreme Court and Magistrates’ Courts) were abolished in 1909.  
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This court structure served New Zealand until 1957 when the Judicature Amendment Act 
1957 created the first permanent Court of Appeal with dedicated judges independent of the 
Supreme Court.  In 1978 the question of whether New Zealand ought to retain rights of 
appeal to the Privy Council was considered by a Royal Commission on the Courts5 which 
recommended that domestic reforms to the judicial system be made before any move to end 
those rights be initiated.  The recommendations of the Royal Commission that the 
Magistrates’ Courts be renamed District Courts and the Supreme Court be renamed the High 
Court were adopted by Parliament in 1980.6  Over the years a number of other courts and 
tribunals were created to deal with specialised jurisdictions, such as the Maori Land Court in 
1865 (originally called the Native Land Court), the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, the Planning 
Tribunal in 1977 (renamed the Environment Court in 1996), the Family Court in 1981, and 
the Employment Court in 1991. 
The Genesis of the New Zealand Supreme Court 
The patriation of New Zealand’s court of final appeal became official government policy in 
1987 under the 4th Labour government, spearheaded by the Minister of Justice, Geoffrey 
Palmer.  The Law Commission considered alternatives to appeals to the Privy Council in its 
1989 report The Structure of the Courts,7 recommending that a Supreme Court be established 
above the High Court, with the extinguishment of rights of appeal to the Privy Council.  A 
change of government after the 1990 general election heralded a change in government 
policy, with the 4th National government moving the idea of abolishing rights of appeal to  
                                                
5  D. S. Beattie, et al., Report of Royal Commission on the Courts, AJHR, H.2. (Wellington, New Zealand: 1978). 
6 See Judicature Amendment Act 1980. 
7 New Zealand Law Commission, The Structure of the Courts, NZLC R7, AJHR E.31D (Wellington, New Zealand: 
1989). 
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the Privy Council to the back burner, suggesting that such constitutional change might be 
possible, but only once New Zealand’s appellate court structure were strengthened and then 
only if to do so would be fiscally neutral.  A return to power in 1999 saw the 5th Labour 
government revive discussion around the desirability of continued appeals to the Privy 
Council.  The Solicitor-General, John McGrath,8 issued a report entitled Appeals to the Privy 
Council: Report of the Solicitor-General to the Cabinet Strategy Committee on Issues of Termination and 
Court Structure9 which recommended abolishing rights of appeal to Privy Council and 
replacing them with a single right of appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal. 
This report was followed in April 1996 by the introduction of the New Zealand Court 
Structure Bill, which included provisions abolishing appeals to the Privy Council. 
Reshaping New Zealand’s Appellate Structure 
While the New Zealand Court Structure Bill did not proceed, by the late 1990s the push to 
patriate our court of final appeal had gained momentum.  In December 2000 the Attorney-
General and Associate Minister of Justice, the Hon. Margaret Wilson, issued a discussion 
document on the matter, Reshaping New Zealand’s Appeal Structure.10  The introduction to the 
report recognised New Zealand’s long-standing reliance on the Privy Council, noting that, 
while historically appropriate while New Zealand had been a British colony governed directly 
from London, New Zealand had come a long way since and was by that point in time a 
                                                
8 Hon. Justice Sir John McGrath became a member of the Supreme Court bench on 4 May 2005. 
9 Office of the Solicitor-General, Appeals to the Privy Council: Report of the Solicitor-General to the Cabinet Strategy 
Committee on Issues of Termination and Court Structure (Wellington: Government Printer, 1995). 
10 Office of the Attorney-General, Discussion Paper: Reshaping New Zealand’s Appeal Structure (Wellington: 
Government Printer, 2000). 
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“fully independent nation with a unique national identity.”11  Ending appeals to the Privy 
Council seemed, in the Attorney-General’s view, “inevitable” and necessary for creating an 
indigenous justice system which truly represented the nation’s values and provided an 
inclusive and enduring appeal structure providing access to justice for all New Zealanders.12 
The discussion paper suggested a number of reasons for ending rights of appeal to Privy 
Council:13 
1. In terms of New Zealand’s national identity and independence, ending appeals to the 
Privy Council would recognise New Zealand’s constitutional status as an 
independent nation, reinforce New Zealand’s confidence in its judiciary, and ensure 
final appeals were made by New Zealand-resident judges conversant with New 
Zealand society; 
2. Many Commonwealth countries had already abolished links with the Privy Council 
(Ill. 4 & 5);14 
3. Few New Zealand cases were heard by the Privy Council;15 
4. New Zealand’s changing international relationships meant that New Zealand’s social 
and economic focus had shifted from Europe to Asia and the Pacific so ending 
                                                
11 Attorney-General, Reshaping New Zealand’s Appeal Structure, Introduction. 
12 Attorney-General, Reshaping New Zealand’s Appeal Structure, Introduction.  This view echoed that of Sir Robin 
Cooke (as he then was) in his address delivered at the 1987 New Zealand Law Conference, The New Zealand 
Legal Identity, published in (1987) 3 Canterbury Law Review 171, 182-3, quoted at ibid., para 2. 
13 Attorney-General, Reshaping New Zealand’s Appeal Structure, paras 5-14 
14 For example Canada (1933 and 1949), South Africa (1950), Australia (1975-1986), and Hong Kong (1997). 
Pakistan, Ireland, India, Malaysia, and Singapore had also already abolished appeals to the Privy Council, and 
Caribbean nations were at the time discussing replacing appeals to PC with a Regional Court of Appeal.  Ibid., 
para 8. 
15 Only 81 New Zealand cases were heard by the Privy Council between 1990 and 1999. Ibid., para 9. 
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appeals would be unlikely to have a significant impact on business, nor isolate New 
Zealand from the international legal scene given New Zealand’s active participation 
in international legal organisations; and  
5. Although the Privy Council was essentially paid for by the United Kingdom taxpayer, 
the physical distance to London made taking appeals to the Privy Council 
prohibitively costly and therefore practicably inaccessible. 
The paper also identified a number of arguments in support of retention, principally that the 
Privy Council remained a cost-effective way of providing an extra level of appeal in the NZ 
court hierarchy given that the costs associated were primarily borne by the United Kingdom 
and that the Privy Council provided better quality decisions and important detachment from 
local influences.16 
A number of issues of specific concern to Māori were identified by Reshaping New Zealand’s 
Appeal Structure, including the symbolic link to the Sovereign afforded by the Privy Council 
and the perception by some Māori that they received a more favourable hearing from the 
Privy Council than the Court of Appeal.17  However, the paper suggested that the number of 
appeals to the Privy Council concerning Māori interests was actually very limited, suggesting 
that the importance of the right of appeal to the Privy Council was of largely symbolic rather 
than practical value.18  That said, the discussion paper noted that any move to abolish rights 
                                                
16 Ibid., paras 15-18.  The discussion paper noted that no qualitative evidence supported a view of better quality 
of decision making by the Privy Council and that detachment from the influences of local environment was 
seen by some to be detrimental as judges making decisions were largely unfamiliar with New Zealand society. 
17 Ibid., paras 19-24. 
18 The discussion paper noted that in the 20th century there were approximately 13 appeals to the Privy Council 
which were of relevance to M ori.  Most appeals affecting M ori rights and interests were dealt with by the 
New Zealand courts.  Ibid., para 22. 
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of appeal to the Privy Council would require the incorporation of recognition of Māori 
interests and values, suggesting that cognisance be taken of how Māori interests and values 
might be recognised and provided for within the New Zealand legal system (including greater 
representation of Māori within the justice system); how Māori values might be acknowledged 
within the substantive law;  how processes might be incorporated to give the court of appeal 
access to expert advice on Māori values; and whether overseas judges might sit on the bench 
of the court of final appeal. 
At this point in time, the Government’s intention seems to have been that the Court of 
Appeal would fulfil the role of court of final appeal when rights of appeal to the Privy 
Council ended.  The guiding principles ultimately suggested by the Attorney-General in 
considering the reshaping of the appeal structure were: 
• Recognising the Court of Appeal as the New Zealand’s final appellate court; 
• Promoting reflective development of the law; 
• Recognising M ori values and the interests of M ori under the Treaty of Waitangi; 
• Reflecting the nature of New Zealand society; 
• Economic viability 
• Meeting the needs of the community; 
• Maintaining the independence of the judiciary; 
• The effective use of resources; 
• Simplicity; 
• Efficient administration; and 
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• Access to justice.19 
A number of these principles (indicated in emphasis above) bear direct importance to this 
study as expressions of judicial aspiration which resurface time and again in the development 
of the Supreme Court. 
The discussion paper outlined three options for reshaping New Zealand’s appeal structure 
based on a presumption of one level of appeal above the High Court,20 but public 
submissions on the report highlighted the desirability of maintaining two tiers of appeal 
above that level.21  Policy attention therefore moved to the possibility of a New Zealand 
Supreme Court. 
Replacing the Privy Council: A New Supreme Court 
In November 2001, Attorney-General Margaret Wilson established a Ministerial Advisory 
Group (MAG) on the potential purpose, structure, composition and role of a New Zealand 
court of final appeal.  The MAG was chaired by the Solicitor-General, Terence Arnold QC, 
and included in its membership Christine Grice (President of the New Zealand Law Society), 
Shane Jones (chairperson of Te Ohu Kai Moana/Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission), 
Dr Ngata Love (member of the Law Commission and Professor of M ori Business   
                                                
19 Ibid., para 25 and Appendix 1.  
20 The three options were one level of appeal to the Court of Appeal; two levels of appeal within the Court of 
Appeal; or an appeal division within the High Court.  Ibid., paras 27-41 
21 Office of the Attorney-General, Report of the Advisory Group.  Replacing the Privy Council: A New Supreme Court.  
(Wellington: Government Printer, 2002), para 64. 
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Victoria University of Wellington) and Hon Justice Bruce Robertson (President of the Law 
Commission).  The President of the Court of Appeal, Rt. Hon Sir Ivor Richardson, acted as 
a special advisor to the Group.22  Given the earlier discussion document’s identification of 
M ori as having specific issues to be addressed in any reform of the appellate structure, it is 
worth noting that five of the 14 standing members of the Group had backgrounds 
representing significant M ori interests, including the Waitangi Tribunal, Te Ohu Kai 
Moana/Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, and the M ori Congress.  The MAG’s 
terms of reference were seven-fold, the first two of which are directly relevant to the present 
discussion: 
1. The purpose and role of the Final Appeal Court in New Zealand; 
2. How the Court will reflect te ao M ori in its establishment, structure and processes; 
3. The jurisdiction of the Court; 
4. The composition and number of judges appointed to the Court, including whether 
judges from different jurisdictions should be appointed; 
5. The role and responsibilities of the Head of the Final Appeal Court; 
6. Where the Court should be located; and 
7. Any other matter that was relevant to advise on the model for the Final Appeal 
Court.23 
The Group was not asked to comment on the desirability or otherwise of abolishing appeals 
to the Privy Council, only how an appellate court above the Court of Appeal might be 
                                                
22 Ibid., Appendix A. 
23 Ibid., Appendix B. 
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structured.24  The MAG reported back to the Attorney-General in April 2002.  The Attorney-
General’s Foreword to the published report noted the Group’s conclusion that replacing the 
Privy Council with a Supreme Court should improve accessibility to New Zealand’s highest 
court (physically and jurisdictionally) and improve the understanding of local conditions by 
judges on that court.25  Replacing the Privy Council: A New Supreme Court made a number of 
detailed recommendations for a New Zealand Supreme Court, including the following: 
1. The highest court in New Zealand’s justice system should be called the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand.26 
2. A New Zealand-based Supreme Court would be an important, visible and relatively 
accessible institution27  and should better reflect the diversity of New Zealand society 
than the Privy Council, with the composition of the Court being such as to ensure a 
wide range of skills and experience, including a sound knowledge of tikanga M ori.28 
3. The Supreme Court should perform a traditional appellate court role – error 
correction and clarification and development of the law.29  The statutory criteria for 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court should allow an appeal on a matter that raises a 
significant issue concerning the Treaty of Waitangi or tikanga M ori.30 
                                                
24 Ibid., para 1.1. 
25 Ibid., ‘Foreword’ and para 1.2. 
26 Ibid., para 1.3. 
27 Ibid., para 39. 
28 Ibid., para 58. 
29 Ibid., para 41. 
30 Ibid., paras 62 and 152. 
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4. In terms of physical accommodation, the Supreme Court should be located in 
Wellington, which would reflect the symbolic importance of the Court by situating it 
in the capital city and close to the centre of government.31  There is a preference for 
the Court to be located in the former High Court premises in Ballance Street, 
although the principal consideration should be providing a suitable work 
environment.32 
5. Consideration could be given to a different layout for the Supreme Court, for 
example, along the lines of the current layout of the Privy Council, which is semi-
circular and with judges and counsel at the same level.  The layout should reflect that 
it is a New Zealand Court.33 
Like the Attorney-General’s guiding principles for judicial system reform in Reshaping New 
Zealand’s Appeal Structure, the MAG’s recommendations are significant expressions of judicial 
aspiration of the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court Act 2003 
Constitutional change, usually a glacial process, came relatively quickly after the release of the 
MAG’s report.  The Group’s recommendations were considered by Cabinet and directly 
informed the Supreme Court Bill, which was introduced to Parliament on 9 December 
                                                
31 Ibid., para 166. 
32 Ibid., para 167. 
33 Ibid., para 168. 
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2002.34  The Supreme Court Bill adopted as its overarching objective the improvement of 
access to justice through: 
• Improving the accessibility of New Zealand’s highest court; and 
• Broadening the range, and increasing the volume, of appeals considered by New 
Zealand’s highest court; and 
• Using the greater understanding of local conditions of the judges of New Zealand’s 
highest court.35 
These aspirations found direct expression in the legislative purpose of the Supreme Court, 
found in section 3 of the SCA: 
3 Purpose 
(1) The purpose of this Act is— 
(a) to establish within New Zealand a new court of final appeal comprising New 
Zealand judges— 
(i) to recognise that New Zealand is an independent nation with its own history 
and traditions; and 
(ii) to enable important legal matters, including legal matters relating to the Treaty 
of Waitangi, to be resolved with an understanding of New Zealand conditions, 
history, and traditions; and 
(iii) to improve access to justice; and 
(b) to provide for the court's jurisdiction and related matters; and 
(c) to end appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from decisions of 
New Zealand courts; and 
(d) to make related amendments to certain enactments relating to courts or judicial 
proceedings. 
                                                
34 Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-1), Explanatory Note, p 2; Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-2), Commentary, p 3. 
35 Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-1), Explanatory Note, p 1. 
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(2) Nothing in this Act affects New Zealand's continuing commitment to the rule of law 
and the sovereignty of Parliament. 
As it is suggested that section 3 is a key expression of the judicial aspirations of the Supreme 
Court, an in-depth understanding section 3 is of fundamental importance to the present 
study and so will form part of Chapter IV, Briefing the Supreme Court Project. 
The New Zealand Supreme Court sat (ceremonially) for first time on 1 July 2004, in 
temporary accommodation within the Wellington High Court premises.36  In his 
commemoratory speech, Chris Dalow, President of the New Zealand Law Society, expressed 
the key roles of the Court in valuing and safeguarding the rule of law, recognising judicially 
the cultural values of M ori and other ethnic minorities, preserving the concept of open 
justice, and in ensuring that every citizen has an educated understanding of the role of the 
judiciary, the relationships between the courts and other organs of government, and an 
understanding of the courts and other processes.37  The Chief Justice’s speech was perhaps 
illustrative of the mood of the judiciary on the dawn of what the Attorney-General called 
“our legal ‘coming of age’ ”.38  As head and representative of the judiciary, Her Honour 
noted that the institution of the Supreme Court was “greater than the sum of its parts” and 
                                                
36 The Supreme Court continued to sit in the temporary premises in the Wellington High Court building until 
the opening of the new Supreme Court building on 18 January 2010. 
37 Chris Dalow, “New Zealand Law Society President’s Address on the Ceremonial Sitting of the Supreme 
Court” (1 July 2004).  http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/speeches-and-papers/#speechpaper-list-first-
sitting  
38 Margaret Wilson, “Address of the Attorney-General of the First Sitting of the Supreme Court” (1 July 2004).  
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/speeches-and-papers/#speechpaper-list-first-sitting  
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that the judges’ role was to serve an idea “much bigger than all of us.”39  The Chief Justice 
went on to say: 
What we should celebrate is the aspiration for the delivery of justice which has prompted the creation 
of the Court.  Those aspirations have been with us from the very beginning.  In February 1840 at 
Waitangi much of the debate was about law and its administration.  I doubt whether any country was 
founded with such expectations of law as ours.  The creation of a final court of appeal in New 
Zealand furthers those aspirations for justice.40 
The Constitutional Role of the Supreme Court 
In order to fully understand the constitutional role of the Supreme Court, one must 
understand the nature of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements.  As Palmer points out, 
“[a] nation’s constitution is the set of rules that governs the exercise of public power.  It 
determines who exercises power and how they do it.”41  Palmer contends that “[p]ublic 
power is still the most awesome human force in the nation state of New Zealand,” 42 a force 
that strongly influences the shape of New Zealand society: 
[T]he views of a government can still exert a powerful pull, or push, on the values and beliefs of New 
Zealanders – on our social identities, relationships and cultures.  Our constitution, in governing the 
behaviour of the branches of New Zealand government that exercise public power, significantly 
affects the economy, polity, society and culture that constitutes New Zealand collectively. 43 
                                                
39 Sian Elias, “Speech at the Special Sitting of the New Zealand Supreme Court” (1 July 2004).  
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/speeches-and-papers/#speechpaper-list-first-sitting  
40 Elias, “Supreme Court Special Sitting Speech.” 
41 Matthew S. R. Palmer, The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution.  (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2008), 234. 
42 Ibid., 234. 
43 Ibid. 
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New Zealand’s constitution is found not in one all-encompassing document but rather in a 
variety of sources, some codified, others not, including the Constitution, Electoral and 
Judicature Acts;44 the prerogative powers of the Queen;45 decisions of the courts (especially 
those of the Supreme Court on constitutional matters); and constitutional conventions such 
as the rule of law and the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.  The Treaty of Waitangi is 
also recognised as being of constitutional significance as “a basic constitutional document,”46 
being of the “highest constitutional significance,”47 and a “founding document of 
government in New Zealand.”48 
Under the doctrine of the separation of powers, the judiciary is one of the three branches of 
constitutional government, working alongside but independently of the legislature and the 
executive.  As New Zealand’s court of final appeal, the Supreme Court sits at the apex of the 
judiciary with the Chief Justice as its head (Ill. 6).  The constitutional function of the New 
Zealand judicial system is to administer justice by interpreting and applying the law, including 
enforcing the criminal law, resolving civil disputes amongst citizens, upholding the rights of 
the individual, and ensuring that government agencies stay within the law; the disputes 
resolved by the judiciary affect virtually every aspect of New Zealand life.  The Supreme 
                                                
44 See Judicature Act 1908, Constitution Act 1986, and Electoral Act 1993. 
45 See ‘Governor-General’ in Cabinet Office, Cabinet Manual 2008 (Wellington: Government Printer, 2008) 
http://www.cabinetmanual.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/node/22#1.8 
46 Waitangi Tribunal, Ngai Tahu Report (Wai 27) (Wellington: Government Printer, 1991) 4.4.4, cited in Palmer, 
The Treaty of Waitangi, 234. 
47 New Zealand M ori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513, 516 (per Lord Woolf), cited in Palmer, The 
Treaty of Waitangi, 234. 
48 Sir Kenneth Keith, ‘On the Constitution of New Zealand: An Introduction to the Foundations of the 
Current Form of Government’, in Cabinet Office, Cabinet Manual 2008 (Wellington: Government Printer, 2008) 
http://www.cabinetmanual.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/  
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Court is not concerned with the day-to-day administration of justice per se, but rather is 
reserved for correcting errors in the judgments of inferior courts and in the clarification and 
development of the law.  Thus it maintains a supervisory watch over the judicial system as a 
whole.  For this reason, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court may only be granted where the 
appeal raises issues that involve matters of general or public importance, general commercial 
significance, or the occurrence (or possible occurrence) of substantial miscarriages of 
justice.49  Significantly, the Act specifically recognises a significant issue relating to the Treaty 
of Waitangi as a matter of general or public importance per se.50 
Looking back at the purposes of the Supreme Court as stated in section 3 of the SCA,51 there 
are two aspects of New Zealand’s constitution that must be explained in order to fully 
comprehend the role of the Supreme Court within it: the doctrines of the rule of law and  
 
Ill. 6 The New Zealand Court Hierarchy since 1 July 2004 
                                                
49 Supreme Court Act 2003, s 13(2). 
50 Supreme Court Act 2003, s 13(3). 
51 See p 37. 
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Parliamentary sovereignty, and the constitutional status of the Treaty of Waitangi.  
Understanding these two fundamental matters is essential to understanding the reasons 
Parliament saw fit to expressly incorporate them into the purpose section of the Supreme 
Court’s enabling legislation. 
The Rule o f  Law 
An essential function of the judicial system (and of the Supreme Court in particular) is that it 
is responsible for upholding a fundamental tenet of our constitution, the rule of law.  A 
narrow definition of the rule of law requires that a state (acting through government officials) 
and its citizens are bound by and must act consistently with the law.52  Tamanaha identifies 
two functions of the rule of law: 1) to impose legal restraints on government officials; and 2) 
to maintain order and co-ordinate behaviour and transactions between citizens.53  Inherently 
problematic in part 1 of this formulation of the rule of law is that the state makes the very 
laws to which it is required to adhere.  Indeed in New Zealand the state (through Parliament, 
its body of elected representatives) is the sole and supreme law maker.54  This situation is 
ameliorated through the separation of powers – the institutionalised distance between law 
maker (the legislature), law enforcer (the executive) and arbitrator of the law (the judiciary).  
It is crucial to the operation of the rule of law that there be an institutionalised body with 
ultimate say over the interpretation and application of the law independent from the bodies 
                                                
52 Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law.  St. John’s University School of Law Legal Studies 
Paper #07-0082.  (New York: St John’s University, 2007) 3.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012051 
53 Ibid. 
54 The sovereignty of Parliament is expressed in s 15 of the Constitution Act 1986 and recognised in s 3(2) of 
the Supreme Court Act 2003.  The inclusion of this provision was recommended by the Justice and Electoral 
Select Committee in its report on the Supreme Court Bill in order to reinforce that the Supreme Court would 
have no ability to review the legislature’s power to enact laws such as that the US Supreme Court holds. 
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making and enforcing the same.  In New Zealand this body is the judicial system, from the 
most specialised of tribunals to the Supreme Court.   
Judicial independence is a cornerstone of the separation of powers.  Under the Constitution 
Act 1986 judges are independent from the legislature and executive, holding office at the will 
of the sovereign (as opposed to that of the executive) with security of tenure and 
remuneration.55  Judges are appointed by the sovereign on the recommendation of the 
Attorney-General (acting independently of political considerations) and can only be removed 
from office through function of age or by the Sovereign following an address from 
Parliament (on grounds of incapacity or misconduct). Constitutional conventions prevent the 
executive interfering with the judiciary, either directly or indirectly by, for example, adverse 
comment on case outcomes; judges can only be directed by Parliament through duly enacted 
legislation.  Immunity from being sued in their private capacity in respect of actions taken 
against them in their professional role protects judges from civilian interference.  
A principal benefit of the rule of law is that it creates a level of certainty, predictability and 
security in interactions between citizens and the state and citizens inter se, enabling people to 
know in advance the extents of actions they may freely undertake without fear of legal 
sanction or restriction, restricting arbitrary or wilful actions by government officials, 
facilitating economic development, and enabling a sense of justice in that the law is seen to 
be applicable to everyone equally.  However, the rule of law does not exist per se.  Tamanaha 
explains that for the rule of law to exist the state and its citizens must share an orientation 
that believes in and is committed to the rule of law, taking it for granted as a necessary, 
                                                
55 See s 23 and s 24 Constitution Act 1986. 
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proper and existing part of their political-legal system.  Further, it requires the presence of an 
institutionalised and independent judiciary and existence of a robust legal profession and 
legal tradition committed to upholding the rule of law.56  This is significant in appreciating 
the crucial role of the Supreme Court in upholding the rule of law: it sits at the apex of the 
judicial branch of the separation of powers; it provides physical access to the machinery of 
justice; it hears cases in open court and delivers publicly available judgments providing 
transparency in the administration of the law; and its courthouse provides a physical, 
concrete representation of notions of “Justice” to the other branches of government and the 
community at large. 
The Treaty o f  Waitangi  
As noted above, the Treaty of Waitangi is now considered by many to be New Zealand’s 
founding document and a living text within New Zealand’s constitutional framework.57  This 
is significant because, as discussed in Chapter I, one the judicial aspirations of the Supreme 
Court is to resolve New Zealand legal disputes with an understanding of their context, 
including the Treaty of Waitangi.  It is suggested that, as the Treaty is one facet of the 
constitutional lens through which all Crown exercise of public power must be viewed, an 
understanding of the status and force of the Treaty in the New Zealand legal system is 
essential in order to fully understand this aspect of the Supreme Court’s purpose.  
                                                
56 Tamanaha, The Rule of Law, 13-15. 
57 See, for example, Sir Robin Cooke, ‘Introduction’ (1990) 14 New Zealand Universities Law Review 1, where 
Cooke describes the Treaty as being “simply the most important document in New Zealand’s history.” 
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The British Crown assumed sovereignty over New Zealand through the signing of the Treaty 
of Waitangi. 58  At first the Treaty did not make much difference to the status quo, however 
with the steady influx of settlers the Crown asserted its sovereignty more and more and it 
became clear that Treaty rights and protections would be relied upon by M ori to protect 
their interests.  One rule of international law (then and now) which probably escaped the 
M ori signatories is that a treaty has no legal effect within a domestic jurisdiction unless and 
until it is incorporated into domestic law; thus the Treaty did not have the force of law in the 
new New Zealand legal system.  While M ori may not have understood the limited 
justiciability of the Treaty of Waitangi due to its legal status, they nevertheless sought the 
assistance of the early New Zealand courts to resolve alleged breaches of the Crown’s Treaty 
promises. The Treaty first came before the New Zealand Courts in 1847 where the first 
Chief Justice of the colony Justice Chapman noted that the Treaty “does not assert either in 
doctrine or precedent anything new and unsettled,”59 that is to say, the rights of M ori in 
relation to their lands were not affected by the Treaty, the Treaty simply explicated the 
common law status quo.  This view did not persist however.  Recognition of the extant nature 
of M ori rights and the protection of the same by the Treaty was subsequently eroded by 
the courts until Chief Justice James Prendergast infamously declared in his Wi Parata v Bishop 
of Wellington (1877) judgment that the Treaty, “so far as it purported to cede the sovereignty 
of New Zealand, it was a simple nullity for no body politic existed capable of making cession 
                                                
58 The background to the signing of the Treaty and the semantic differences between the English and M ori 
texts of the Treaty are constitutionally significant, but not of present concern.  Three seminal texts may assist 
readers unfamiliar with the history of the Treaty of Waitangi: Claudia Orange’s The Treaty of Waitangi 2nd ed. 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2011); Michael King’s The Penguin History of New Zealand (Wellington: 
Penguin, 2003); and Palmer’s The Treaty of Waitangi. 
59 R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 388, 390. 
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of sovereignty.”60  Prendergast CJ’s views on the legal status of the Treaty permeated the 
New Zealand legal system for the next century, during which time a number of significant 
decisions of the courts eroded or outright rejected the legal status and force of the Treaty.61 
For M ori, however, decades of denial (or avoidance) of the Treaty’s force at law by judges 
and the Crown did not stop repeated attempts to gain redress from the Crown via the courts.  
Access to the courts (including the Privy Council) remained important as a means of 
obtaining audience with and relief from the Crown with whom they had signed the Treaty.62  
In the 1970s a political shift in New Zealand became evident with protests by M ori and 
P keh  alike demanding that the Treaty be honoured, an attitudinal shift to which 
legislators responded.63  In 1975 the 3rd Labour government established the Waitangi 
Tribunal.  A significant step was taken when, in 1986, Parliament enacted the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986, which for the first time in New Zealand legislation referred to the 
“principles” of the Treaty of Waitangi, requiring those acting under the Act to perform their 
duties in accordance with those principles.64  Similar provisions were incorporated into 
subsequent legislation, for example, the Conservation Act 1987, the Education Act 1989, the 
                                                
60 Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72. 
61 See, for example, Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) NZPCC 371; (1902) AC 561; Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of 
Wellington (1902) 21 NZLR 655 (CA); Baldick v Jackson (1911) 13 GLR 398; Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General 
(1912) 32 NZLR 321; Waipapakura v Hempton (1914) 33 NZLR 1065; Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District 
Maori Land Court (1941) AC 308; Re the Bed of the Wanganui River [1963] NZLR 673; and In re the Ninety Mile Beach 
[1955] NZLR 419. 
62 The notion of “the Crown” is complex.  At first the Crown meant “the British Crown” i.e. Queen Victoria 
and her Ministers; as New Zealand gained responsible government it came to mean “the Crown in respect of 
New Zealand” i.e. the Monarch and his or her New Zealand executive.  See Janine A. D. Hayward, “In Search 
of a Treaty Partner: Who, or What, is the Crown?” (PhD diss., Victoria University of Wellington, 1995). 
http://hdl.handle.net/10063/744 
63 Dame Whina Cooper’s 1975 hikoi (land march) and the 1978 Bastion Point occupation are but two large-
scale examples of this shift. 
64 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 9.  
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Crown Minerals Act 1991 and the Public Records Act 2005.  After a century of dismissal, 
these provisions opened the floodgates for fresh consideration of the Treaty by the New 
Zealand courts, albeit consideration based on the essence of the Treaty rather than its strict 
legal status.  The first case to consider the principles of the Treaty was New Zealand M ori 
Council v Attorney-General65 (the “Lands Case”), a case which turned on the interpretation of 
section 9 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986.  The Court of Appeal’s judgments66 in 
this case identified a number of Treaty principles based on the “spirit” rather than the strict 
text of the Treaty.  Significant for the present discussion were the principles of partnership 
and active protection; the Court found that the Treaty established a partnership which 
imposed on the partners a duty to act reasonably and in good faith,67 and which required the 
Crown to actively protect those interests of M ori guaranteed by the Treaty.68  Although 
they have each articulated the principles of the Treaty in their own ways, the Crown, 
Parliament and the Waitangi Tribunal have all consistently endorsed these two principles.69 
What though is the force of the Treaty in the 21st century?  Palmer suggests that it remains 
fundamental to our constitution and: 
                                                
65 [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
66 Such was the significance of the Lands case that, while the Court of Appeal reached a unanimous decision, 
each of the five judges who heard the case - Cooke P, Richardson J, Somers J, Casey J, and Bisson J - issued 
separate judgments with the reasons for their decision. 
67 [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 667 (per Cooke P) 
68 [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 664 (per Cooke P) 
69 See, for example, Te Puni Kokiri and Ministry of Justice, Te Whanaungatanga a te Karauna me te M ori: Ng  
tohutohu mo te kawanatanga me ng  tari kawanatanga/Crown-M ori Relationship Instruments: Guidelines and Advice for 
Government and State Sector Agencies (Wellington: Government Printer, 2006), Appendix 3 (Cabinet Approved 
Treaty Statements); Te Ture Whenua M ori Act 1993 (Preamble) and Ng ti T rangitukua Claims Settlement 
Act 2006 (s 5); and Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei Claim (Wai 9) (Wellington: 
Government Printer, 1987) 11.10.1 (partnership) and Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the 
Manukau Claim (Wai 8) (2nd ed., Wellington: Government Printer, 1989) 8.3 (active protection). 
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[...] is best understood as representing an explicit commitment to the health of the relationships 
between the Crown, M ori and other New Zealanders.  This is the common re-interpretation of the 
general meaning of the Treaty that has emerged from constitutional dialogue between the Waitangi 
Tribunal, the Court of Appeal, Parliament and the executive branch of government since the early 
1970s.70 
Palmer’s view reinforces a long-held view of many M ori that, through the Treaty, there 
exists a direct relationship with the Crown, a relationship accessible through the courts.  For 
many M ori, the ability to take cases to the Privy Council was a key aspect of this 
accessibility.  Although very few appeals of significance to M ori interests were heard by the 
Privy Council between 1840 and the end of the 20th century, the Privy Council represented to 
many M ori a direct link to the Monarch, removed from the influence of daily New Zealand 
life.  It was understandable, therefore, that many groups representing M ori interests were 
concerned when the Government announced its intention to remove rights of appeal to the 
Privy Council.  This situation was clearly in the Government’s mind when creating the 
Supreme Court; as noted in the preceding subsection, the fundamental role of the Treaty in 
New Zealand’s legal system was expressly referenced in the Supreme Court’s enabling 
legislation. 
This section indicates that a purely legalistic analysis of the Treaty gives an incomplete 
understanding of the status and force of the Treaty in New Zealand’s constitutional 
framework.  As Palmer suggests, the key on-going constitutional issue surrounding the 
Treaty is the M ori-Crown relationship established by the Treaty and recognised and 
affirmed by the Waitangi Tribunal, the courts, Parliament and the Crown.  The inclusion of 
                                                
70 Palmer, The Treaty of Waitangi, 24. 
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references to the Treaty in the purpose and leave to appeal criteria sections of the Supreme 
Court Act are express reminders of the role the Supreme Court as the apex of the judicial 
branch of government must play in upholding the Treaty’s constitutional position.71  This is 
significant.  On replacing the Privy Council, the Supreme Court stepped into its shoes 
judicially and symbolically; M ori will continue to look to the courts to clarify and reinforce 
the Treaty principles and the importance of Supreme Court as judicial arbiter of the special 
relationship between M ori and the Crown should not be underestimated. 
New Zealand Judicial Architecture 
Unfortunately, the architectural history of New Zealand’s courthouses is relatively poorly 
understood at present.  Many early New Zealand courthouses are all but lost to the public 
record (particularly in the main commercial centres, for example the original Auckland 
(1841), Wellington (1865) (Ill. 7) and Dunedin (c. 1850) (Ill. 8) Supreme Courts), having been 
replaced and demolished within a decade or two of their openings.  Together with the wealth 
of published information on the early work of government architects,72 the entry of many 
historic courthouses onto the New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT) Register means 
a great deal of information is available on early courthouses, many of which remain in 
operation today.  However, such focused attention has not been given to later examples of 
the typology.  This section gives a brief overview of New Zealand’s judicial architecture from 
                                                
71 See pp. 44 and 82f. 
72 See for example Peter Richardson, “Building the Dominion: Government Architecture in New Zealand, 1840 
– 1922” (Ph.D. diss., University of Canterbury, 1997); Lewis E. Martin, Built for Us. The Work of Government and 
Colonial Architects, 1860s to 1960s (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2004); John Stacpoole, Colonial 
Architecture in New Zealand (Wellington: Reed, 1976); and Rosslyn J. Noonan, By Design: A Brief History of the Public 
Works Department, Ministry of Works 1870 – 1970 (Wellington: Government Printer, 1975). 
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1840 to 2010 based on information currently available, but illustrates that large gaps in 
knowledge exist and further investigation is warranted. 
The stories of the development of the New Zealand justice system and that of New Zealand 
architecture are very similar.  They are both tales of building on what has been handed down 
from a colonial parent in order to find an indigenous way of doing things.  Like the judicial 
system, the New Zealand courthouse typology has its origin in the English legal system.  The 
first New Zealand courthouses were established in areas of high concentration of European 
settlers, particularly in early commercial centres such as Auckland, but also on the 
Coromandel Peninsula and in Central Otago areas where the discovery of gold had led to an 
influx of settler prospectors keen to make their fortunes in the new colony.73  Indeed the 
establishment of courthouses maps the early economic development of the nation – where 
prosperity arose, so did the need for law and order. 
New Zealand’s early courthouses were small, often jointly serving as offices for the 
administrators of the goldfields, regional police barracks and gaols, and post offices, for 
example the former Queenstown courthouse (1880)(Ill. 9).  This multi-purpose functionality 
was borne of necessity in the new colony, but also had its precedents in the combined town 
hall/law court complexes of England and continental Europe found from the Middle Ages 
to the 19th century.74    
                                                
73 For example, the first courthouse in Clyde was a calico and scantling building constructed in 1862, the year 
Clyde was legally proclaimed a goldfield.  See NZHTP “Clyde Courthouse (Former)” 
http://www.historic.org.nz/TheRegister/RegisterSearch/RegisterResults.aspx?RID=2379 
74 For example the Amsterdam Town Hall (since 1808, Royal Palace of the Netherlands) and the English Royal 
Courts of Justice which originally sat in Westminster Hall, part of Westminster Palace.  A dedicated Royal 
Courts of Justice building opened in London in 1882.  See Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis “Representing 
Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-First-Century Courthouses” Proceedings of the American 
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Ill. 7 Former Wellington Supreme Court, c. 1865 
 
Ill. 8 Former Dunedin Supreme Court, c. 1850  
                                                                                                                                            
Philosophical Society (2007) 151(2): 139-183, 155 and Nikolaus Pevsner, A History of Building Types (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1976) 53.   
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The early New Zealand courts were of varied construction, predominantly making use of 
readily available local materials such as kauri in the Coromandel and stone in Central Otago.  
The designs of the early courthouses were relatively consistent however, a consistency most 
easily explained by the near monopoly of the colonial and government architects on the 
design of courthouses.  Henry William Clayton (1823 – 1877) (Ill. 10), appointed New 
Zealand’s first Colonial Architect in 1869, was a prolific designer of early courthouses, 
including the former Reefton (1872), Coromandel (1873)(Ill. 11), Naseby (1875), Napier 
(1875), Rawene (1876) and Akaroa (1878)(Ill. 12) courthouses.75  Martin notes that Clayton 
found little precedent for buildings so small and yet so prestigious, and that, while they were 
mostly constructed in local timber, they were designed to be more formal than other 
“standard plan” buildings he designed, emphasising the “iconic power of simple shapes.”76   
 
 
Ill. 9 Former Queenstown Courthouse and Library 
                                                
75 Stacpoole reports Clayton was the author of at least 16 courthouses during his tenure as Colonial Architect.  
See Stacpoole, Colonial Architecture, 131. 
76 Martin, Built for Us, 16. 
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Ill. 10 William Henry Clayton in 1860 
 
 
 
Ill. 11 Former Coromandel Courthouse and Post Office 
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Ill. 12 Former Akaroa Courthouse 
 
During this era courthouses were also designed by private architects, notably Edward 
Rumsey’s Auckland High (formerly Supreme) Court (1865), a courthouse which remains in 
use today (Ill. 13).  The significance of the Auckland High Court building in the evolution of 
New Zealand’s judicial system and its architecture is evident in its NZHPT Register citation: 
The High Court is nationally significant as an early public building of Gothic Revival style, unusual in 
its scale and level of decoration in 1860s New Zealand. It graphically demonstrates the growing power 
of the state and legal system on a national level, as well as the local importance placed on law and 
order as Auckland was undergoing transformation soon after the third New Zealand - or Waikato - 
War (1863-1864). [...] The building reveals much about nineteenth-century life through its appearance 
and layout, including attitudes to justice, the organisation of legal affairs and relationships between the 
public and the state. The preserved interiors also demonstrate prevailing fashions for decor and 
nineteenth-century craft techniques. [...]  The significance of the building is enhanced by its imposing 
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landmark qualities, and by being one of several structures on their original sites in the Waterloo 
Quadrant and Symonds Street area.77 
Pierre Finch Martineau Burrows (1842 – 1920) paid tribute to his predecessor William 
Clayton’s Government Building (1876) (Ill. 14) in the former Wellington Supreme Court 
building (1880) (Ill. 15) by “repeating the use of arched windows in a rusticated ground floor 
and rectangular windows topped by triangular pediments.”78  Burrows’ courthouse employed 
a Victorian neo-classical style, which, compared with Rumsey’s Auckland courthouse, 
parallels the contemporaneous competition in English architecture between advocates of 
Neo-classical and Gothic Revival styles as the most appropriate for civic architecture.79  The 
Neo-classical Oamaru District Court (1883, designed by local architects Forrester & Lemon) 
(Ill. 16) and Gothic Revival Dunedin High/District Court (1902, designed by John 
Campbell) (Ill. 17) (both still in use as courthouses) also evince this stylistic tension. 
Then, as now, there was a marked difference between the architecture of provincial versus 
urban courthouses.  In the late 19th and early 20th centuries provincial courthouses tended to 
be simple in style and modest in scale and constructed using local materials, particular timber 
(e.g. Warkworth District Court (1880) (Ill. 18)) while (as noted in relation to the Auckland 
High Court above) city courthouses tended to make more of a statement about the 
imposition of colonial government over the fledgling colony.   
  
                                                
77 New Zealand Historic Places Trust, “High Court Building, Auckland”, 
http://www.historic.org.nz/TheRegister/RegisterSearch/RegisterResults.aspx?RID=17 
78 Martin, Built for Us, p. 36. 
79 See Paul Jones, “Architecturing Modern Nations: Architecture and the State” in Gerard Delanty and Engin F. 
Isin (eds.), Handbook of Historical Sociology, London: Sage, 2003, pp. 301-311. 
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Ill. 13 Auckland Supreme Court 
 
 
Ill. 14 W. H. Clayton’s Government Building 
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Ill. 15 P. F. M. Burrow’s Wellington Supreme Court 
 
 
Ill. 16 Oamaru courthouse 
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There would appear to be exceptions to that rule, however, for example the grand Waimate 
(Ill. 19) and Oamaru District Courts (1880 and 1883 respectively) or the original Hamilton 
District Court (1903) (Ill. 20).  An assumption that could use further investigation is that the 
relative grandeur or simplicity of these courthouses vis-à-vis their present-day operational 
significance is likely a function of the rise and fall of the districts’ economic and political 
fortunes. 
The mix of architectural styles of courthouses up to the turn of the century gave way to a 
fairly consistent Edwardian Baroque style in the public architecture designed within the 
Public Works Department under the direction of John Campbell (Government Architect 
1909 – 1922) (Ill. 21).  Like Clayton, Campbell is credited with the design of a large number 
of courthouses, both provincial courthouses in either timber or masonry (e.g. the Marton 
(1897) and Otorohanga (1913) courthouses), and larger, more ornate urban courthouses in 
stone or plaster-rendered masonry (e.g. the Auckland Magistrates’ Court (1913) (Ill. 22)), 
predominantly in an Edwardian style, with the exception already noted of the Dunedin 
courthouse.  John Mair (1876 – 1959), the first New Zealand-born Government Architect, 
designed the Hamilton courthouse (1930) (Ill. 23), which was executed in his customary 
“severely restrained ‘stripped classical’ manner, with precisely controlled Art Deco 
ornamentation.”80  This approach is also evident in Mair’s Blenheim (1937) (Ill. 24), 
Ashburton (1938) and Invercargill (1941) courthouses, all of which evince architectural 
influences that extend for the first time in New Zealand judicial architecture beyond the 
English frame to continental Europe and America. 
                                                
80 Martin, Built for Us, 115, 128. 
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Ill. 17 Dunedin courthouse 
 
 
 
 
Ill. 18 Former Warkworth courthouse 
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Ill. 19 Former Waimate courthouse 
 
 
Ill. 20 Former Hamilton Courthouse   
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By distinct contrast with the pre-WWII period, there is a dearth of knowledge relating to 
New Zealand judicial architecture after the 1940s.  There was an explicable lull in the design 
and construction of new courthouses in New Zealand during the war era while the 
immediate post-war period saw construction activities restricted to the renovation and 
expansion of existing courthouses to meet contemporary operational requirements.  It wasn’t 
until the 1960s that new courthouses were opened, predominantly in reinforced concrete, 
steel and glass, stylistically investigative of moment-frame structural expressionism and 
architectural functionalism.81  Despite recent attention in New Zealand architectural 
historiography surrounding modernist influences, courthouses which identifiably respond to 
such influences do not appear to have received much consideration.82  Gatley’s Long Live the 
Modern gives passing mention to the Rotorua M ori Land Court (1963), Nelson (1974) (Ill. 
25) and Palmerston North courthouses (1988).83   
These references make note of the influence of Ministry of Works architects on courthouse 
design, an influence which Stacpoole and Beaven note  
had become particularly powerful during the war and remained so, with the imposition of standards 
and controls, in the following years.  With [the Ministry of Works], the engineer frequently played a 
significant role and their buildings sometimes show repetitious patterns and a domination of 
engineering values.84 
                                                
81 See John Stacpoole & Peter Beaven, Architecture 1820 – 1970 (Wellington: Reed, 1972), 75. 
82 See for example Julia Gatley (ed.), Long Live the Modern: New Zealand’s New Architecture 1904 – 1984 (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 2008) and Justine Clark and Paul Walker, Looking for the Local: Architecture and the New 
Zealand Modern (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000). 
83 See Gatley, Long Live the Modern, 126, 154, and 216. 
84 Stacpoole & Beaven, Architecture 1820 – 1970, 75-6. 
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Ill. 21 John Campbell 
 
 
Ill. 22 Former Auckland Magistrates Court 
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Ill. 23 Former Hamilton Courthouse 
 
  
Ill. 24 Blenheim Courthouse 
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This aesthetic is particularly evident in the use of concrete construction, prefabrication, 
precasting and moulding techniques in courthouses as geographically and temporally diverse 
as the Taumarunui District Court (1970), Marton District Court (1975), and Christchurch 
Courthouse (1989) (Ill. 26).85 
The legibility of the courthouse typology within the urban fabric diminished significantly 
from the 1980s with a shift to more “commercial” architectural styles.  This approach to 
judicial architecture is best exemplified by the Auckland District Court (1988) (Ill. 27).  Some 
courts in this era (particularly tribunals such as the Environment and Employment courts) 
were located within existing commercial properties; some even assumed a suburban identity, 
such as the Pukekohe District Court (1993) (Ill. 28).  Taking this diminished legibility into 
account, it seems likely that the renovations of a number of courthouses in the early 21st 
century have intentionally sought to reinforce (or even re-establish) the presence of the local 
courthouse within the social fabric of the communities they serve, as seen in the renovations 
and revitalisations of the Gisborne Courthouse (2004), the Hastings District Court (2009) 
(Ill. 29), and Timaru Courthouse (2011) (Ill. 30).   
New varieties of judicial architecture have also begun to emerge in the 21st century, such as 
the Ruatoria Hearing Centre (2002) (Ill. 31), which evinces a strong architectural response to 
the interplay of its judicial function and the community it serves.  It is suggested that the 
Supreme Court complex’s expressions of judicial aspirations similarly evince a reassertion of 
the public persona of the courthouse in New Zealand.   
                                                
85 See Gatley, Long Live the Modern, p. 154, and Terence Hodgson, Looking at the Architecture of New Zealand 
(Wellington: Grantham House, 1990), 86. 
65 
 
 
 
 
Ill. 25 Nelson Courthouse (original) 
 
Ill. 26 Christchurch Courthouse 
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Ill. 27 Auckland District Court 
 
 
Ill. 28 Pukekohe District Court  
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For all the change that has occurred in New Zealand judicial architecture since 1840, one 
aspect has seen very little evolution: courtroom planning.  It is significant that while 
courthouses have come to evince local stylistic influences externally, the layout of the 
courtroom in New Zealand judicial architecture which was also imported as part of the 
English precedent has been altered very little since (Ill. 32 & 33).  This arrangement is 
steeped in centuries of history and tradition and (despite research illustrating the 
shortcomings of traditional planning in judicial proceedings86) seems likely to persist in New 
Zealand judicial architecture.  As will be discussed in Chapter VI, however, the Supreme 
Court building is illustrative of how courtroom planning might evolve in New Zealand in the 
future. 
Summary 
The New Zealand judicial system follows in direct descent from the English system, both 
institutionally and architecturally, in style and substance.  New Zealand’s judicial system 
developed to meet the needs of the nation as required, evolving from a single court (the then 
Supreme Court) into a complex hierarchy of tribunals, trial courts and courts of appeal.  
Similarly, New Zealand’s early judicial architecture predominantly referenced English 
courthouse design until the post-WWII period when more “rational” international styles 
were appropriated.  Towards the end of the 20th century, however, courthouse design began 
to respond to international architectural shifts to better represent regional perspectives in 
architecture.  The fundamental planning of the courtroom has remained closely tied to 
tradition common law models world however.  
                                                
86 See for example Louis G. Redstone, Institutional Buildings.  Architecture of the Controlled Environment (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1980). 
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Ill. 29 Hastings Courthouse 
 
 
Ill. 30 Timaru Courthouse 
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Ill. 31 Ruatoria Hearing Centre 
In the same era, a focus on a more indigenous perspective also became part of the political 
rhetoric regarding the structure and content of New Zealand’s judicial system.  While the 
Privy Council had served at the apex of New Zealand’s judicial system from the cession of 
sovereignty to the British Crown in 1840, since the 1970s there was a move to patriate New 
Zealand’s court of final appeal, resulting in reform of the judicial system in the early 2000s 
which saw the establishment in 2004 of the New Zealand Supreme Court.  The Supreme 
Court represents one of the three branches of Government (the others being the executive 
and legislature) and has a fundamental constitutional responsibility for maintaining the rule 
of law in New Zealand.  The Treaty of Waitangi, considered by many to be New Zealand’s 
founding document, is a unique and fundamental feature of New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements and remains a vibrant force in New Zealand’s justice system today and into the 
future. 
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Ill. 32 No. 1 Courtroom, OHCB 
 
Ill. 33 Courtroom, Timaru Courthouse   
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III.  
Expressive Meaning in Judicial Architecture 
 
Chapter III aims to provide some theoretical context to this study.  In particular, Chapter III 
positions this study in relation to Charles Goodsell’s work on the social meaning of civic 
architecture and introduces relevant concepts relating to the political use of architectural 
symbolism grounded in the work of Murray Edelman, Harold Lasswell, Rudolf Arnheim and 
Joseph Gusfield.  Studies by Antoine Garapon and the Law Reform Commission of Western 
Australia on the expressive role judicial architecture plays within the justice system further 
inform that understanding.  The work of these scholars underpins the assumption of this 
study that the architecture of the Supreme Court complex legibly expresses the aspirations of 
the New Zealand justice system at the beginning of the 21st century. 
Considering the constitutional importance of the judiciary in democratic societies, judicial 
architecture seems to have received limited and sporadic academic attention as an 
architectural typology.  Increasingly, however, attention is being paid to how the judicial 
environment affects the process and administration of justice.  Areas of prior research 
identified in the course of this study include the spatial and technical requirements of 
courthouses;87 historical surveys of the courthouses of a geographic area;88 case studies of 
                                                
87 E.g. Glenn R. Winters, ed., Courthouses and Courtrooms: Selected Readings, Chicago: American Judicature Society, 
1972; and Michael Griebel & Todd S. Phillips, “Architectural Design for Security in Courthouse Facilities” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 576 Courthouse Violence: Protecting the Judicial 
Workplace (July 2001), 118-131. 
88 E.g. Martha J. McNamara, From Tavern to Courthouse: Architecture & Ritual in American Law, 1658-1860 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004). 
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specific courthouses;89 the psychological implications of courthouse design;90 conservation 
studies of historic courthouses;91 symbolism in judicial architecture;92 and courthouses as 
buildings within the oeuvre of a particular architect or architectural practice.93  No focused 
consideration of judicial architecture in New Zealand per se was found.  It is suggested that 
this lack of study is not because to do so would lack value, but rather that this field is 
generally underexplored in the canon of architectural analysis and critique.  Mulcahy suggests 
that this absence of research can be explained (at least from the perspective of the legal 
profession) by the legal system’s obsession with the word: 
When we teach our students about law we do so through the medium of the written judgment or 
transcript as though these give a complete account of why a case is decided in a particular way.  [...].  
In this sense lawyers have traditionally looked upon space within the court as a depoliticized surface.  
The conceptualization of the legal arena limits our appreciation of how spatial dynamics can influence 
what evidence is forthcoming, the basis on which judgments are made and the confidence that the 
public have in the process of adjudication.94 
It is suggested that many architectural critics may be reluctant to engage with judicial 
architecture due to the esoteric nature of the judicial arena.  However, as a species of civic 
                                                
89 E.g. Piyel Haldar, “In and Out of Court: Topographies of Law and the Architecture of Court Buildings (A 
Study of the Supreme Court of Israel)” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law Vol. VII, no. 20 (1994) 185-
200; and Rosemary Annable, A Setting for Justice: Building for the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Sydney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2007). 
90 E.g. Anne Maass, et al., “Intimidating Buildings: Can Courthouse Architecture Affect Perceived Likelihood of 
Conviction?” Environmental Behavior 2000 32: 674 doi: 10.1177/00139160021972739 
91 E.g. NZHPT Register http://www.historic.org.nz  
92 E.g. Resnik & Curtis, “Representing Justice”; John N. Hazard, “Furniture Arrangement as a Symbol of 
Judicial Roles” ETC: A Review of General Semantics 19 (July 1962): 181-88. 
93 E.g. Martin, Built for Us; Richardson, “Building the Dominion”. 
94 Linda Mulcahy, “Architects of Justice: the Politics of Courtroom Design” Social & Legal Studies 2007 16: 383, 
doi: 10.1177/0964663907079765. 
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architecture, judicial architecture has significance beyond its walls and is therefore worthy of 
detailed investigation.  Civic architecture may be defined as those buildings and spaces which 
serve as infrastructure for public life, including public parks and libraries, national and local 
government buildings, and indoor and outdoor public performance spaces.  While research 
into judicial architecture seems to be limited, civic architecture (itself a subset of public 
architecture) has received more attention.  Civic architecture, or civic spaces as Charles 
Goodsell calls them in his seminal work The Social Meaning of Civic Space, are “enclosures 
within governmental buildings designed for the performance of political rituals before 
audiences”95 which are “relatively accessible but not entirely unguarded”96 and are “built with 
the realisation that outsiders may be present on auspicious occasions.”97  Civic spaces include 
national parliaments, city and regional council debating chambers, and town hall meeting 
rooms.   
Goodsell’s study of city council debating chambers provides useful background to this study 
as their performative function is clearly analogous to that of judicial architecture.  
Courthouses are spaces built for the purposes of performing the rituals of justice, namely 
enquiry into grievances and the passing of judgment, and are prima facie open to the public at 
large in order that the community may be part of this ritual.98  It is judicial architecture’s 
                                                
95 Charles T. Goodsell, The Social Meaning of Civic Space.  Studying Political Authority Through Architecture (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1988), xiv. 
96 Ibid., 11. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Resnik & Curtis reinforce this description of justice as ritual in their investigation of the shift in the role of 
the public in the administration of justice from one of ‘rite’ to one of ‘right’.  See Judith Resnik & Dennis E. 
Curtis, “From ‘Rites’ to ‘Rights’ of Audience.  The Utilities and Contingencies of the Public’s Role in Court-
Based Processes” in Antoine Masson & Kevin O’Connor, eds., Representations of Justice (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter 
Lang, 2007) 195-236. 
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fundamental role of enabling and supporting the public aspects of the justice system that 
makes the investigation and understanding of the courthouse typology so important. 
Goodsell’s study involved analyses of American city council debating chambers dating from 
1865 to the mid-1980s.  Goodsell visited the subject sites, analysing them against the design 
features noted above, then drew conclusions about the ways in which democratic political 
culture was expressed in the architecture of the spaces.  This resulted in the studied 
chambers being grouped into three generalised sub-typologies (Traditional (1865-1920), Mid-
Century (1920-1960), and Contemporary (1960-1980s)), each displaying variation in the 
architectural design features he analysed, thus inferring different conclusions regarding the 
democratic political culture of the era during which the chambers were designed and built.  
Much of Goodsell’s study is illuminating to an investigation of judicial architecture.  A 
successor to the pioneering work of Murray Edelman on political symbolism,99 Goodsell 
believes that all civic architecture contains an expression of political ideas, “a nonverbal 
statement emanating from the political culture of the time”100:  
[C]ivic space can be thought of as a kind of stage, with scenery and props designed and selected to 
convey a certain impression.  By studying that stage, we can in effect study those who designed it and 
those for whom it was designed.101 
Goodsell’s assumption is that design features of civic architecture (such as social and 
architectural setting, composition of space, arrangement of furniture and allied features,  
                                                
99 Murray Edelman,  The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). 
100 Goodsell, Civic Space, xiv 
101 Ibid., 11 
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interior decoration, and overall aura of the space) express distinctive and meaningful 
concepts of political authority:102 
[Civic spaces] are not randomly or casually brought into existence; they reflect various antecedents and 
predispositions, including architectural conventions of the day, the conscious preferences of those in 
power at the time, underlying characteristics of the prevailing system of political authority, and – 
perhaps – certain universal human tendencies regarding spatial relationships.  Thus, such space and 
the objects within it become what might be thought of as nonverbal commentary about people, 
politics, culture, and civilisation.103 
One must bear in mind Goodsell’s note of caution about approaching civic architecture with 
the intention of unpacking its expressive meaning: 
Buildings, rooms, and objects are constructed of durable materials; hence they last a long time.  We 
can use them as vivid and embracing portrayals of the past; walking into old spaces is, perhaps, the 
closest we can come to entering a time machine.  At the same time, the expressive meaning of an 
architectural past must be interpreted with care, since it cannot be understood except by appreciating 
the sociocultural context in which it was built.104 
That said, the very nature of civic spaces as sites of public political ritual means that 
convincing inferences as to the political values of the day can be made by attending to the 
detail of the architecture.  As Goodsell recognises: 
                                                
102 Ibid., xvi 
103 Ibid., 8. 
104 Ibid., 8. 
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Location, design, and layout [of civic space] have received the state’s imprimatur.  Ideas of authority 
and status, as reflected in the space, are either officially endorsed or at least are not in conflict with 
accepted regime values.105 
It must also be noted that Goodsell’s method did not involve any analysis of designers’ goals 
or intentions in relation to civic architecture.  It is suggested that the present study differs 
from Goodsell’s in that the various stakeholders involved in the briefing and design of the 
Supreme Court complex expressed clear and discoverable intentions on the record and in 
interviews with the researcher, which, when understood in conjunction with the express 
judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court as an institution and the built form of the Supreme 
Court complex, permit an understanding of the complex’s contemporary expressive meaning 
that Goodsell’s work necessarily implied rather than discovered.   
Another valuable study of judicial architecture in a jurisdiction similar to New Zealand is that 
undertaken in the late 1990s by the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia 
(LRCWA) as part of its review of the justice system in Western Australia.  The review 
resulted in a comprehensive two-volume consultation document and then a final report,106 
which were significant in that they interrogated the court environment as an important 
constituent element of the justice system, not just as something incidental to it.  The opening 
sentences of the consultation document also shows why the LRCWA thought the 
understanding of judicial architecture so important in the context of its justice system review: 
                                                
105 Ibid., 10. 
106 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System in Western Australia 
Project 92 – Consultation Papers (June 1999) and Final Report (September 1999)  (Perth: Government Printer, 
1999) http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/092g.html 
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Court buildings can be understood as living systems or cultural environments in which decisions are 
made about people’s lives, property and rights.  A court is not just a set of rooms, corridors and 
entrances; it is a social and emotional world.107 
Chapter 34 of the final report (“The Court Environment”) reiterated that view: 
The physical and social environment of the courts and its impact on how citizens experience court 
processes may be an essential component in improving the justice system.  This is because the design 
and aesthetics of court buildings may affect users’ perceptions of the justice system.108 
Implicitly accepting that judicial architecture performed similarly to civic architecture, the 
LRCWA noted Goodsell’s study was valuable in the way it linked the design of civic spaces 
to changing political views about the relationship between citizens and the state and thus 
highlighted a questioning of whose views shape or should shape court buildings.109  
Considering the work of the French judge and sociologist Antoine Garapon, the LRCWA 
cited Garapon’s argument that careful attention must be paid to court symbolism, 
appearances and design to ensure that justice is executed in an orderly and accountable way: 
[Garapon] argues that today’s legal decisions are given credibility by legitimate authority inherited from 
the past.  This raises the question of ‘communication’.  What do particular aspects of court buildings, 
or the rituals that take place therein, ‘say’ about justice, access, truth, or authority?  Whereas the 
onward march of progress towards democracy and citizen participation can be traced in the design of 
council chambers, courts tend to be relatively conservative.110 
                                                
107 LRCWA, Consultation Papers, 1017. 
108 LRCWA, Final Report, 301. 
109 LRCWA, Consultation Papers, 1020. 
110 LRCWA, Consultation Papers, 1021.  See Antoine Garapon, Bien juger: Essai sur le rituel judiciaire (Paris: 
Editions Odile Jacob, 1997). 
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As noted above, the LRCWA study recognised the role that judicial architecture plays in 
communicating to court users the values of those who administer the justice system and the 
values placed on the users as participants in that system.  Writing on ritual and ceremony in 
relation to civic architecture, Goodsell notes that the experience of participants is: 
imparted to a substantial degree by elaborate staging, since what is communicated is more 
presentational than discursive.  Embodied in the staging are, not objective facts, but our deepest 
understandings of the world and the underlying values with which we engage it.111 
For Goodsell, this architectural staging supports the ceremonial and ritualistic behaviours 
associated with civic (and, it is suggested, judicial) space.  In turn, ritualism is supported by 
the manipulation of symbols:   
Ceremonial ritual achieves its power over the human mind and spirit through the manipulation of 
symbols.  [...] By the careful manipulation of symbols, vaguely articulated but deeply felt beliefs can be 
mobilized at a given time and place.  Because of its dedication to ritual, civic space is, not surprisingly, 
replete with symbols; in fact, the space as a whole can behave symbolically.112 
Goodsell employs Peter F. Smith’s definition of a symbol, which (unlike the sign and the 
icon) suggests only vaguely and indirectly that for which they stand.113  Goodsell notes that 
“[t]he very inarticulateness of symbols makes us interpret, not understand, their meaning”:114 
                                                
111 Goodsell, Civic Space, 25. 
112 Ibid., 12. 
113 Ibid, 25. 
114 Ibid., 26.  See also LRCWA, Consultation Papers, 1021, where the Commission discusses art historian 
Katherine Taylor’s work which notes sometimes conflicting symbols in French courtrooms in the Second 
Empire denoting authority to judge coming from God, the monarch, and/or the people.  See Katherine Taylor, 
In the Theatre of Criminal Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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“Reduced to its simplest, a symbol is a phenomenon (object, sound, smell or tactile sensation) which 
has a meaning additional to that which is communicated by its superficial configuration or stimulus 
profile. It stands for a ‘landscape’ of meaning without a precise horizon.  Because of the contrast 
between the relative simplicity of the object and the potential complexity of the meaning towards 
which it points, the experience of symbols evokes an emotional reaction. [...] Most of these reactions 
remain out of reach of consciousness, but can nevertheless have a decisive influence upon mood and 
behaviour.”115 
It is important in this context also to note the seminal work of Murray Edelman on the 
relationship between symbolism and politics, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, which found that in 
general terms the physical characteristics of political stages invariably include massiveness, 
ornateness, and formality: 
The degree to which the physical setting is emphasized in political performances depends on (1) the 
importance of impressing large audiences, (2) the need for legitimizing acts and for securing 
compliance, and (3) the need to establish or reinforce an official’s definition of self.116 
This is certainly true in relation to judicial architecture, which at a superficial level is simply a 
venue for court proceedings, but which at a deeper level is an expression of a political 
demand:  
that architecture shall make edifices befitting the importance and power of these institutions, that it 
shall make these institutions appear mighty and durable, and that is shall, in its symbolism and 
expressive form, state dramatically something of these institutions’ ‘idea’ of the world.117 
                                                
115 Peter F. Smith, “Architecture, Symbolism and Surrealism,” Architectural Design 48 (2) (1978): 150 quoted in 
Goodsell, Civic Space, ch. 2, n. 3. 
116 Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, 95-99, quoted in Goodsell, Civic Space, 28. 
117 David Milne, “Architecture, Politics and the Public Realm” Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 5 
(Winter/Spring 1981): 131-146, quoted in Goodsell, Civic Space, 29. 
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Two further points regarding architectural symbolism bear mentioning in the present 
context. The first is Rudolf Arnheim’s view that architectural symbolism is not merely a 
subjective phenomenon, but rather is an innate given in a building’s architectural dynamics.  
For example, a staircase as geometric form expresses nothing until conceived of as a dynamic 
crescendo from ground to upper level, while a building lacking windows inherently conveys a 
quality of closedness or tightness of mind.118  The second is Joseph R. Gusfield’s concept of 
“symbolic gestures.”  To Gusfield, “ ‘cohesive’ symbolic gestures embrace, in a unifying way, 
all persons who are present, whereas ‘differentiating’ symbolic gestures divide people 
according to status or subgroup.” 119  Examples of unifying symbols noted by Goodsell are 
flags and emblems that represent a whole community whereas differentiating symbols would 
include thrones for royalty while requiring commoners to sit in ordinary chairs.120 
Returning to the LRCWA report, the Commission ultimately concluded that the shape and 
content of judicial architecture is of fundamental importance in the delivery of justice in the 
community: 
Court buildings convey information about the justice system. Good court design may communicate 
that justice is accessible; safety and privacy are respected; and contributions to the process are 
welcomed. All too frequently, however, architecture may send out other messages: 
• the courts are isolated from our physical and cultural environment; 
• the courts are closely linked to other law enforcement agencies; 
                                                
118 Rudolf Arnheim,  The Dynamics of Architectural Form.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, pp. 210, 
253-54, cited in Goodsell, Civic Space, 35. 
119 Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement, Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1966, cited in Goodsell, Civic Space, 37. 
120 Goodsell, Civic Space, 37. 
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• all people are not equals in the court; 
• jury service is not valued; 
• participants and the public are not entitled to understand the proceedings; and 
• court management needs are more important than the time commitments of civilian 
participants in the justice system.121 
In the LRCWA’s view, “the characteristics of courthouse spaces tacitly inform the users of 
their status before the law:”   
Some courthouses inform citizens they have the same rights as others.  Others inform citizens they 
must defer to their ‘betters’.  Still other design aspects and behaviours signal that an accused is 
‘criminal’.  Court facilities and staff signal to parties and victims whether or not their claims are being 
taken seriously.  Although users may not be conscious of ‘reading’ the environment in these terms, 
they may feel more of less comfortable in different court spaces and by the way they are treated by 
court staff and legal professionals.122 
It was for that reason that the LRCWA recommended (inter alia) that care be taken in 
designing courthouses concerning the values expressed and the means of representing the 
justice system through architectural design, the user-friendliness of facilities, and having 
spaces that encourage the treatment of all participants in the justice system with courtesy, 
respect and fairness. 
                                                
121 LRCWA, Final Report, 304. 
122 LRCWA, Consultation Papers, 1027. 
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Summary 
The theoretical perspectives described in Chapter III show that, like civic architecture, 
judicial architecture communicates the contemporary judicial aspirations of those who create 
it.  It does so through the careful and mindful manipulation of architectural symbols in a 
process Goodsell and others understand as “stage setting.”  The role of the courthouse in 
this communication of aspirations for the judicial system is self-evident; courthouses are by 
definition the stages for the public ritual of justice and are replete with political symbols 
relating to how such justice is (or should be) administered.  Judicial architecture’s 
fundamental role of enabling and supporting the public aspects of the justice system makes 
the studying the courthouse typology so important.  Drawing on these perspectives, the 
underlying assumption of this study is that the New Zealand Supreme Court complex 
embodies judicial aspirations for the justice system, those embodied aspirations having 
expressly or implicitly received the state’s imprimatur through the briefing process. 
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IV.  
Briefing the Supreme Court Project 
 
The review of theory and history undertaken in Chapter III of this thesis provides this study 
with an understanding of how and why judicial architecture expresses judicial aspirations.  
The aim of Chapter IV is to assess the judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court as these are 
evinced through two sources: 1) the drafting of the purpose section (section 3) of the SCA; 
and 2) the translation of the aspirations expressed in the legislation into requirements within 
the Supreme Court complex’s briefing documents.  This analysis engages with the Supreme 
Court legislation from introduction to enactment, revealing the aspirations for the New 
Zealand judicial system that were intended with the establishment of the Supreme Court, and 
the various premises briefs promulgated by the project’s steering group (as informed through 
consultation with the project’s judicial and political advisors) insofar as these were made 
available to the researcher. 
The Judicial Aspirations of the Supreme Court 
From the late 1990s the New Zealand Parliament has included purpose sections in legislation 
in order to guide interpreters of the law to understand its intentions in enacting those 
statutes.  The purpose of the Supreme Court is found in section 3 of the SCA.  The 
development of section 3 of the Act is important in the context of this study since it is 
suggested that the aspirations for the New Zealand judicial system intended by Parliament 
and the promoters of the Court are to be found there.  This section analyses the 
development of section 3 (and the related section 13) in detail.  The precise wording of the 
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prototypical section 3 (clause 3 of the Supreme Court Bill) as introduced to Parliament 
stated:  
Clause 3 Purpose 
The purpose of this Act is to — 
(a) establish the Supreme Court of New Zealand as the court of final appeal for New 
Zealand, and provide for its jurisdiction and related matters; and 
(b) end appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from decisions of New 
Zealand courts; and 
(c) make related amendments to certain enactments relating to courts or judicial 
proceedings. 
An allied provision, clause 13 of the Bill (the leave to appeal criteria provision), stated: 
Clause 13 Criteria for leave to appeal 
(1) The Supreme Court must not give leave to appeal to it unless it is satisfied that – 
(a) the proposed appeal involves a significant issue relating to the Treaty of Waitangi or 
tikanga Maori; or 
(b) the proposed appeal involves some other matter of general or public importance; or 
(c) a substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred, or may occur unless leave is 
given; or 
(d) the proposed appeal involves a matter of general commercial significance; or 
(e) it is necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the 
proposed appeal.  
(2) [...] 
Two important points should be noted from clauses 3 and 13.  First, clause 3 expresses what 
are best understood as purposes of the Act, essentially to establish the Supreme Court.  
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Second, the priority given to issues involving the Treaty of Waitangi and tikanga Maori123 in 
clause 13 is significant.  The Explanatory Note to the Bill implicitly justified this prioritisation 
by describing the Treaty as “New Zealand’s founding document,”124 reinforcing the view of 
the constitutional role of the Treaty described in Chapter II of this study. 
 The Justice and Electoral Select Committee received submissions on the Supreme Court Bill 
and reported back to Parliament on 16 September 2003, recommending a number of 
significant changes to the wording of clauses 3 and 13.   In relation to the purpose clause, the 
Select Committee recommended that clause 3 be:  
amended to reflect the broader context of the Bill, which includes New Zealand's commitment to the 
rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament. The exact wording of this amendment was the subject 
of considerable debate amongst members, and it now emphasises the independence of New Zealand 
and the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi.125  
[...] 
Most of us support the reference in the amended purpose clause to the Treaty of Waitangi. These 
members recognise that the Treaty of Waitangi is part of New Zealand's jurisprudence, and consider 
the new purpose clause goes some of the way to meeting concerns [of submitters] at the lack of 
recognition accorded to the Treaty in the Bill.126 
                                                
123 Tikanga M ori is understood in this context as M ori customary values and practices. 
124 Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-1), Explanatory Note, p 3. 
125 Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-2), Commentary, p 22. 
126 Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-2), Commentary, p 24. 
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Faced with concern from some submitters that a Supreme Court might see fit to challenge 
Parliament’s law-making monopoly, clarifying the relationship of the Supreme Court within 
the doctrine of the separation of powers was also an object of the Committee’s amendments: 
National and ACT members argue that the purpose clause should restrain judicial activism. [...] We 
consider the proposed amendment [subsection 3(2)] effectively restates the primacy of Parliament in 
making law and determining public policy issues.127 
This is significant.  While the Bill originally did not provide for them, these two aspects, the 
role of the Treaty of Waitangi and the role of the Supreme Court in upholding the rule of law 
and Parliamentary sovereignty, were evidently quintessential for the Select Committee when 
considering the purposes of the Supreme Court.  Parliament agreed with the Select 
Committee; the Committee’s recommended wording of clause 3 was enacted and will be 
considered further below. 
The original inclusion in clause 13 of the Bill of reference to “tikanga M ori” was also 
amended by the Committee: 
Clause 13 sets out the criteria for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. A majority of the 28 
submissions on this clause were critical of its prescriptive approach and recommended wider criteria. 
We recommend the reference to tikanga M ori in clause 13 be removed. The Attorney-General 
informed us that the tikanga M ori leave provision was drafted in response to consultation with 
M ori, and that in each case the tikanga will be determined before it comes to the Supreme Court. 
However, we agree with those submitters who raised concerns that 'a significant issue relating to 
tikanga M ori' was too broad a matter for inclusion in the leave criteria.  [...]  The issue of 'tikanga 
M ori' was raised by several submitters. Most favoured deleting the reference from the leave criteria, 
                                                
127 Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-2), Commentary, 22f. 
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either because the leave criteria should be set out in general terms or because the reference is 
discriminatory.128 
The priority given to Treaty and tikanga M ori issues noted above also concerned the Select 
Committee, which recommended “further amendments to clause 13, to clarify that the leave 
criteria are not hierarchical.”129  As with clause 3, the amended wording of clause 13 was 
adopted by Parliament and, together with the rest of the amended Bill, became law when the 
Supreme Court Act received Royal Assent from the Governor-General on 17 October 2003.  
The Act came into force on 1 July 2004.130 
The enacted wording of section 3 reads: 
3 Purpose 
(3) The purpose of this Act is— 
(a) to establish within New Zealand a new court of final appeal comprising New 
Zealand judges— 
(i) to recognise that New Zealand is an independent nation with its own history 
and traditions; and 
(ii) to enable important legal matters, including legal matters relating to the Treaty 
of Waitangi, to be resolved with an understanding of New Zealand conditions, 
history, and traditions; and 
(iii) to improve access to justice; and 
(b) to provide for the court's jurisdiction and related matters; and 
(c) to end appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from decisions of 
New Zealand courts; and 
(d) to make related amendments to certain enactments relating to courts or judicial 
proceedings. 
                                                
128 Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-2), Commentary, 44. 
129 Supreme Court Bill 2002 (16-2), Commentary, 44. 
130 See Appendix I – Supreme Court legislation (excerpts). 
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(4) Nothing in this Act affects New Zealand's continuing commitment to the rule of law 
and the sovereignty of Parliament. 
In strict legal terms, section 3 expresses the purpose of the SCA rather than the Supreme 
Court itself.  However, section 3 inherently expresses a mix of the purposes of the legislation 
and the purposes of the institution.  For example, providing for the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction and ending appeals to the Privy Council are purposes of the legislation.  The 
purposes of the institution, on the other hand, are:  
a) To recognise New Zealand as an independent nation with its own history and 
traditions (section 3(1)(a)(i));  
b) To enable important legal matters, including those relating to the Treaty of Waitangi, 
to be resolved with an understanding of New Zealand conditions, history and 
traditions (section 3(1)(a)(ii));  
c) To improve access to justice (section 3(1)(a)(iii)); and  
d) To continue New Zealand’s commitment to the rule of law and sovereignty of 
Parliament (section 3(2)).  
It is suggested that these institutional purposes are significant in that they express the judicial 
aspirations of the Supreme Court.  As stated in Chapter I, the aim of this study is to assess 
the design of the Supreme Court complex as the embodiment of judicial aspirations, that 
embodiment being a legible response to the complex’s briefing process which expresses the 
judicial aspirations of the New Zealand justice system at the beginning of the 21st century as 
enshrined in section 3 of the SCA.  Drawing on the above analysis of section 3, the three 
aspirations against which the Supreme Court architecture will be assessed are:  
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1. the independence of New Zealand’s justice system within the context of its history 
and traditions (purpose a) above);  
2. the social context of the New Zealand justice system (in particular the relevance of 
the Treaty of Waitangi) (purpose b) above); and  
3. commitment to upholding the rule of law (including access to justice) and the 
sovereignty of Parliament (purposes c) and d) above).   
 
The Supreme Court Brief 
When it first sat in July 2004, the Supreme Court did so in a basement-level room in the 
Wellington High Court building, with the court registry and judges’ chambers located nearby 
within the Victoria University of Wellington Law Faculty in the former Government House 
building.  In early 2006 officials at the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) began to develop a brief for 
stand-alone premises for the Court, initially directing the restoration of OHCB to serve that 
purpose as had been recommended by the MAG in 2002.131  To the consternation of many 
architects and commentators there was neither an open nor an invited competition for the 
design of this significant civic building.132  WaM’s lead architect for the Supreme Court 
project, Roy Wilson, explained that the MoJ officials leading the project did not wish to have 
a design competition for the Supreme Court project because they were looking for a team to 
deliver the project in a collaborative, iterative manner, working through a process that 
developed the design in response to the aspirations of the stakeholders, rather than a design 
outcome developed in isolation through competition which would then require compromise 
                                                
131 Attorney-General, Replacing the Privy Council, para 167. 
132 See Roy Wilson et al.  “Natural Justice” Architecture NZ 2:2010 (March/April): 50-60, 60. 
90 
 
 
 
on the parts of stakeholders and designers to make work.133  Responding to an open MoJ 
request in 2004, WaM had previously submitted a memorandum outlining their capacity to 
provide design services for courthouses, on the basis of which the Ministry invited WaM to 
tender for the Supreme Court project.134  One could expect that WaM’s lengthy pedigree in 
designing key civic and public buildings (including the Christchurch Town Hall (1972), the 
Waiouru Army Museum (1977 and 1984), the New Zealand Chancery in Washington, D.C. 
(1979), the New Zealand High Commission in New Delhi (1991), and, most recently, the 
Parliament and Executive Wing (Beehive) buildings refurbishments (1996 and 2003 
respectively) also had something to do with their appointment.135  Ultimately, the team 
assembled to develop the Supreme Court design was known as the Project Steering Group 
(PSG) and comprised representatives from the MoJ, members of the Supreme Court 
judiciary and registry staff, WaM, and project managers The Building Intelligence Group.  
Through consultation with Ministers, government agencies and the judiciary, the PSG 
developed a series of design brief iterations for the Supreme Court which outlined three key 
parameters: 1) physical parameters; 2) functional parameters, and 3) time and cost 
parameters.136  The question of how the building should look was largely given over to the 
architects however.   
                                                
133 Roy Wilson (Principal, Warren and Mahoney), in discussion with the author, March 2011. 
134 Wilson, discussion; Andrew Hampton/Joanne Jeppesen (Ministry of Justice), in discussion with the author, 
July 2011. 
135 The Executive Wing Refurbishment project was still under construction when the MoJ invited WaM to 
tender on the Supreme Court project. MoJ officials indicated that a number of other architectural practices 
were also invited to tender for the project, which practices is not known however.  Hampton/Jeppesen, 
discussion. 
136 Project Steering Group, “Supreme Court Permanent Premises Project.  Option C (Modified) Parameters” (6 
April 2006).  See Appendix 2 – Supreme Court – Design Briefs. 
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A Cabinet Paper from the then Minister for Courts shows that the briefing process 
undertaken reflected the collaborative approach desired by the MoJ for delivery of the 
Supreme Court project in that there was extensive consultation regarding the project by MoJ 
officials with the Minister for Courts, the NZHPT, the Ministry for the Environment, and 
the judiciary, each layer influencing the framing of the brief.137  For example, consultation 
with the NZHPT and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage over the concept designs for the 
Supreme Court revealed objections to original proposals predicated on substantial 
modification of the OHCB to make it appropriate for Supreme Court purposes.  In response 
to such opposition the Cabinet paper referred to above outlined four alternative options for 
the development of permanent accommodation for the Supreme Court.  Option A proposed 
use of the OHCB for the Supreme Court, with a degree of demolition of that building to 
make it suitable for the new Court.  Option B proposed a separate Supreme Court with 
linkages to a restored OHCB but with no demolition of the latter.  Option C proposed 
partial demolition of the OHCB with a large new addition linked to it in which the Supreme 
Court would be housed, with use of the OHCB by the Supreme Court.  Option D proposed 
a stand-alone Supreme Court building with no linkage to or use of a restored OHCB by the 
Supreme Court.  The Cabinet paper shows that the judiciary were opposed to any 
operational restrictions that would result from being located within the existing fabric of the 
OHCB.  This included not having a bench large enough to accommodate the five sitting 
judges comfortably, limitations on the space available for the public and media, concerns 
about not co-locating clerks with the judges they serve, then need for extensive library 
facilities, and a concern that the compromise required in making use of Courtroom 1 of the 
                                                
137 Office of the Minister for Courts, “Memorandum for Cabinet Policy Committee” (undated, c. March 2006).  
See Appendix II – Supreme Court – Design Briefs. 
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OHCB would necessitate establishment of a new, larger court in the future.  The NZHPT 
objected in principle to any option that included demolition of any significant part of the 
OHCB, but proposed a fifth option known as Option C (Modified).138  Under that option 
demolition of the 1981 extension at the rear of the OHCB to enable connection with a new 
Supreme Court building would be acceptable, with the rest of the OHCB being restored and 
made available for other MoJ or ceremonial purposes.   
Cabinet ultimately approved Option C (Modified) and the project brief was refocused to 
deliver a new Supreme Court building together with the complete restoration of the OHCB, 
essentially creating two projects from what had originally been conceived as one.139  Three 
explicit directions were given to the architects under the final iteration of the premises brief: 
1. the new Supreme Court building was to be located on the original site of the Armed 
Constabulary and Court of Arbitration buildings (at the time of briefing known as 
Justice Park), with public entry to the building from Lambton Quay;  
2. the OHCB was to be modified by removal of the 1981, 1913 and part of the 1907 
additions, and fully restored to provide for better efficiency, functional 
improvements, and achieve a 100 year design life; and 
3. the new Supreme Court building exterior should reflect the status of the Supreme 
Court as the repository of NZ law and the apex of the third arm of Government.  
The building should not be ostentatious but was to be of substance and of enduring 
                                                
138 Ibid. 
139 Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion.  See also Project Steering Group, “Option C (Modified) Parameters”. 
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design.  It was to be respectful to the OHCB and not dominate it in relation to 
height.140   
The Supreme Court judges also provided WaM with three key parameters.  First, it was taken 
for granted by the judiciary and the MoJ that the Court should function correctly.141  Further, 
the judges asked that they be able to see to the exterior from the courtroom, to the daylight, 
sky, and activities of the world outside.  Finally, the judges expressed a desire that the 
building be representative of all New Zealanders as a nation, a building that “didn’t pay too 
much more recognition to any one cultural background than others.”142  MoJ officials 
described the substantial debate at the briefing stage of the Court’s design over what sort of 
“cultural identity” the building should have, whether it should have a substantial Maori 
cultural content or whether to bring in references to other cultures in New Zealand.  The 
decision was made to instead incorporate something that was “of New Zealand,” namely the 
references to native flora.143  According to Roy Wilson, the wishes expressed by the judiciary 
strongly influenced the design of the courthouse throughout, from spatial planning 
promoting collegiality and a discussion-enabling courtroom to furniture style and art 
works.144  It should be noted, however, that approval of the design of the Supreme Court 
                                                
140 Project Steering Group, “Supreme Court. Premises Brief Version 4” (28 March 2007) 1.  See Appendix II – 
Supreme Court – Design Briefs. 
141 Wilson, discussion. 
142 Wilson, discussion. 
143 Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion.  See further discussion on this point in Chapter VI – “An Indigenous 
Court.” 
144 Ibid. 
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complex was a Cabinet decision; while the judiciary were consulted extensively and had 
significant input into the design, final approval was made at ministerial level.145   
While there is no direct evidence that the provisions of the SCA informed the Supreme 
Court project brief, it is suggested that point 3 (above) and the requirements of the judiciary 
relate directly to the judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court as extrapolated from the 
legislation in the previous section.  A notable exception, however, is the desire for “cultural 
neutrality” for the Supreme Court building.  This aspect of the complex’s brief and design 
seems notably at odds with the judicial aspirations contained in the legislation; this matter 
will be explored further in Chapter VI. 
Summary 
Chapter IV illustrates the layered briefing process undertaking with respect to the Supreme 
Court complex, showing how the Court’s constituting legislation expressed the judicial 
aspirations of the institution and revealing how these aspirations were translated into 
requirements within the Supreme Court complex’s briefing documents.  The aspirations for 
the New Zealand judicial system contained in the Supreme Court Act are suggested to be: 
a) To recognise New Zealand as an independent nation with its own history and 
traditions;  
b) To enable important legal matters, including those relating to the Treaty of Waitangi, 
to be resolved with an understanding of New Zealand conditions, history and;  
c) To improve access to justice; and  
                                                
145 Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion. 
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d) To continue New Zealand’s commitment to the rule of law and sovereignty of 
Parliament. 
The various premises briefs devised by the PSG illustrate the layered process this briefing 
took, with the brief being regularly revised and updated in accordance with consultation with 
the project’s judicial and political advisors from the Supreme Court bench, the NZHPT and 
Ministries of Justice, Culture and Heritage, and the Environment.  While the outcomes of 
some of this consultation were made available to the researcher, some influences on the 
briefing process remain unknown.  For example, it is unclear the extent to which informal 
directions may have been given to the architects by stakeholders in relation to design of the 
Court.  What is known about the consultation during the briefing process is that it influenced 
the splitting of the project into two components (the restoration of the OHCB and design of 
a new Supreme Court building)146 and that the judiciary had an important role in the briefing 
of the project, requiring that the courtroom be exemplary in terms of planning, 
environmental, and acoustic performance, that it embody a sense of openness and 
collegiality, and that the courthouse exhibit a neutrality through avoiding what has been 
termed “cultural ownership” of the building.   
While there is no direct evidence that the provisions of the SCA informed the Supreme 
Court project brief, it is suggested that the brief’s requirements, read together with the 
requirements of the judiciary, relate directly to the judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court 
                                                
146 A true split never occurred as both aspects continued to be undertaken under the rubric of one project.  MoJ 
officials considered this approach may have contributed to political and public criticism regarding budget 
overruns as the original budget for the “project” was extended considerably to cover the restoration of the 
OHCB.  The Supreme Court building was, however, delivered within its original budget.  Hampton/Jeppesen, 
discussion. 
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as expressed in the legislation.  Chapter V of this thesis, The Architecture of the Supreme Court 
Complex, analyses the outcome of this briefing process, the Supreme Court’s built form. 
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V.  
The Architecture of the Supreme Court Complex 
 
With the understanding developed in Chapter IV of the Supreme Court project’s layered 
briefing process, Chapter V of this thesis analyses the architecture of the Supreme Court 
complex in order to provide a detailed understanding of the Court’s built form and the 
multiple considerations and influences that went into its design from an architectural 
perspective.  This case study draws heavily on interviews and architectural drawings and 
images provided by the complex’s architects and the OHCB conservation work undertaken 
by heritage architect Chris Cochran, as well as archival research on the design of the complex 
and an in-context assessment of the buildings. 
The Supreme Court Building 
The Supreme Court complex is bounded by Lambton Quay and Ballance, Stout and 
Whitmore Streets (Ill. 34 & 35).  The Lambton Quay frontage was the site of the former 
Justice Park;147 the Stout Street frontage that of the OHCB.  The appropriateness of this site 
for the new Supreme Court was never really in question.  While other options were cursorily 
considered, the fact that the site was already owned by the MoJ, its location at the edge of 
central business district within  
  
                                                
147 The site known as Justice Park was never officially reserved for public recreation purposes; it was the 
original site of the Armed Constabulary and Court of Arbitration buildings and always intended for eventual 
use by the Crown but had been improved with landscaping to enable its use by the public in the meantime.  
Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion. 
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Ill. 34 The Supreme Court complex - locality 
 
Ill. 35 The Supreme Court complex – aerial view  
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the government quarter and at beginning of the Lambton Quay commercial area, and its 
significant cultural heritage value meant that other potential sites were quickly dismissed.148   
The presence of the OHCB presented an interesting opportunity and challenge to the 
architects.  As described above, the initial intention of the PSG (based on the 
recommendation of the MAG) was that the Supreme Court be housed within the existing 
OHCB.  This intention quickly became untenable once it was realised that the OHCB could 
not provide the functionality required by the judges given the renovation and modification 
limitations imposed by the building’s NZHTP and Wellington City District Plan heritage 
building listings.  The brief (and budget) were therefore reframed in terms of the design and 
construction of a new Supreme Court building, while restoring and utilising the OHCB as an 
extra High Court courtroom and as ancillary space to support the functioning of the 
Supreme Court. 
Looking at the Supreme Court complex from the direction of Parliament (Ill. 36), it is clear 
that this relatively demure building is one of reserved significance.  As noted in Chapter IV, 
the final iteration of the brief given to WaM for the new Supreme Court building asked for a 
building of substance and of enduring design, sensitive to the OHCB, and reflective of the 
status of the Supreme Court as the repository of NZ law and the apex of the third arm of 
Government.  The scale of the Supreme Court building is indeed sympathetic to the OHCB, 
and also to the former Government Building opposing it on Whitmore Street given the 
relationship of the OHCB to the Government Building described in Chapter II.149  The 
                                                
148 Hampton/Jeppesen interview; Wilson, discussion. 
149 See p 56 (supra).  This sympathy is again the result of the consultative approach to the design of the Supreme 
Court undertaken. Roy Wilson described a process where the relationship of the new building with the old was 
workshopped with parties representing built heritage interests using large format elevation mock ups to arrive at 
an appropriate proportion of similarity and distinction between the buildings.  Wilson, discussion. 
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building forms an appropriate step in vertical scale from Whitmore Street and Lambton 
Quay to the taller buildings fronting Stout and Ballance Streets (Ill. 37).  A much taller 
building (which would also have accommodated commercial floor space) was considered by 
the architects early in the design process, but was discounted in favour of something "small 
and special, rather than tall and commercial."150  Essentially a “regular modernist box”151 of 
concrete and glass, the recycled bronze p hutukawa/r t  screen which wraps the building 
provides form, privacy, shelter and shading to the interior of the building and lends to it an 
iconic aspect, setting it apart from the ubiquity of concrete and glass buildings in the vicinity 
(Ill. 38).  For the size of the building, the relative scale of the bronze screen denotes an 
important building, implying the enclosure and protection of something unique.  Roy Wilson 
described the process of devising the screen thus: 
We knew we were going to screen this glass box.  The screen went through endless iterations about 
what we should do. We tested out a number of options and it became clear in that process of things 
that there is a relationship to the New Zealand landscape.  If you are going to make a pattern on a 
building in a screen what do you do?  You look out there and see those trees, those lovely branches, 
and you look through those and we said, well why isn’t that the process of how we go and why don’t 
we take it that way?  So we started the development of the design of that image of looking through the 
branches and we said pohutukawa trees, and once you start the story is easy to build up, you know, 
pohutukawa and rata, North and South Island trees, converge in Wellington as one species, they 
represent New Zealand, longevity, power, mana, shelter, protection, enclosure – all of those things.  
And isn’t that what the Court is all about?  It’s not about the state dominance over its citizens; it’s all 
about our nature [...].    
                                                
150 Wilson et al., “Natural Justice”, 52 
151 Ibid., 60 
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Ill. 36 Supreme Court viewed from intersection of Lambton Quay and Whitmore Street 
 
Ill. 37 Supreme Court complex with Stout and Ballance Street buildings beyond  
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We carried on the development of the design and it became clear that we weren’t going to build it out 
of plastic or steel or aluminium, it had to be bronze.  When we presented the design and that story 
that went with it, it was tick tick tick tick, everybody just instantly said that’s what we’ve got to do.  We 
said that’s where we’ve got to, we’d like to push it a bit further, it would be good if an artist had a look 
at this to cast an eye over it. We suggested Neil Dawson.152 
It was Christchurch sculptor Neil Dawson who suggested the inclusion of red glass 
“blossoms” in the screen design (Ill. 39).  On closer consideration, one notices the branch 
pattern (which comprises some 84 modules of 17 component parts each) has been designed 
with a greater density at the top and bottom and more open through the mid-range to 
maximise shading from above, privacy from below, and transparency for users through the 
mid-range.153 There is a legible rhythm and modulation to the screen pattern which has led 
one commentator to see a relationship between the screen and elements of the OHCB 
elevations.154  
Approaching the Supreme Court one ponders the placement of the entrance to the Court 
square onto Lambton Quay (Ill. 40).  While this access point was stipulated in the brief,155 
mirroring and extending the strong axial symmetry of the OHCB, urban designer Gerald 
Blunt has commented that this seems a missed opportunity: 
The symmetrical planning of the old building has been carried through to the new building with the 
axis terminating at a bus stop on the adjacent side of Lambton Quay.  What is so special about this 
                                                
152 Wilson, discussion.  It should be noted that the screen was developed by WaM’s Christchurch office under 
the design leadership of WaM principal Bill Gregory. 
153 Wilson, discussion.  See also Appendix IV – Supreme Court – Architectural Drawings. 
154 Wilson, et al., “Natural Justice”, p. 52. 
155 Project Steering Group, “Option C (Modified) Parameters”, 2.  See Appendix II – Supreme Court – Briefing 
Documents. 
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location?  The idea of standing at the bus stop and observing justice in the making is compromised by 
the layers of glass obscuring the view.  An asymmetrical response, reinforcing the buildings’ 
differences, would have been justifiable.  This layout could have focused on the important Lambton 
Quay-Whitmore Street corner, diagonally opposite the Beehive and Parliament.  The symbolic link 
between Court, Executive and Legislature could have been accentuated [...].  A strong corner would 
also have signalled the entry of this part of Lambton Quay from the north.156 
As Blunt notes, the interior of the courtroom is visible from the exterior; standing at the 
entrance there is a perception of connection with the heart of the Court.  While Blunt finds 
this connection somewhat compromised by the collocation of the entrance next to a major 
city bus stop, there is something special about this relationship between the exalted and 
quidotian, in observing justice being done at its highest level while carrying on one’s daily 
routine.  This connection is, of course, intentional; as noted in Chapter IV, the judges 
required a visual links from the bench to the exterior both horizontally and vertically.  It is 
suggested also that compromise in this context is inevitable; the steps up to the entrance, the 
horizontally deep reflecting pools, bullet-proof glazing and steel bollards necessarily secure 
the building from trespass.  The break made in the Supreme Court design from the tradition 
of fully enclosed and isolated courtrooms is significant and should not be underrated.157   
 
                                                
156 Wilson, et al., “Natural Justice”, 60. 
157 WaM wished to see the Supreme Court set back more considerably from Lambton Quay, but “other 
[political] powers said no. [...] When [they] say no, well [they] say no and that’s the decision that was made and 
you’ve just got to live with it.” Wilson, discussion.  Indications of how the siting might have been are evident in 
the proposals illustrated in the Minister for Courts March 2006 Cabinet paper (see Appendix II). 
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Ill. 38 Supreme Court, bronze screen and reflecting pool 
 
105 
 
 
 
 
Ill. 39 Cast glass “blossoms” catch the evening light  
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Ill. 40 Supreme Court entrance on Lambton Quay 
 
After entering the building through the main doors (or via the security scanner to the left of 
the main doors when the Court is sitting (Ill. 41), one enters the spacious public lobby (Ill. 
42). The restrained material palette of the Supreme Court building of concrete and stone, 
timber and glass, and copper and bronze is appreciable in this space, materials intended to 
have substance and longevity, materials that have a life and “mana”158 of their own.  
                                                
158 Wilson, discussion. 
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Ill. 41 Supreme Court security scanner 
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Ill. 42 Concierge’s desk in the Supreme Court lobby 
Visitors are immediately struck by the primacy of courtroom; the unmistakable focus of this 
space is the ovoid, copper-clad courtroom (Ill. 43).  To the left and right in the reception area 
are large flat screen televisions which show a recording for visitors about the design of the 
Supreme Court and the OHCB restoration or relay the proceedings before the Court when it 
is sitting (Ill. 44).  Visual connection to the exterior inverts the prior relationship of outsider-
looking-in to insider-looking-out, while, to the right of the courtroom, interior glazing gives a 
backlit, opaque view of the goings on within the Supreme Court library (Ill. 45).  To the left 
of the courtroom one finds the reception desk, and a small, somewhat non-descript wall 
penetration that is the Supreme Court Registry counter (Ill. 46).   
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Ill. 43 Exterior of the Supreme Court courtroom 
 
 
Ill. 44 Information screens in the Supreme Court lobby 
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Ill. 45 Supreme Court library viewed from the lobby 
 
 
Ill. 46 Supreme Court Registry counter 
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A concierge usually sits at the reception desk prepared to direct visitors to their destinations 
or give free tours of the Court to those interested.   A room adjacent to the reception desk is 
reserved for media.  Half way around the circumference of the courtroom, public access 
stops.  Beyond the security lock are the Registry offices, meeting rooms, and a staff common 
room to the left; the library to the right; and behind the courtroom a spiral staircase and 
elevator provide access to the basement and first floor (Ill. 47). 
 
Ill. 47 Supreme Court spiral staircase 
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Many people consider that the highlight of the Supreme Court is its courtroom.  Indeed 
many laypeople would equate the courtroom with the Court, so it is fitting that the building’s 
most expressive aspect be that space.  The ritual of the courtroom can be observed from the 
reception area through a penetration glazed with dual-glazed, switchable glass which allows 
the judges to screen the courtroom from view with the flick of a switch, if required for 
confidentiality reasons (Ill. 48).159   
 
Ill. 48 Visual access from lobby to Supreme Court bench 
 
Counsel and the public enter the rear of the courtroom at this point (Ill. 49).  Externally clad 
in articulated copper sheet, some 2300 panels of sustainably harvested New Zealand silver 
beech clad the interior of the courtroom, which the architects state was influenced by the 
                                                
159 While the Court normally operates with full public access, on occasion cases will be heard in closed court, 
for example where suppression issues arise.  Photographic or audio-visual recording devices are not permitted 
in the courtroom when sitting, even under normal circumstances. 
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cone of the New Zealand kauri tree and commentators have remarked suggests “the idea of 
the court as the seed of a new tradition in New Zealand”160 (Ill. 50 & 51).  
 
Ill. 49 An entry to the Supreme Court courtroom 
                                                
160 Wilson, et al., “Natural Justice,” 52. 
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Ill. 50 Beech panels lining the Supreme Court courtroom 
 
Ill. 51 Female cone of the kauri tree 
While the panelling might have been “influenced” by the kauri cone, this was by accounts a 
late addition to the court’s referential repertoire.  The courtroom was originally to be lined 
with timber slats but that intention was reconsidered after the judges pointed out the 
problems encountered by legal counsel in the Court of Appeal, which has a similar lining 
behind the bench.  The parallel lines in the Court of Appeal courtroom lining cause what is 
known as a moiré pattern effect, a visual distortion caused by stong visual lines which, when 
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in one’s field of vision for an extended period of time, cause the lines to appear to distort, an 
understandably disconcerting situation for counsel attempting to present legal arguments for 
any length of time (Ill. 52).  The diamond pattern of the Supreme Court courtroom interior 
came about as a solution to avoid this effect.  The carefully articulated surface assists in 
meeting the highly particular acoustic characteristics required of the courtroom.161   
 
Ill. 52 Moiré effect in brickwork 
The technical brilliance of the courtroom’s ovoid design is evident in the perfect pairing in 
section of interior and exterior panels, which permits glazed penetrations through the skin 
for daylight access.  These penetrations allow ambient light from the ground and first floors 
into the courtroom, but their placement just below the finished ceiling height of the floors 
intersecting with the courtroom prevents a goldfish-bowl viewing of the judges at work (Ill. 
53 & 54).162  Further daylight access is provided by the skylight at the apex of the courtroom, 
creating an axis mundi from the courtroom to the sky and the occupants an additional link 
with the outside world, while mechanical louvres can be engaged to prevent direct light 
                                                
161 Wilson, discussion; Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion. 
162 The ground floor also has elevated glazed penetrations through the cone for daylight access. 
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penetrating the courtroom (Ill. 55).  What at first appears to be an ornate light diffuser in the 
skylight is actually an acoustic reflector.   
 
Ill. 53 Courtroom wall penetrations (interior) 
 
 
Ill. 54 Courtroom wall penetrations (exterior) 
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Ill. 55 Courtroom skylight with louvres closed behind the acoustic reflector 
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It has been suggested that the acoustically reflective copper screens to the left and right of 
the bench recall tukutuku panels in traditional M ori carved houses,163 thus being symbolic 
of the M ori culture in New Zealand.  Just as tukutuku panels evolved as a means of 
disguising less aesthetically-pleasing elements within traditional carved meeting houses164 so 
the copper screens hide audiovisual equipment occasionally employed by the court for 
electronic display of evidence or videoconferencing (Ill. 56).   
 
Ill. 56 Tukutuku panel-inspired acoustic screens 
                                                
163 Wilson, discussion.  See also Ministry of Justice, The Design of the New Building 
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/about/supreme/the-supreme-court-complex/the-design-of-the-new-building.  
Tukutuku panels are ornamental lattice-works used particularly between carvings around the walls of Maori 
meeting houses.  Traditional patterns have names and symbolic meanings.  See p 156 (Ill. 83) below and 
http://christchurchcitylibraries.com/Maori/Puawaitanga/Stories/ 
164 Julie Paama-Pengelly, Ma ̄ori Art and Design: Weaving, Painting, Carving and Architecture (Auckland: New Holland, 
2010), 34. 
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The idea of having tukutuku panels in the courtroom came from the judiciary, as MoJ 
officials explained: 
There was a range of views of comfort among the judges as to the extent to which the building should 
reference M ori culture.  I think everyone agreed that it shouldn’t be viewed as being the preserve of 
any single iwi, but given that M ori are New Zealand’s first people it was probably appropriate that 
there was some recognition of that.  And so the debate was less about the outside of the building and 
more about the inside.  The Chief Justice liked the idea of something being done like had been done in 
the M ori Affairs Select Committee room where tukutuku panels had been produced by various iwi 
around the country, so that dealt with the issue of it not being representative of any one particular 
group [...].  I think Roy [Wilson] picked up on that [in the copper screens] which reference tukutuku 
panels.  The Chief Justice quite liked that.  People quite liked that this was something you could expect 
to see in a modern marae, but wasn’t necessarily attributable to one iwi.165 
Planning and acoustics provide a more intimate relationship between bench and counsel (and 
the public gallery) than New Zealand courtrooms have previously enabled.  The curve of the 
bench (which seats five judges at a time) was a request of the judges who wished to have 
better sightlines between each other while hearing cases and represents a notable departure 
from traditional courtroom planning (Ill. 57).  This curve has been continued through the 
courtroom creating a greater feeling of in-the-round participation than the traditional 
rectangular courtroom planning allowed.  The outstanding acoustic performance of the room 
means that neither judges nor counsel nor public need strain to hear the proceedings 
clearly.166   
                                                
165 Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion. 
166 In the author’s personal experience, people speaking at normal volume in the public seating can clearly be 
heard from the bench at the opposite end of the courtroom. 
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Ill. 57 Curved bench, New Zealand coat of arms, and glass cabinets 
 
Ill. 58 Queen Anne inkwell 
 
Ill. 59 Waka huia  
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The bench is also the location of three of the key symbolic elements of the Supreme Court.  
First, the New Zealand coat of arms is prominently displayed on the wall behind the judges.  
Secondly, at the front of the bench are two glass boxes.  One contains a sterling silver 
inkwell gifted to the Supreme Court by the Privy Council in 2004 which was given to the 
Privy Council by Queen Anne in 1702 (Ill. 58).  The other contains a waka huia167 on loan to 
the Court from Te Papa Tongarewa/Museum of New Zealand, an indigenous counterpoint 
to the English inkwell (Ill. 59).  The waka huia was chosen by Roy Wilson and the Chief 
Justice on grounds of its similarity in size and age, but also because the specific waka huia 
selected lacks verified provenance meaning that it can be viewed as a universal symbol of a 
time and culture.168  Together the inkwell and waka huia symbolise the twin ancestors of 
New Zealand’s current legal system. 
Access to the interior of the Supreme Court building beyond the courtroom is restricted to 
staff and judges.  This area is spacious and primarily one for circulation, being both the 
understated link to the OHCB and the location of a glass elevator and the (unusually for this 
“light” building) massive spiral staircase leading to the first floor (Ill. 60).  The first floor is 
the most restricted part of the Supreme Court building, unsurprisingly given that it is the 
daily workplace of the nation’s most senior jurists.  The judges required that the planning of  
                                                
167 A “waka huia” is a vessel for containing objects of significance to the owner.  The name relates to the tail 
feathers of the huia bird (now extinct) which were worn by M ori of chiefly status in times past. 
168 Wilson, discussion. Some confusion exists as to the provenance of the waka huia.  Wilson stated that its 
provenance is unknown (Wilson, discussion); MoJ officials and the Chief Justice, however, has stated that it is 
of Te Atiawa origin (Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion; Sian Elias, “Speech at the Opening of the Supreme Court 
of New Zealand” (18 January 2010) http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/speeches-and-
papers/#speechpaper-list-2010) 
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Ill. 60 Ground floor staircase (OHCB beyond) 
their chambers promote collegiality between them;169 accordingly, the chambers are located 
around the perimeter of the building with open circulation around the courtroom which 
pushes through the floor level as it rises through the building (Ill. 61).  A “collegial” room is 
also reserved for the judges to meet and deliberate on judgments collectively.  Bookshelves 
line this circulation space giving it the feel of a modern public library while a glazed 
penetration in the floor describing the circumference of the courtroom permits a view to the 
ground floor (and vice versa) (Ill. 62).  The curve of the courtroom’s dome diffuses daylight 
through the space, and inviting movement around it (Ill. 63).  
Returning to the ground floor, occupants are able to enter the OHCB through what was 
once a judge’s chamber at the rear of the OHCB (Ill. 64).  The exemplary restoration of the 
                                                
169 This approach had previously been explored by WaM in the Parliament Refurbishment project, where 
carefully secured corridors now mean that passing politicians can freely discuss issues in a relatively public 
space.  Wilson, discussion. 
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OHCB means that moving from the Supreme Court building into the OHCB is like stepping 
back in time.   
 
Ill. 61 Judge’s chambers 
 
 
Ill. 62 First floor circulation space 
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Ill. 63 Light reflected off the courtroom into the first floor circulation space 
 
 
Ill. 64 Access between the Supreme Court and OHCB (former judge’s chamber)  
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The Old High Court Building  
Designed in 1878 by Pierre Finch Martineau Burrows (the “de facto Government architect 
of the day”170) the OHCB functioned as a Supreme Court from its opening in 1881 until 
1980 when it was renamed the High Court, and operated as such until 1993 when the current 
Wellington High Court building opened on Molesworth Street and the building was vacated.  
As noted in Chapter II, the OHCB was not the first Supreme Court in Wellington.  The 
construction of Wellington’s first Supreme Court building (located at the present-day 
intersection of Hunter Street and Lambton Quay) coincided with the shift of Government 
from Auckland to Wellington in 1865.171  It can be imagined that an expanding caseload 
being brought before the Court in the 1860s and 70s concomitant with the expansion of 
Wellington’s population after it became the nation’s capital meant that the original building 
quickly became too constrained for the Court’s purposes.  Cochran suggests also that the 
appointment in 1875 of Sir James Prendergast as New Zealand’s first Chief Justice to be 
permanently stationed in Wellington necessitated more appropriate and dignified 
accommodation for the Supreme Court.172  The availability of vacant land created by 
reclamations begun in 1875 meant commissioning of a new courthouse occurred little more 
than 10 years after the opening of the first Supreme Court.   
                                                
170 Chris Cochran, Supreme Court. 42 Stout Street. Conservation Report for the Ministry of Justice (Wellington, New 
Zealand: 2006), 24.  P F M Burrows succeeded Colonial Architect William Clayton but without the formal title.   
171 See p. 49 (Ill. 7). 
172 Cochran, Supreme Court Conservation Report, 39. 
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As previously mentioned, the OHCB is a designated heritage building under the Wellington 
City District Plan and (since 1981) a Category I Historic Place on the NZHPT Register.173  It 
was the first major masonry building in Wellington and originally the brick bearing walls 
rested on mass concrete footings supported by foundations of stout totara piles.174  The 
NZHPT describes the building as a “scholarly work having dignity and good proportions in 
its [Victorian] neo-classical style” which is “well mannered” and “relates happily to the 
adjacent Government Building of W H Clayton.”175  The cultural heritage significance of the 
OHCB is undeniable.  Conservation architect Chris Cochran notes the building has had a 
long association with administration of justice in New Zealand and is exemplary of a history 
of architectural change and adaptation over 130 years.176  Cochran’s Supreme Court Conservation 
Report provides a remarkably comprehensive architectural, historical and cultural description 
of the OHCB.  Appendix III contains excerpts from Cochran’s report which describe the 
architectural history, structure, planning, finishes, additions and services of the OHCB prior 
to its restoration, together with some relevant historical and contemporary architectural 
drawings. 177   
                                                
173 It should be noted that the heritage protections given to the OHCB prior to its use in the Supreme Court 
project extended only to the facade of the building.  The entire building (including interior finishes) became 
protected under the designation of the Supreme Court complex site by the Wellington City Council in April 
2007.  See Wellington City Council, “Council Decision – Notice of Requirement: Supreme Court of New 
Zealand” (12 April 2007) (Wellington, New Zealand). 
174 NZHPT, “High Court Building (Formerly Supreme Court Building” 
http://historic.org.nz/TheRegister/RegisterSearch/RegisterResults.aspx?RID=219&m=advanced 
175 Ibid. 
176 Wilson, et al., “Natural Justice,” 54. 
177 Cochran, Supreme Court Conservation Report.  The report was originally written for the MoJ in October 2006 
and revised in March 2007 for the Supreme Court project. 
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The courthouse originally had an expansive and unimpeded view to Lambton Harbour from 
its main entrance off Stout Street (Ill. 65).  There were three significant additions to the 
building designed by Government Architect John Campbell – two additions in 1907 and one 
in 1913 - which emulated the neo-classical style of Burrow’s original design, although it has 
been noted  
 
Ill. 65 OHCB (left) viewed from Thordon reclamation (c. 1881) 
that the later additions disturbed the strict symmetry of the original.178  Alterations within the 
building were far more numerous.  The Supreme Court Conservation Report notes over 100 
extant renovation drawings dating up to the 1970s, including the flooring over of two double 
                                                
178 Wilson, et al., “Natural Justice,” 54.  See Appendix 3. 
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height spaces, the rebuilding of stairs, the reconfiguration of offices, and the lowering of 
ceilings, all in styles generally contemporaneous with their periods of construction:179 
One of the challenges of the conservation of the building was how to treat these alterations.  Some 
changes were deeply integrated into the fabric of the building and had been made very early in its life, 
while other had quite distinct historic and aesthetic values of their own.  Examples of the latter are the 
upgrading of the Chief Justice's chambers in the 1950s, which saw the moulded Victorian finishes 
replaced with flush mahogany fittings and steel-framed windows, and the modernisation of 
Courtroom 3, where plywood, broad flush architraves, and a stark red and black panelled ceiling are 
evocative of the work of the 1960s.180 
As part of the Option C (Modified) brief for the Supreme Court project, the OHCB was 
painstakingly restored in accordance with the recommendations of the Supreme Court 
Conservation Report.  The 1981, 1913, and part of the 1907 additions to the northwest of the 
building were demolished to make way for the Supreme Court, although windows, doors and 
mouldings were salvaged where possible.181  By comparison with the Supreme Court, the 
OHCB’s material palette and detailing seem sumptuous by modern standards.  Heart matai 
tongue and groove flooring, kauri and rimu exterior and interior joinery and panelling, ornate 
plaster mouldings, carved timber friezes and patterned carpets are found throughout (Ill. 66).  
Some technologies were significantly updated in the restoration process, such as heating and 
ventilation systems and the introduction of insulated window units.  Spaces renovated during 
the original life of the building were largely retained and restored consistent with their period, 
for example the (original) Chief Justice’s chambers with its 1940s style mahogany joinery 
                                                
179 Cochran 
180 Wilson, et al., “Natural Justice,” 54. 
181 See Appendix III – Supreme Court Conservation Report (excerpts) 
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(Ill. 67).  All these elements were carefully restored by skilled artisans, many of whom re-
learned traditional techniques in order to honestly replicate the finishes of the 19th century 
original.182  Even graffiti carved into benches by persons remanded in the basement holding 
cells and journalists in the No. 1 Courtroom was saved (Ill. 68).  Some architectural elements 
lost over the years of renovation were rediscovered during the OHCB refurbishment.  For 
example, floorlights in the two upper galleries flanking the No. 1 Courtroom shown in the 
original drawings but no longer evident in the building were restored (Ill. 69), and original 
ventilation cavities in the masonry walls (possibly an early system of heating) were 
rediscovered and reused.  Given its heritage significance, only one major disturbance to the 
envelope of the building was made: new openings were cut through two walls of one of the 
original ground floor judge’s chambers to allow the linking of the OHCB with the Supreme 
Court building (Ill. 70). 
Naturally, some significant alterations were made to the OHCB as part of the Supreme Court 
project.  The whole building was base isolated and strengthened to meet modern seismicity 
regulations, which drew on WaM's experiences gained during the Parliament 
Refurbishment.183  The No. 1 Courtroom was fully restored (and is now once again available 
for use as a High Court courtroom), replete with original judge’s bench and baldacchino;184 
jury, counsel and press seating; prisoner’s dock; fluted cast-iron columns with Corinthian 
capitals supporting the public gallery; timber wall panelling with carved friezes; and plaster 
                                                
182 Wilson, et al., “Natural Justice,” 54. 
183 Structural engineering design was undertaken by Holmes Consulting Group Ltd.  Their work on the OHCB 
won them an Institution of Structural Engineers (IStructE) Award in 2010. 
184 The baldacchino (the carved timber canopy over the judge’s bench decorated with the English Royal Arms 
(used by New Zealand 1840-1911) and drapes) is thought to have originally been constructed for the 1865 
Wellington Supreme Court. Cochran, Supreme Court Conservation Report, 84. 
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architraves and pediments over doors and windows (Ill. 71).  The No. 2 and 3 Courtrooms, 
however, were modified; the No 2. Courtroom has been converted into the main function 
room for the Supreme Court complex (Ill. 72) and the No. 3 Courtroom into a similar multi-
functional space.  This is illustrative of the modern role of the OHCB.  While the No. 1 
Courtroom has regained some of its original function, the rest of the building now acts in a 
supporting role to the Supreme Court, providing it with ancillary space for staff and 
administration, as well housing the Institute of Judicial Studies, the professional development 
arm of the New Zealand judiciary. 
Just as the laying of the Supreme Court foundation stone on 1 December 1879 had been a 
significant public event,185 so too was the opening of the new Supreme Court on 18 January 
2010.  The Chief Justice had personally invited Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to the 
opening, who sent in her stead HRH Prince William (Ill. 73).  The opening of the Supreme 
Court complex marked a significant milestone in the history of New Zealand’s judicial 
architecture, with the rejuvenation of a building illustrative of 130 years of post-Treaty of 
Waitangi judicial history and the commissioning of one expressing the present and future of 
New Zealand’s judicial system. 
 
 
 
                                                
185 Some 2000 people attended the laying of the OHCB foundation stone, an event which involved a great deal 
of Masonic pomp and ceremony. 
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Ill. 66 OHCB lobby (entrance to No. 1 Courtroom on left) 
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Ill. 67 Former Chief Justice’s chamber, OHCB 
 
 
Ill. 68 Graffiti on press desk, No. 1 Courtroom, OHCB 
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Ill. 69 Floor lights surrounding No. 1 Courtroom, OHCB 
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Ill. 70 Link between Supreme Court and OHCB, view from Supreme Court 
 
 
Ill. 71 No. 1 Courtroom, OHCB 
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Ill. 72 No. 2 Courtroom, OHCB 
 
 
Ill. 73 HRH Prince William opening the New Zealand Supreme Court, 18 January 2010 
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Summary 
The Supreme Court project brief challenged architects Warren and Mahoney with the 
unusual juxtaposition of having to work with a significant heritage building with tight 
restrictions on adaptation and re-use, and a substantially open field of play in terms of 
appearance of the new courthouse.  Asked to design a Supreme Court that befitted the 
stature of the institution without being ostentatious, WaM adopted an approach that 
completely restored the OHCB, thus giving it a renewed life expectancy, and used the model 
of the former Supreme Court to inform the new.  Taking the single Supreme Court 
courtroom as their starting point, the architects took their cues as to the scale and rhythm, 
materials and planning of the Supreme Court from the OHCB.  Thus the architecture of the 
Supreme Court relates with respect and cohesion to the OHCB, yet represents a fresh 
consideration of the traditional courthouse typology, one that signals the nature of the 
administration of justice in New Zealand today, and into the future.  The architectural 
embodiment of that nature – the aspirations of the judicial system – in the Supreme Court 
complex’s architecture is the subject of detailed assessment in Chapter VI, Representing Justice.  
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VI.  
Representing Justice 
 
Regarding the value of civic spaces, Richard Francis-Jones of the Australian architecture firm 
Francis-Jones Morehen Thorp has said that “the most important thing is you somehow have 
to create a structure that embodies the social values of the time.  The buildings need to 
capture a spirit of the select group of people involved to capture their aspirations.”186  This is 
certainly true of the New Zealand Supreme Court.  Chapter VI of this thesis assesses the 
success of the Supreme Court complex as an embodiment of judicial aspirations.  Armed 
with theoretical perspectives on the role judicial architecture plays in communicating judicial 
aspirations, knowledge of the Supreme Court’s judicial aspirations expressed in the Court’s 
legislation and briefing process, and an understanding of the complex’s built form, this 
Chapter refocuses attention on the assumption stated at the outset of this study, namely, that 
the architecture of the Supreme Court complex legibly responds to its briefing process and, 
in doing so, expresses the aspirations of the New Zealand justice system at the beginning of 
the 21st century.  Based on the judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court identified in Chapter 
IV, this assessment is made under three thematic headings:  
1) Heritage and Independence, which draws on theories of the role of heritage conservation in 
identity formation to assess architectural expressions of concepts of judicial 
independence within the context of New Zealand’s legal history and traditions;  
                                                
186 Nicola Harvey, “Art World” Mindfood (Apr 2010), 61. 
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2) An Indigenous Court, which draws on theories of cohesive and differentiating symbolic 
gestures and of landscape as symbol of national identity to consider how the Supreme 
Court complex expresses the indigeneity of its condition; and 
3) The Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty, which assesses notions of “openness” of the 
Supreme Court institution such as access and transparency that are expressed in the 
Court’s architecture, and architectural design moves in the Supreme Court complex that 
reinforce the tenet of Parliamentary sovereignty within New Zealand’s constitutional 
framework. 
Unlike previous chapters, the key findings of Chapter VI will not be summarised at the end 
of this section, but rather formal conclusions will be made in the closing chapter. 
Heritage and Independence 
The section 3(1)(a)(i) purpose of the Supreme Court recognises that a unique legal system 
has evolved in New Zealand while also recognising the role New Zealand’s colonial heritage 
and legal traditions have played in that evolution.  It is suggested that an identifiable Supreme 
Court building expresses the Court’s independence from its colonial umbilicus, while the 
restoration and incorporation of the OHCB is an important and  appropriate counterpoint 
within the Supreme Court complex, recalling the centuries-old legal and architectural heritage 
from which the Supreme Court evolved.  This section assesses questions of continuity and 
change in the Supreme Court architecture: does the design of the Supreme Court represent a 
radical shift in New Zealand judicial architecture or simply a reformulation of the status quo?  
What does any such shift or reformulation tell us about the nature of the judicial system in 
New Zealand? 
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As described in Chapter II, New Zealand’s judicial system (including its architecture) is 
predominantly English in heritage.  As previously discussed, architectural styles imported 
from England informed New Zealand’s judicial architecture into the 1930s, after which time 
more international influences of Art Deco and Modernism became incorporated.  A 
relatively young country with few extant examples of built heritage, attachment to heritage 
buildings is strong in New Zealand and many former (and current) courthouses have 
NZHPT registration.  As noted earlier, limitations on reconfiguration permitted under the 
OHCB’s heritage protections meant that the Justice Park site between the OHCB and 
Lambton Quay was adopted as the site of the new Supreme Court.  Adding the Supreme 
Court to the OHCB became a fitting opportunity (viewed at least through the lens of this 
research) to architecturally explore juxtapositions relating to history/tradition and 
future/innovation in judicial architecture.  It is useful at this stage, therefore, to consider in 
general terms the value retaining the OHCB as part of the Supreme Court complex had in 
terms of heritage and identity.   
One important point raised in the Supreme Court Conservation Report was that the OHCB 
provided a continuous link with the administration of justice in New Zealand over 130 years. 
187  The Supreme Court architects retained the historic fabric, renovating and innovating as 
they went to include contemporary environmental engineering systems while retaining 
important features from not only the 1800s, but also the 1940s, 1960s and 1990s.  As noted 
in Chapter V, the only major exceptions to the generally conservationist approach were the 
                                                
187 Cochran, Supreme Court Conservation Report, 66. 
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linking of the two buildings and the collateral removal of the 1981 extension (which was in 
any event not considered to have any heritage significance).188 
Restoring the OHCB was more significant in this context than simply renovating an old 
building.  A significant corollary of restoring the OHCB was that it anchored the Supreme 
Court within a recognisable context and heritage.  As Howard notes:  
 a major outcome of conserving and interpreting heritage, whether intended or not, is to provide 
identity [...].  There may be other purposes as well, such as legitimation, cultural capital and sheer 
monetary value, but the common purpose is to make some people feel better, more rooted and more 
secure.189 
This grounding of the Supreme Court was important for the founding of a new legal 
tradition in New Zealand.  There had been significant concern from some sectors of the legal 
and business communities that the new Supreme Court would lead to an era of judicial 
activism by a bench that felt unfettered by the past.  However, as the Chief Justice said: 
The reference to New Zealand’s history and traditions in the statute does not prompt any wholesale 
reassessment of our law.  The history and traditions of the [English] common law are our history and 
traditions.  So too are the great charters of England, such as the Magna Carta.  In its origin, this 
history and tradition predates European knowledge of New Zealand by centuries.  To that extent it is 
an inherited tradition.  But to a substantial extent English law is not inherited history but part of our 
own direct history.190 
                                                
188 Ibid., 130. 
189 Peter Howard, Heritage: Management, Interpretation, Identity (London: Continuum, 2003), 147. 
190 Sian Elias, “Supreme Court Special Sitting Speech.” 
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The OHCB is emblematic of the direct history of the Supreme Court to which the Chief 
Justice refers, but this grounding within the traditional judicial architecture typology goes 
further than simply having the OHCB to hand as a reference point.  For all that at first 
glance appears divergent between the OHCB and the Supreme Court, a remarkable amount 
of the latter remains consistent with the 19th century courthouse typology.  Were he to be 
revived to the 21st century, Chief Justice Prendergast (who opened the OHCB in 1881) might 
be startled at the latent effects Modernism has had on judicial architecture, but he would 
most likely clearly understand the planning and function of the Supreme Court building and 
courtroom due to these consistencies.   
As noted in Chapter IV, the design brief stipulated entry to the Supreme Court from 
Lambton Quay.  Given that this entrance would be diametrically opposed to the entrance to 
the OHCB on Stout Street, it made sense for the architects to employ the axial planning of 
the OHCB in the Supreme Court building.191  The entry to the Supreme Court further 
mirrors that of the OHCB with its air lock for security and to protect from inclement 
Wellington weather.  Primacy is clearly given to the central courtroom in each building with 
supporting spaces surrounding.  There is a clear relationship between the materials employed 
in the two courthouses.  The rendered masonry and rich native timbers of the OHCB are 
echoed in the basalt, concrete and pale beech of the Supreme Court.  Both have New 
Zealand wool carpets, and glazing for daylight and view features in both, albeit that the 
proportion of glazing to volume in the Supreme Court would have been technically 
impossible when Burrows designed the OHCB.   
                                                
191 See Appendix IV – Supreme Court – Architectural Drawings. 
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Even the copper roofing of the OHCB finds its relations in the copper roofing and bronze 
screen of the Supreme Court (Ill. 74).  The basis for the planning of the two courthouses is 
as near to identical as possible with arrangements of courtrooms surrounded by offices and 
ancillary spaces.  Externally, the scale of the Supreme Court is intentionally sympathetic to 
the OCHB; the rhythm of the classical proportions of the OHCB informs the fenestration 
and rhythm of the p hutukawa/r t  screen.  It is suggested that this symmetrical 
connecting with the past is significant as it suggests order, stability, and permanence in the 
new Court.192 
 
Ill. 74 Supreme Court complex from above 
 
                                                
192 Cf. René Smeets, Signs, Symbols and Ornaments (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1973) and Rudolf 
Arnheim, The Dynamics of Architectural Form (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 
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In the midst of all this intentional consistency with the past, what is there to give the public 
confidence that the Supreme Court is also concerned with the future of New Zealand’s 
justice system?  The most appreciable aspect of the Supreme Court that evinces the future of 
the administration of justice in New Zealand is the form of the courtroom.  The ovoid form 
of the courtroom is highly innovative in the New Zealand context and internationally.  
Comparisons have been drawn between the New Zealand Supreme Court and the Bordeaux 
Law Courts (1998), which also have exposed, rounded courtrooms.193  However, the 
planning of the courts’ interiors is orthogonal in the Bordeaux scheme and much more akin 
to the OHCB than the Supreme Court (Ill. 75-77).  Drawing on Arnheim, Goodsell suggests 
that a rounded form gives users a greater sense of personal significance: 
Arnheim suggests that round rooms give occupants the feeling that they are the focal point of 
attention; radial vectors seem to extend from their bodies outward to the surrounding surfaces.  If 
domed ceilings are then added in a kind of vertical-axis spatial sculpting, a degree of concavity obtains, 
thus forming a comforting hollow into which the occupants can fit.194 
While the form of the courtroom was primarily driven by the judges’ requirement for a 
curved bench, any psychological effect of the architectural outcome, while unintentional, 
should not be discounted.   
  
                                                
193 The Bordeaux Law Courts designed by Richard Rogers Partnership (1998) were a precedent studied in 
relation to the Supreme Court project.  Other precedents investigated included the High Court of Australia and 
the Singapore Supreme Court.  Wilson, discussion; Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion. 
194 Goodsell, The Social Meaning of Civic Space, p. 37, citing Arnheim, op. cit.. 
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Ill. 75 Bordeaux Law Courts 
 
Ill. 76 Bordeaux Law Courts (transverse section) 
 
Ill. 77 Bordeaux Law Courts (plan)  
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The Supreme Court has a very different gravitas to it compared with the OHCB.  What 
might now been seen as the opulence and stuffiness of the restored OHCB No. 1 
Courtroom (which was, in its day, seen as only appropriate for the status of the Court and its 
judges) has given way to a perceptibly more relaxed atmosphere, of which the reduced 
elevation of the bench compared with the traditional courtroom and more inclusive in-the-
round form is symptomatic.  The differences between the OHCB and Supreme Court in this 
respect reflect that the judicial system has greatly relaxed its formality since the late 19th 
century, for example, full court dress is now restricted to ceremonial occasions (Ill. 78), there 
is a conscious effort to use “plain English” language in the Court, and a much more collegial 
work environment was desired by the judges.   
It is suggested that the materiality of the Supreme Court courtroom supports this view. 195  
Further, the modern administration of justice requires the incorporation of technology like 
never before, and this is certainly true in the Supreme Court, but the careful incorporation of 
technology so that it assists and facilitates but does not distract from or impede judicial 
proceedings.196  The new courthouse has functional requirements that have tested the 
architects’ precision of design and innovation.  Indeed functional requirements give it much 
of its impact – it was acoustic performance which necessitated the faceted cone-like interior.  
There can be no doubt that the new courtroom is a significant development of (rather than a 
departure from) the traditional typology.  All said and done, it is clear that the Supreme 
Court building has as its direct architectural ancestor the OHCB (and thus the antecedents to 
                                                
195 In The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, Charles Jencks suggests that “dark-stained wood suggest formality 
while light-stained or natural wood speaks of informality”.  See Charles Jencks, The Language of Post-Modern 
Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1977), 131. 
196 This was a requirement of the judges.  Wilson, discussion. 
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the OHCB in English judicial architecture).  This clear relationship grounds and reinforces 
the identity of the Supreme Court within (and as symbol of) the New Zealand judicial 
system.  Just whose identity is reinforced remains uncertain however.  
 
Ill. 78 Senior members of the judiciary (in red gowns) attend the opening of Parliament 
 
Trapeznik & McLean have observed that a sense of collective identity incorporating 
commonly agreed-upon cultural values enables us to speak of “our” or “national” heritage.197  
In her speech at the opening of the Supreme Court building, the Chief Justice noted that 
New Zealand’s legal traditions date back many centuries, but recognised that: 
[I]n these islands we have other traditions.  Some were shaped by our history as a country already 
occupied by M ori. [...].  English law adapted to meet those local conditions. [...].  Other traditions 
arose from the experiences of our young country.  [...].  All of these strands of history and memory 
                                                
197 Alexander Trapeznik & Gavin McLean, “Public History, Heritage and Place” in Alexander Trapeznik (ed.) 
Common Ground?  Heritage and Public Places in New Zealand (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2000), 13-24, 15.  
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contribute to a distinctive New Zealand legal tradition.  The Supreme Court is set up to operate 
consciously within it, not to tear it down.198 
A key symbol of the dual heritages and traditions of New Zealand’s judicial systems is the 
side-by-side display of the Queen Anne inkwell and waka huia in front of the Supreme Court 
bench:  
Her Majesty has shown interest in the Court from its creation.  Then she sent us a magnificent silver 
inkwell, part of the Royal Treasury.  Two such inkwells are placed before the Judges of the Privy 
Council whenever they sit to advise the Monarch on petitions for justice, as they did on appeals from 
New Zealand for 165 years.  The display of the inkwell in this new courtroom symbolises links that 
endure and a heritage of which we are proud.  […]  In this courtroom the Queen’s inkwell is matched 
with a beautiful waka huia kindly lent to us by Te Papa.  The waka huia is thought to date from the 
same time as the inkwell which, by British reckoning, is from the reign of Queen Anne. It is likely that 
the tangata whenua of this region, Te Atiawa, whose taonga it is, would date the waka huia in some 
other way since the first British monarch of whom they became aware was George III. The two 
taonga represent the two strands of our original heritage.199 
The display of the inkwell and waka huia is understatedly significant.  One need only refer to 
the British Royal Arms that hangs above the bench in the OHCB No. 1 Courtroom to sense 
how far New Zealand jurisprudence has come since 1881 (Ill. 79).  That said, it is suggested 
that the Supreme Court complex nevertheless ignores a perspective of the heritage and 
traditions of the Court that might take cognisance of a pluralist history of the institution, 
particularly one which recognises the impacts on M ori the workings of the judicial system 
has had since 1840.   
                                                
198 Sian Elias, “Supreme Court Special Sitting Speech.”  
199 Sian Elias, ““Supreme Court Opening Speech.” 
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As Trapeznik & McLean observe: 
[T]he heritage sector has been slow to embrace the concept of pluralism.  Indeed, heritage advocates 
most frequently adopt a Pollyanna-like attitude to the collective symbols of the past.  They rarely 
portray heritage as being about alienation.  Instead, they talk about pride and community cohesion, 
spinning tales of success, not failure.  In doing so, they increasingly market heritage as a commodity, 
producing a past that did not exist in order to promote the interests of the tourist industry, property 
developers, the keepers of public culture and the promoters of national identity. […]  Just like the 
artfully staged photographs of buildings in some coffee table books, heritage often implies a past 
bereft of people, their ideas, or their struggles.200 
 
Ill. 79 Baldacchino with British Royal Arms, No. 1 Courtroom, OHCB 
                                                
200 Trapeznik & McLean, “Public History,” 15. It is positive to note, however, that the evolution of the building 
and traces of human presence have mostly been retained, for example, in preferences in office fit out from the 
1940s and 1960s, graffiti in the OCHB holding cells, and the Lord Cooke library collection.  However, it is 
notable that the copper exterior of the courtroom, a potentially rich palimpsest of human presence in the 
Supreme Court, has, since opening, been coated with a mark-resistant coating in order that fingerprints (and 
other marks) be easily removed, although to date no “Do Not Touch” sign has been placed in the lobby. 
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Care must be taken, however, not to be historically relativistic in this regard.  Rather than 
reading the Supreme Court complex as ignorant of the multiple strands of influence on the 
judicial system various communities have provided, one might observe that the history of the 
Court and judicial system has, in fact, been predominantly monocultural, and that the 
restoration of the OHCB vis-à-vis the Supreme Court stands an apt testament to that 
condition.  This should not, however, excuse an intentional ignorance of that condition.  If it 
is to be accepted that the Supreme Court’s architecture expresses the independence of the 
institution within the context of its heritage and traditions (which this study does), then the 
question must be asked: As the highest court in the land, what does the Supreme Court 
building say about the “New Zealand-ness” of the judicial system at the beginning of the 21st 
century?  This is the focus of the next section, An Indigenous Court. 
An Indigenous Court 
One of the key institutional purposes of the Supreme Court is to establish an indigenous 
court of final appeal, one that administers justice with a recognition, understanding and 
application of New Zealand’s unique jurisprudential conditions.  This purpose begs a 
number of questions: What about the Supreme Court building speaks of the indigeneity of its 
situation?  What does it say about the “New Zealand-ness” of doing justice in this country?  
What is included in that conceptualisation? Perhaps more importantly, what is omitted? 
There are a number of ways in which the indigeneity of the Supreme Court might have been 
architecturalised in its building, means most easily summarised in the context of this research 
as planning, materials, and symbolism.  As the preceding discussion revealed, the planning of 
the Supreme Court represents a minor shift from the status quo of traditional courthouse 
planning in the common law world.  It is suggested that an expression of the indigeneity of 
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the Court is not to be found in its planning.  The building’s materials offer more by way of 
indigenous expression through the use of native silver beech timber in the interior panelling 
of the courtroom and the New Zealand basalt stone work of the building’s plinth.  However, 
the majority of the materials expressed in the building, while locally sourced insofar as 
possible, are not uniquely indigenous in nature or use.  It is suggested, therefore, that the 
significant expressions of the indigeneity of the Supreme Court are to be found in the Court 
building’s symbolic devices. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, compared with the strict functional requirements it details, the 
Supreme Court brief is notably unspecific on the issue of how the architecture might express 
the indigeneity of the Court.  As was described in Chapter IV, the brief and its supporting 
documentation (in all the various iterations to which the researcher has been given access) 
required only that the building’s exterior “reflect the status of the Supreme Court as the 
repository of New Zealand law and the apex of the third arm of Government” and “not be 
ostentatious but [...] be of substance and of enduring design.”  While indigeneity has often 
been expressed in New Zealand’s built environment through an engagement with M ori 
iconography (for example in Cliff Whiting’s sculpture for the Christchurch courthouse Nga 
Kete Wananga (“The Baskets of Knowledge”, 1989) (Ill. 80)), this approach was specifically 
excluded in the Supreme Court project.  As outlined in Chapter IV, it was clearly articulated 
by those involved in the Supreme Court project design development interviewed for this 
research that the Court architecture should avoid culturally specific symbolism or 
iconography in the building in order that no cultural ownership of building (and thus, by 
extension, the institution) be expressed or implied.  This stance infers an assumption that the 
cultural neutrality of the building was desirable in order to express the cultural impartiality of 
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the institution.  Although couched by interviewees in terms that presented this direction as 
relating to any of New Zealand’s constituent cultural groups, the assumed concern of the 
judiciary was that, given the tribally specific nature of traditional M ori building crafts,201 
there could be no way of “de-tribing” any M ori iconography employed, which could lead 
to the impression that a particular hap  or iwi held some sort of dominion over the building. 
 
Ill. 80 Nga Kete  Wananga , Cliff Whiting, 1989 
 
That point of view is not without rational basis.  As Julie Paama-Pengelly notes, traditional 
M ori art and design express and reinforce whakapapa202 and m tauranga M ori203 which 
                                                
201 By crafts I refer to carving, weaving and construction techniques employed in traditional Maori buildings. 
202 The term “whakapapa” refers to a person’s genealogy, but extends far beyond immediate familial 
relationships to include tribal relationships with anthropomorphised entities such as meeting houses and 
mountains. 
203 The term “m tauranga M ori” refers here to traditional M ori knowledge, understanding, wisdom and 
skills. 
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permeate M ori culture and society and thus express strong tribal individuation.204  
According to tikanga M ori any role of expressing a M ori cultural perspective in the 
Supreme Court building would fall to Te Atiawa, who have tangata whenua205 status in 
relation to the Supreme Court site.206  Indeed Te Atiawa did play an important role in the 
Supreme Court project, being consulted by the architects in relation to the selection of a 
waka huia to be displayed alongside the Queen Anne inkwell207 and laying three mauri stones 
from Mount Taranaki at the steps of the Supreme Court during construction, representing 
the life force or the essence of the building and the important work to be conducted there in 
the future.208   
It is suggested that attempting to achieve cultural neutrality in a civic building such as a 
courthouse is nonsensical and, moreover, impossible.  As has been discussed above, the 
OHCB is exemplary of late 19th century judicial architecture in New Zealand and the 
Supreme Court, while certainly representing an evolved version of the traditional courthouse, 
still embodies an overwhelmingly English lineage in its design.  No one considering the 
Supreme Court could reasonably hold a view that the building has at its heart and heritage 
anything other than the inherited English courthouse model, albeit updated for the 21st 
century.  The formal relationship of the Supreme Court building to the OHCB is perceptibly 
one of cohesion and complement, not challenge and departure.  The colonial status quo reigns 
                                                
204 Paama-Pengelly, Ma ̄ori Art and Design, 10. 
205 This term is commonly translated as “local people; hosts; people of the land.” 
206 Wellington City Council, Wellington City District Plan (Wellington, New Zealand: 2000), para. 2.5.1. 
207 Wilson, discussion.  This would seem to support the Chief Justice’s comments (see p 148 supra) that the 
waka huia selected has some Te Atiawa provenance. 
208 Georgina Te Heuheu, “Mauri Stone Laid at New Supreme Court” (3 March 2009) (Wellington, New 
Zealand) http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/mauri-stone-laid-new-supreme-court  
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and is evident in symbolic gestures such as the New Zealand coat of arms over the entrance 
and in the courtroom, the relationship of the Queen Elizabeth II-gifted inkwell to the waka 
huia of intentionally obscure provenance, and the nods to M ori culture in the borrowed 
artworks in the secure, private areas of the courthouse.  Even the so-called tukutuku screens 
in the courtroom could more easily be described as having a traditional European tabby 
weave pattern (Ill. 81-83).  The entire architectural tradition and heritage embodied in 
building is P keh , making the Court itself a symbol of P keh  cultural ownership over 
the administration of justice in this country.  The significance of this condition should not be 
downplayed. 
While the situation concerning tribal identification within carvings and weaving may be 
problematic, it is suggested that it would not have been impossible to resolve.  Many 
examples exist of architecture mediating the uncertain ground of representing more than one 
M ori tribal group in a coherent and cohesive way.  Fairly recent examples which may be 
cited are the carved meeting houses Te Hono ki Hawaiki at Te Papa Tongarewa/Museum of 
New Zealand (Ill. 84) and Te Wharenui Ngakau Mahaki at the Unitec Institute of Technology 
Mount Albert campus in Auckland (Ill. 85).  The reality of the situation is, however, that the 
architects (at the direction of their clients) deliberately avoided references to cultures other 
than P keh  in what was ab initio an impossible attempt to make the building appear 
culturally neutral.  To many immersed in the hegemonic cultural order this move can actually 
be viewed as very successful; nothing in the building challenges a view that the citizens the 
Court serves – New Zealanders of every ethnicity, race and creed – have identities or 
interests that diverge in any way from the hegemonic culture.  However, it is suggested that 
this move, rather than being encompassing of the nation as a whole, is alienating of those  
154 
 
 
 
 
Ill. 81 Woven copper screens 
 
Ill. 82 Plain weave fabric 
 
Ill. 83 Tukutuku panel  
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Ill. 84 Te Hono ki  Hawaiki , Cliff Whiting, 1989 
 
Ill. 85 Te Wharenui  Ngakau Mahaki , Lyonel Grant, 2009  
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who do not identify with the hegemonic order.  Moreover, this approach is particularly 
concerning given the centrality of the living Treaty relationship to New Zealand’s legal, 
constitutional, and social fabric which was outlined in Chapter II.  So, if the Court avoids 
non-P keh  cultural ownership and expression of the significance of the Treaty 
relationship between M ori and the Crown, how then is the indigeneity of the Court 
expressed?  How is this expression to be read and understood?   
The most significant symbolic move in the Supreme Court building is the use of indigenous 
natural resource emblems as symbols of nationhood, namely the pōhutukawa/rātā screen 
and the kauri cone.  If cultural symbolism is undesirable for the Supreme Court, what makes 
symbolism drawn from New Zealand’s natural environment appropriate?   
As Bell & Lyall observe, one effect of globalisation has been an urgent assertion and 
celebration of national identity.  Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s conceptualisation of 
nationhood as an imagined community,209 Bell & Lyall summarise the criteria for present-day 
nationhood as: 
[A] specific piece of territory; common language; social, cultural, or economic traditions and 
institutions; artefacts, rituals, and practices passed from one generation to the next; respect for 
emblems and symbols; myths of origin; a common sense of history; an imagined idea of community 
with fellow nationals; a sense of distinction from other nation groups; pride and sorrow about past 
achievements and disasters; and shared hopes for a shared future.210 
  
                                                
209 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities.  Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (rev. ed.) 
(London: Verso, 2006). 
210 Claudia Bell & John Lyall, The Accelerated Sublime: Landscape, Tourism and Identity (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
2001), 171. 
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Using these criteria, where is New Zealand, a bi-(or multi-)cultural nation, to find its 
symbolic common ground?  Many of the criteria could potentially be politically and socially 
divisive (or contentious at least), for example cultural institutions and contested territories.  
New Zealand’s natural environment, however, is a widely respected, cohesive symbol which 
supports the imagined ideal of nationhood.  According to Bell & Lyall, the reason for the 
adoption of landscape as national symbol is that: 
Nature predates recorded human history.  The past brings with it thousands of years of myths and 
legends about nature untainted by humanity, visions of primeval forests, mysterious mountains, 
pellucid lakes; a nature modified only by the elements, not by human activity.211   
The landscape, innocent bystander free of the shackles of subjective human history, 
therefore becomes something which is part of all New Zealanders without belonging to any 
one person or group, a common ground free of cultural ownership, instantly recognisable as 
“New Zealand.”  It is the ultimate, enduring, cohesive symbol.212  As MoJ officials noted, this 
recognisability was a key reason the natural environment references in the Court’s design 
were so attractive to the project’s proponents: 
I think it’s fair to say that it was really important that the building represented New Zealand and that it 
was recognisable by people of New Zealand as something that derived from their country.  So that 
took you pretty quickly to flora and fauna as opposed to other cultural connotations.213 
The landscape symbolism in the Supreme Court is not so generic as common New Zealand 
motifs of “beach”, “birds”, “mountain” or “forest” however, the symbols are very specific 
                                                
211 Ibid. 
212 A well-known M ori proverb states “Whatungarongaro te tangata, toitu te whenua” (Each generation 
passes in its turn, but the land remains). 
213 Hampton/Jeppesen, discussion. 
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trees: kauri, p hutukawa and r t  (Ill. 86-88).214  For Philip Simpson the reasons for 
selecting these symbols is clear: 
[T]here are just a handful of native plants that are readily recognised by most New Zealanders: 
cabbage trees and flax for their distinctive form, kauri for its remarkable size […], kanuka and manuka 
because of their floral displays and widespread occurrence, and kowhai for its noticeable yellow 
flowers.  P hutukawa and r t , however, are known and appreciated for all of these.215 
Kauri, p hutukawa and r t  are cherished by New Zealanders and feature prominently in 
the lists of protected trees in many parts of New Zealand, for example the p hutukawa in 
the grounds Old Saint Pauls Church in Wellington and in the grounds of Parliament.216  
P hutukawa have even been planted along the Supreme Court’s street frontages (Ill. 89).  
Such is the ubiquity of p hutukawa in Wellington that many people mistakenly consider it 
native to the region; in fact, (and perhaps ironically) p hutukawa were first planted in 
Wellington in 1880, contemporaneous with the construction of the OHCB.217  
Kauri, p hutukawa and r t  are also tree species loaded with historical, social, and cultural 
meaning for M ori and P keh  New Zealanders alike.  Simpson’s monograph, 
P hutukawa and R t : New Zealand's Iron-hearted Trees, describes the meaning attached by 
M ori to p hutukawa and r t  thus: 
                                                
214 In the case of the screen, the p hutukawa and r t  symbols merge, symbolising the meeting in middle of 
the country of the North Island p hutukawa (Meterosideros excelsa), the northern r t  (Meterosideros umbellata) 
and the southern r t  (Meterosideros robusta).  Wilson, discussion. 
215 Philip Simpson, P hutukawa and R t : New Zealand's Iron-hearted Trees (Wellington: Te Papa Press, 2005), 
198. 
216 Notably, a protected p hutukawa tree stands opposite the offices of Warren and Mahoney in The Terrace, 
Wellington.  This is apparently coincidental, however – as stated at n. 150 (supra) the screen was designed out of 
the firm’s Christchurch office.  Wilson, Discussion. 
217 Simpson, P hutukawa and R t , 208. 
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Te r t  whakaruruhau is a concept that seems to represent best the core of the M ori response to 
r t  (including p hutukawa).  The phrase is used to refer to people who are particularly well thought 
of, comparing them in a positive way to the structural and ecological aspects of the tree – it means, 
literally, ‘to provide shelter’.  From the botanical standpoint, there are several characteristics of r t  
that correspond to the qualities of a person who gives shelter, in particular the great size of some trees, 
their strength and their longevity.  A person given the appellation ‘te r t  whakaruruhau’ would have 
commitment, wisdom, a commanding presence, and a strong sense of place and belonging.  He or she 
would have the personality to lead and protect others, and the resources to provide for them.  In 
addition, such a person would show the way for others, perhaps descendants, to follow a similar 
pathway.218 
Kauri also have significant anthropomorphic symbolism in Māori culture; former prime 
minister Helen Clark noted the passing of the Māori queen Te Ariki Dame Te 
Atairangikaahu as the falling of a mighty kauri,219 while New Zealand’s largest known living 
kauri tree bears the name of the Māori deity Tāne Mahuta.220  Kauri are symbols of the 
pioneering spirit of immigrant Europeans who felled timber and dug kauri gum in the very 
early days of New Zealand’s settlement, but are also symbols of native flora and fauna 
conservation efforts in the 20th century.  Pōhutukawa (a coastal species) and rātā (a mountain 
tree with northern and southern variants) romanticise care-free summers and the harshness 
of the alpine environment respectively (Ill. 90).  As symbols of nationhood kauri,  
                                                
218 Simpson, P hutukawa and R t , 131. 
219 Helen Clark, “Te Ariki Dame Te Atairangikaahu” (15 August 2006) 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/26785 
220 See Department of Conservation – Tane Mahuta Track http://www.doc.govt.nz/parks-and-
recreation/tracks-and-walks/northland/kauri-coast/tane-mahuta-track/.  In traditional M ori cosmology, 
T ne Mahuta was the son of the sky father, Ranginui, and the earth mother, Papatuanuku. It was T ne 
Mahuta who separated his parents’ tight embrace, thus creating the heaven-earth dichotomy.  T ne Mahuta is 
considered father to all living creatures of the forest, including mankind.  See Margaret Orbell, The Concise 
Encyclopedia of M ori Myth and Legend (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 1998). 
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Ill. 86 Kauri tree 
 
Ill. 87 P hutukawa blossoms 
 
Ill. 88 R t  blossoms  
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p hutukawa and r t  can be everything to everyone and have represented New Zealand in 
a multitude of representational forms, from stamps and postcards to banknotes and beer 
labels, from television advertisements for electricity generation companies to medals for the 
1990 Commonwealth Games in Auckland (Ill. 91).221   
 
Ill. 89 P hutukawa planted on Whitmore Street frontage  
                                                
221 Simpson, P hutukawa and R t , p. 258. 
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Ill. 90 An advertisement relying on p hutukawa’s links with the New Zealand summer 
 
 
Ill. 91 P hutukawa on a New Zealand postage stamp  
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Because of M ori connections with kauri, p hutukawa and r t , appropriating them 
symbolically also permits a conflation of the “native” with the “indigenous” whereby M ori 
interests can easily be subjugated into the notion of the prehistoric nature of landscape.  This 
“land before time” conceptualisation of natural resource symbolism can also be used to 
reinforce a romanticised connection with the land, a strategy employed by American 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his promotion of nature preservation: 
[Roosevelt] believed that the sublime landscape was not only inspiring for its romantic spirit, but also 
an important part of his nation’s history, and embodied national characteristics and the democratic 
ideals of the nation.  It was worth preserving for those reasons.  The lack of cultural history in a new 
land meant a turning to nature instead, to emblematize the nation’s historic identity and uniqueness.222 
That said, the point was made in Chapter III that any given symbol stands for a field of 
meaning; it must therefore be recognised that even the landscape does not always offer a 
stable point of reference: 
While many New Zealanders define their (imagined) sense of national and cultural identity in terms of 
their relationship with the land, this embodies a range of landscapes and of symbolisms that often are 
at odds with one another.223 
In the case of the New Zealand Supreme Court, however, it is suggested that the perceived 
eternalness of the natural world is intentionally drawn upon to lend legitimacy and 
indigeneity to the institution.  Recalling Gusfield’s characterisation of symbolic gestures as 
cohesive or differentiating explored in Chapter II, it is suggested that the value of landscape 
                                                
222 Bell & Lyall, The Accelerated Sublime, p. 176. 
223 Thierry Jutel, “Lord of the Rings: Landscape, Transformation, and the Geography of the Virtual” in Claudia 
Bell and Steve Matthewman (eds.) Cultural Studies in Aotearoa New Zealand.  Identity, Space and Place (Auckland: 
Oxford University Press), 54-65, 57. 
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symbolism in the Supreme Court is that it is a cohesive gesture which permits an 
identification by all New Zealanders with a sense of nationhood that is personal yet 
collective, as opposed to ethnically derived symbolic gestures which are, by their very nature, 
differentiating.   
This is a significant expressive function of the Supreme Court building.  It is important to 
emphasise here that the foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that an either/or 
dichotomy exists in the types symbols that might be employed in the Supreme Court to 
signify judicial aspirations in New Zealand.  Rather it is suggested that both culturally 
referential differentiating gestures (acknowledging and reinforcing the constitutional 
involvement of the Court in the extant M ori-Crown Treaty relationship) and nationally 
cohesive gestures (providing a reference point outside the traditional and thereby 
emphasising the super-national nature of the Court) could (and arguably should) have been 
made in this building.  More is needed than an inkwell and waka huia to satisfy that demand.  
Observers are still left questioning what the Supreme Court has to say about the nature of 
NZ justice, today and into the future.  Perhaps the answer to that question is that it is not so 
much the content but rather the process of justice in New Zealand that is important.  This is the 
subject of the next section, The Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
The Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty 
As was outlined in Chapter II, the rule of law is a fundamental tenet of our legal system and 
one so constitutionally important that upholding it is recognised as a key purpose of the 
Supreme Court.  There are two key aspects of the rule of law that are particularly pertinent to 
the present discussion: 1) access to justice, and 2) the institutional independence of the 
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Supreme Court, tempered by its subjugation to Parliamentary sovereignty.  This section 
explores how the architecture of the Supreme Court complex expresses these two aspects. 
Access to Justice 
As one of the key policy drivers for patriating New Zealand’s court of final appeal, the idea 
of “access to justice” has been somewhat nebulously employed by a variety of stakeholders 
in relation to the Supreme Court.  It certainly encompasses the jurisdictional access to the 
Court enabled by the broadening of rights of appeal under the SCA, as opposed to the 
relatively limited rights of appeal to the Privy Council.  It also refers to the public’s physical 
and symbolic access to the Court and its processes, a quality which American researchers on 
courthouse design Pati, Bose & Zimring call “openness.”  As the LRCWA clearly expressed 
in the Review of the Justice System consultation document: 
Law courts display a myriad of approaches to space enclosures, courtroom layout, and circulation 
management.  Many courts evoke classical themes with a strong infusion of hierarchy and clear 
delineation of space.  The ‘vision’ many courts embody is one of authority, tradition and exclusion.  
The spaces are not just separated from the outside world.  Each internal space is discrete; courtrooms, 
registry areas, galleries, chambers, jury box, deliberation room and in the courtroom itself the bench, 
the bar tables and the dock.  The enclosing may be as much psychological as physical.  Not only are 
there walls, railings and barriers; there are also language, traditions and rules.  Courts are perhaps the 
most segregated and segregating public buildings in contemporary cities. 224 
In the research by Pati, Bose & Zimring, openness reveals itself architecturally in 
conceptualisations of accessibility, transparency, exposure, organisational clarity, illumination, 
                                                
224 LRCWA, Consultation Papers, 1026. 
166 
 
 
 
and inclusiveness.225  Taking as their starting point expressions of openness as a key late-20th 
century political ideology in U.S. architecture,226 the researchers investigated expressive 
attributes of judicial architecture that revealed notions of openness in the design.  
Courthouses were chosen for the study due to their “significant symbolic and functional 
performance.”227  It is suggested that Pati, Bose & Zimring’s conceptualisations of 
“openness” listed above are precisely the types of architectural device employed by the 
Supreme Court’s architects to convey the judiciary’s desired sense of access to justice.  
Accordingly they provide a useful framework for analysing the Supreme Court building in 
this regard. 
Access ibi l i ty  
Accessibility is conceptualised by Pati, Bose & Zimring in three ways: to the site, to the 
building, and within the building.  Site accessibility means ease of access to the site in terms 
of physical accessibility and proximity to other important buildings in the area since it 
eliminates special planning by the public for a courthouse visit.228  Accessibility to the 
building at the street-building interface is a significant indicator of openness for Pati, Bose & 
Zimring.  Architectural devices employed to enable building accessibility might include 
articulated entrances, visibility of public entry, invitingness of the public entry, mitigation of 
                                                
225 Debajyoti Pati, Mallika Bose, & Craig Zimring, “Rethinking Openness: Courthouses in the United States” 
Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 24:4 (Winter, 2007) 308-324. 
226 Pati, Bose & Zimring, “Rethinking Openness,” 309.  See also LRCWA, Consultation Papers, 1026, where 
openness to the sky and air is associated also with openness to public complaint, scrutiny and accountability, 
but also possibly open to threats, corruption and political interference: “Openness can be seen as both a 
characteristic of architectural design and of the imagination of those who manage and occupy the space.” 
227 Pati, Bose & Zimring, “Rethinking Openness,” 311. 
228 Ibid., 312-3. 
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entry security devices, and easy accessibility for all.229  Articulated entrances might be large 
and grand, or involve a contrast in form or materiality from the majority of the building.230  
Articulation also aids visibility of the public entrance and thus legibility of the entrance for 
the public.231  Creating an inviting public entry (through, for example, some form of 
processional approach to the building)232 and having multiple public entries (i.e. increasing 
the porosity of the building)233 can suggest to the public that a courthouse is more accessible, 
as can mitigating the obtrusiveness of security devices234 and easy accessibility for all, 
especially for the physically challenged.235  The final conceptualisation of openness through 
accessibility suggested by Pati, Bose & Zimring is that within a building, which may be 
provided by multiple circulation routes to internal spaces.236 
Accessibility is evident in the Supreme Court building in many of the ways suggested by the 
Pati, Bose & Zimring research.  The siting of the Court is such that public access is 
permitted to all four elevations of the building.  The complex is also within relatively close 
proximity to many major public nodes, including the House of Representatives, the Beehive, 
other courts and government buildings; the central train and bus stations;  the Lambton 
Quay/Golden Mile commercial district; Victoria University of Wellington law and commerce 
                                                
229 Ibid., 313. 
230 Ibid., 313-4. 
231 Ibid., 314. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid., 314-5. 
234 Ibid., 315. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
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faculties; major hospitality areas; and the Wellington waterfront.  The entrance to the 
Supreme Court is clearly legible from Lambton Quay and although there are no public 
entrances to the Supreme Court on the other facades of the building, it is suggested that the 
legible lack of other entrances actually aids accessibility in a building of this scale by focusing 
attention on the main entrance.  The orientation of the entrance onto Lambton Quay 
perhaps does not maximise its potential invitingness (as discussed in Chapter V, one critic 
described this as a “lost opportunity”237), but the broad steps leading to the entrance and 
careful mitigation of entry security devices (the discrete bollards, the liquid softness of the 
horizontally deep reflecting pools, and off-axis positioning of the security scanner to the left 
of the public entrance) aid perceived and real accessibility.  Ramp access to the same main 
entrance (rather than to a secondary entrance as is sometimes the case with public buildings) 
assists accessibility for people with physical movement limitations.  Once inside the building, 
the courtroom is similarly accessible by the public, with a clearly legible, wide open reception 
area, welcoming concierge, and information videos to help first-time visitors come to grips 
with the history and function of the Court.  The two public access points to the courtroom 
are clearly visible from the main entrance.  Even the Registry office interface, unobstructed 
by any perceptible security measures, give a sense of an accessible court.   
Transparency 
For Pati, Bose & Zimring, transparency (which may be defined as a condition of being easily 
seen through or understood, easily discerned, or obvious, open and ingenuous) refers to the 
notion that a courthouse is not open if it is opaque and invariably relates to perceived or real 
                                                
237 See p. 103. 
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visual linkage, both inside-out and outside-in.238  In this way transparency is closely linked 
with accessibility.  Inside-out transparency is said to link users to vistas and other important 
landmarks in the vicinity and thus imparts a sense of belonging to the community, while 
linkages from the outside to interior (especially public) spaces is said to convey the 
transparency of the State’s functions to the public.239 
This notion of transparency requires more detailed consideration in relation to the Supreme 
Court building, especially since transparency was a key design outcome sought by the 
judiciary.240  Pati, Bose & Zimring’s suggestion that outside-in transparency is perceived to 
convey official transparency is supported by Deborah Asher Barnstone’s work The 
Transparent State,241 which provides some insight as to why the concept featured so clearly in 
the judges’ requirements.  Barnstone contends that, since the end of the Second World War, 
the concept of transparency came to be employed in western political spheres to denote 
democratic, open, and physically and intellectually accessible government.  As noted in 
Chapter III, architecture has long been employed by those in power to convey political 
values. Harold D. Lasswell speculates in The Signature of Power that the extent to which a 
government operates in closed (versus open) spaces connotates the degree to which that 
authority wishes to share power with outsiders. Whereas totalitarian regimes exclude the 
public from their sites of power, democratic governments permit transparency and 
                                                
238 Pati, Bose & Zimring, “Rethinking Openness,” 315. 
239 Pati, Bose & Zimring, “Rethinking Openness,” 316. 
240 Wilson, discussion. 
241 Deborah Ascher Barnstone, The Transparent State.  Architecture and Politics in Postwar Germany (New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
170 
 
 
 
permeation through large windows and doors.242  Writing on architectural transparency in the 
German Federal Republic, Barnstone found that “[t]ransparency began as a metaphor for a 
desired condition, but became an analogy for democracy in [West] Germany as it was 
embodied in architectural projects over the last 50 years.”243  For Barnstone the formal, 
spatial, and stylistic use of transparency in West German architecture of the late 20th century 
is analogical in that it establishes an explicit structural alignment between two represented 
situations which then projects inferences.244  In the case of the Supreme Court this analogy 
suggests an alignment between the architectonic transparency of the building and the 
transparent structure of the judicial system and the society it serves.   
It is important to note, however, that there is no such thing as a “democratic” (or, for that 
matter, “fascist” or “communist”) architecture; transparency per se does not denote open 
process, but our cultural milieu is such that we are willing to read openness in the analogy of 
transparency, as illustrated by the Pati, Bose & Zimring research.  Visual accessibility remains 
a strong analogy for openness, accessibility, checkability, honesty and egalitarianism, but it is 
an attractive ideal rather than a secured fact. As Barnstone observes: 
In fact, a truly transparent society and democracy does not exist.  [...].  The ideology supporting 
transparency has persisted in spite of these facts. [...] [T]ransparent government is supposed to act as a 
                                                
242 Harold D. Lasswell, in collaboration with Merritt B. Fox, The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and 
Policy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979), cited in Goodsell, Civic Space, 29. 
243 Barnstone, The Transparent State, 13. 
244 Barnstone, The Transparent State,12, citing Dedre Gentner, Keith J. Holyoak, and Boicho N. Kokinov (eds). 
The Analogical Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). 
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preventative measure, a guarantee.  It offers the false hope that things and events that are visible are 
controllable.245 
That said, promoting that ideal is especially important in the case of such a significant (yet 
unelected and rarely publicly criticised) constitutional body as the judicial system.  Therefore 
transparency is employed as the primary architectural analogy to convey the concept of 
transparent administration of justice, since complete transparency in the judicial system is a 
myth.   
However, where the analogy is accepted by the public the building itself becomes a symbol 
for the (idealised) transparency of the system.  This is the value of the architectural analogy – 
whether or not the system is truly transparent, the symbol of the system – the Supreme 
Court building – embodies the analogy in the hope that the system functioning within always 
lives up to its symbolic representation.  The transparency of the building suggests that the 
conditions for transparency of the judicial system are manifest.246 
Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis suggest, however, that transparency in architecture is not 
ideology-driven but rather a function of technological advancement in the 20th century.247  
For them, this explains why civic buildings such as the Supreme Court are more transparent 
today than, say, the OHCB.  It is suggested that Resnik & Curtis’ view does not explain the 
level of transparency incorporated into civic buildings in the late 20th/early 21st centuries, 
where greater transparency is not required for the functional performance such buildings and 
in fact pose greater security risks than less transparent buildings; nor does it take account of 
                                                
245 Barnstone, The Transparent State, 2. 
246 Barnstone, The Transparent State, 11. 
247 See Resnik & Curtis “Representing Justice”. 
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the express intentions of the clients and architects involved in such projects, as revealed in 
both the Pati, Bose & Zimring research and this study.  As Christian Norberg-Schultz has 
observed, a window may function as a mere hole in the wall, or it may dematerialise that wall 
- the difference between perforating apertures and expansive window walls is both technical 
and conceptual.248 
As described in Chapter V, transparency is a fundamental architectural device utilised in the 
Supreme Court building.  Curtain wall glazing covers the majority of the building enabling 
unobstructed outside-in visual contact to all public spaces of the court.  The 
p hutukawa/r t  screen provides security, shading and privacy to the first floor of the 
courthouse while not restricting the inside-out transparency which visually connects the 
judges and their clerks with Parliament and the Beehive, the various government 
departments and other courts located in the vicinity, the inner city commercial district, and 
the wider public and community.  While the screen device has been described by some critics 
as a “strange” and “inappropriately veiled” image of transparent justice,249 the Chief Justice 
has described with approval the “loving embrace” of the screen.250 
Exposure 
Many of the respondents in the Pati, Bose & Zimring research suggested that judicial 
architecture is not open if it is not available for interaction and engagement in the judicial 
process.  The concept of exposure relates to the visibility to the public of a courthouse at 
                                                
248 Christian Norberg-Schultz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1979), 67, 
cited in Goodsell, Civic Space, 36-7. 
249 See Wellington City Council, Council Decision – Notice of Requirement: Supreme Court of New Zealand (12 April 
2007), para 3.1, and Wilson, et al., “Natural Justice,” 60. 
250 Sian Elias, “Supreme Court Opening Speech.”  
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local and broader urban scales and is thus related (but not identical) to concepts of 
accessibility.  Local scale exposure might be enabled through selection of a prominent site in 
a block or neighbourhood, while city scale exposure in the Pati, Bose & Zimring research 
typically related visibility from major transportation corridors such as highways.251  In the 
Supreme Court complex, exposure seems to have been more a corollary of siting 
contingencies rather than intention.  That said, the exposure level of the Court at the local 
level is very high being at the intersection of a number of arterial transport routes in a key 
area of the central city. 
Organisat ional c lar i ty  
Pati, Bose & Zimring found that a lack of legibility to the public of the functions and spaces 
within courthouses was analogous to closed doors, whereas encouraging exploration of 
spaces and reducing way-finding problems promoted openness. 252  Organisational clarity was 
a key concern of the Supreme Court’s architects253 and is evident in the legibility of the 
spaces to which the public has (and also does not have) access.  For example, upon entering 
the building the concierge desk is very clear to the visitor as a place to get information, just as 
the entrance to the courtroom is clear.  On the other hand, while the location of the library is 
clearly visible to the public, the internal glazing is opaque and the access to the library is not 
in the public area, thus reducing confusion about whether the library is open to the public. 
                                                
251 Pati, et al., “Rethinking Openness,” 317. 
252 Ibid., 317. 
253 Wilson, discussion. 
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I l luminat ion 
Linked with the concept of organisational clarity in the Pati, Bose & Zimring research was 
that of illumination – that the better illuminated the interior of a courthouse was, the better it 
could be understood and therefore be considered more open.254  Illumination is a key device 
employed in the Supreme Court complex and one closely aligned with (and a function of) 
transparency devices.  Daylight illuminates all areas of the Supreme Court building, even the 
library, stereotypically a dark and dusty space.  The courtroom skylight and cone penetrations 
allow daylight to pass deep into the heart of the building.   Similar passive daylight 
illumination devices are found in the OHCB’s Courtroom 1 floorlights, but these do not 
have the organisational clarity or transparency functions associated with illumination in the 
Supreme Court.  Artificial lighting of the Supreme Court complex at night (both architectural 
light of the exterior facades and interior down lighting) serves to illuminate and expose the 
complex in the dark. 
Inc lus iveness  
The final conceptualisation of openness found by Pati, Bose & Zimring is that of 
inclusiveness, which the researchers defined as including non-traditional public functions 
within courthouse spaces which invite people who would not normally have cause to visit a 
courthouse into the building and thus expose them to the workings of the court.  Suggested 
uses might include large atria available for public use during off-times and weekends, 
exhibition spaces, and restaurants or cafes.255  As noted in Chapter IV, consideration was 
given in the briefing stage of the Supreme Court project to incorporating commercial floor 
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space into the brief but the idea was rejected in favour of maintaining the typological purity 
of a courthouse.  While this reduces potential daily public interaction with the Supreme 
Court, it arguably promotes the clarity of the complex as symbol of the judicial system. 
Parliamentary sovereignty 
As discussed in Chapter II, the Supreme Court plays a fundamental role in New Zealand’s 
constitutional framework.  As one of three branches of Government under the constitutional 
separation of powers, the Court maintains an institutional distance from the legislature and 
the executive and enjoys powers which enable it to perform its “check and balance” function 
vis-à-vis the other two branches.  It is suggested that having a stand-alone Supreme Court 
building speaks in and of itself of the independence of the institution.  Just as the legislature 
has the House of Representatives and the executive the Beehive, so the judiciary now has the 
Supreme Court.  The complex stands as an emblem of the third branch, but fittingly it is 
further removed from Parliament and the Beehive geographically, just as its constitutional 
functions are further removed from the much closer workings of the Government with the 
legislative law maker.  As required by the Supreme Court brief, the building is not 
ostentatious; it is, however, iconic of the institution and symbolic of justice.  As previously 
noted, the Court’s strong corner siting means that is it not hidden behind other buildings and 
it enjoys clear sight lines to the other branches of Government, and vice versa.  The Supreme 
Court building is also suitably isolated from commercial interests.  As already mentioned, 
there was consideration at the beginning of the project to incorporating a tower above the 
court to garner commercial leasing revenue.  This option was discarded, and rightly so – 
there would never be a serious suggestion that the Beehive or Parliament could have a 
number of floors leased out to recover costs.  While the Supreme Court is constitutionally 
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independent from Parliament and, together with the Executive, enjoys equal status as a 
branch of government, the lower elevation of the Supreme Court provides an apt analogy 
that Parliament is sovereign and the only body with the full power to make law within New 
Zealand’s constitutional framework,256 something that the siting of the Beehive fails to 
communicate.  That said, there is an irony in this regard in the slight turning off-axis from 
Parliament of the main entrance to the Supreme Court which might be seen by some as an 
appropriate expression of institutional independence.  
                                                
256 Constitution Act 1986, section 15(1). 
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VII.  
Conclusion 
 
As found by this study, the Supreme Court Act 2003 expresses that the judicial aspirations of 
the Supreme Court are to recognise the independence and historical and contemporary 
context of the Court, to provide an accessible, indigenous court of final appeal which 
understands and provides for the unique conditions of New Zealand’s justice system, and 
one which affirms the constitutional significance of the sovereignty of Parliament and the 
fundamental role of the rule of law in New Zealand society.   
The guiding assumption of this study has been that the architecture of the Supreme Court 
complex legibly responds to its layered (but not always publicly accessible) briefing process, a 
process which expresses the aspirations of the New Zealand justice system at the beginning 
of the 21st century.  Analysis of the New Zealand Supreme Court complex’s legislation and 
briefing documents revealed the judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court.  Through analysis 
of archival research, interviews and the Court’s built form, Chapter VI of this thesis then 
assessed the success of the Supreme Court complex as an embodiment of judicial aspirations 
at the beginning of the 21st century.  Drawing on that assessment, this chapter summarises 
the significant findings of the study. 
The first section of Chapter VI, Heritage and Independence, found that the architectural 
relationship between the OHCB and the new Supreme Court building embodies the strong 
heritage of the new institution within the history and traditions of the New Zealand judicial 
system.  This relationship successfully anchors the Court in an extant judicial tradition and 
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gives the new institution a strong identity moving forward.  Viewed in the context of that 
relationship, the architecture of the Supreme Court building recognises that one of the 
Court’s aspirations is to look to the future, embodying innovation in planning and form that 
express the maturity of New Zealand’s judicial system and the independence of the Supreme 
Court from its colonial heritage.  A key finding of this section was that rather than being a 
significant break with tradition, the Supreme Court represents a distinctive step in the 
evolution of New Zealand’s judicial architecture. 
By synthesising theories of how landscape references can act as cohesive symbols of national 
identity, An Indigenous Court explained how the architecture of the Supreme Court complex 
draws on native tree species as symbols of New Zealand’s natural environment in an attempt 
to express another judicial aspiration, the indigeneity of the Supreme Court.  Kauri, 
p hutukawa and r t  references in the Court’s architecture represent New Zealand in a 
culturally cohesive yet non-specific manner that satisfies the express desire of the judiciary to 
avoid cultural ownership of the building.  It is suggested, however, that by avoiding 
pluralistic references the Supreme Court complex fails to appropriately recognise, support 
and advance the fundamental relationship between M ori and the Crown established by the 
Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document and the basis for constitutional 
government in New Zealand.  This compromises the success of the architecture in 
expressing the judicial aspirations of the Court as they relate to M ori, aspirations which 
have been consistently articulated by promoters of the Supreme Court since the Reshaping 
New Zealand’s Appeal Structure discussion document in 2000. 
The final section of Chapter VI, The Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty, showed that 
there are significant expressions of concepts relating to the rule of law in the architecture of 
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the Supreme Court.  The architecture of the Supreme Court building communicates ideals of 
institutional openness through a design that promotes the physical accessibility of the 
courtroom to the public (including by persons with physical disabilities); metaphorical 
accessibility through transparency (in terms of both public engagement with the ritual of 
justice and connection of the judiciary with the community which it serves); exposure of (and 
therefore familiarity with) the courthouse as symbol of the justice system; and organisational 
openness through spatial clarity and legibility.  Day- and artificial lighting are also used to 
enhance the legibility of the interior and perception of transparency.  This section also 
illustrated a number of urban design aspects of the Supreme Court’s architecture which 
reinforce tenets of Parliamentary sovereignty and judicial independence within New 
Zealand’s constitutional framework. 
In summation, this study shows that the architecture of the Supreme Court complex is 
largely successful in expressing judicial aspirations of recognising the heritage and 
independence of the Court, its “New Zealand-ness”, and its commitment to a number of 
fundamental constitutional tenets.  Significantly, however, the architecture of the Supreme 
Court fails to appropriately engage with the constitutional significance of the on-going 
M ori–Crown relationship embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi.  The intentional rejection of 
any form of non-P keh  cultural identity in the Supreme Court promotes fundamental 
questions as to the present and future of New Zealand’s judicial system: Does “Justice” in 
New Zealand require a dismissal of cultural pluralism?  Or is the Supreme Court building 
perhaps accurately representative of a justice system that, even in the 21st century, struggles 
to understand and provide for New Zealand’s cultural pluralism?  Both are anachronistic and 
concerning propositions.  
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While the contemporary expressive value of the Supreme Court complex can be revealed in 
the manner shown by this study, it must be recognised that there are limitations on how far 
that unveiling can extend.  The disconnect between the judicial aspirations regarding the role 
of the Treaty in New Zealand’s jurisprudence expressed in the Supreme Court’s constituting 
legislation and the expression of aspirations in the architecture of the Court reveals some of 
the complexity of the briefing process undertaken in relation to New Zealand’s civic 
architecture, some of which is publicly accessible, some of which is not.  It is suggested that 
this discrepancy highlights a layering of aspirations that occurred in the Supreme Court 
complex’s briefing process.  Compared with aspirations expressed in the public record, 
unofficial aspirations behind a design can only be suggested by the built form. 
It must also be recognised that the Supreme Court complex will develop in meaning over 
time.  The architectural expressions assessed by this study reveal the aspirations of those 
involved in the establishment of the institution at the beginning of the 21st century, but the 
complex’s symbolic capital will either increase as its symbolism is accepted and affirmed by 
the community as the ideal expression of New Zealand’s justice system, or such resonance 
will not occur and the Court’s symbolic function will diminish.  Accordingly, care ought to 
be taken not to limit the building’s expressive value to the here and now, to too literal a 
reading of its component parts; after all, qui haeret in littera haeret in cortice – he who chokes on 
the words, chokes on the substance.257  In the words of the Chief Justice, the Rt. Hon Dame 
Sian Elias: 
The Supreme Court, like any Court, is not a building.  Nor is it simply made up of the Judges and 
court staff who occupy the office today.  They serve an idea which is greater than the sum of the built 
                                                
257 Lord Linley in Smith v McArthur [1904] AC 389; (1904) NZPCC 323 (Privy Council). 
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and living parts of today’s Court.  [...]  Altogether, this is a confident building which looks with 
optimism to the future of the Court within our society.  The building challenges all who work in the 
Court to fulfil the aspirations for justice with which it was set up.  [...] Such shared expectations are 
sometimes disappointed but over the long haul they are shared values which bring us together as a 
people.  In this Court the hopes of the people who have gone before and those yet to come can be 
felt.  May we in our time work to fulfil those hopes here.258 
 
  
                                                
258Sian Elias, “Supreme Court Opening Speech.” 
182 
 
 
 
  
183 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix I   Supreme Court Legislation (excerpts) 
Appendix II   Supreme Court Complex – Briefing Documents 
Appendix III   Supreme Court Complex – Architectural Drawings 
Appendix IV   Chris Cochran, Supreme Court. 42 Stout Street. Conservation Report for The 
Ministry of Justice (2006) (excerpts) 
Appendix V   Supreme Court Complex – Selected Credits and Awards 
  
184 
 
 
 
  
185 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
Supreme Court – Legislation (excerpts) 
 
Supreme Court  Act 2003 – Legis lat ive  History 
9 December 2002 Introduction (Bill 16-1) 
17 December 2002 First reading and referral to Justice and Electoral Committee 
16 September 2003 Reported from Justice and Electoral Committee (Bill 16-2) 
7 October 2003 Second reading 
8, 9 October 2003 Committee of the whole House (Bill 16-3) 
14 October 2003 Third reading 
 
Supreme Court  Bi l l  (First  Reading)  
Clause 3 Purpose 
The purpose of this Act is to— 
(a) establish the Supreme Court of New Zealand as the court of final appeal for New 
Zealand, and provide for its jurisdiction and related matters; and 
(b) end appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from decisions of New 
Zealand courts; and 
(c) make related amendments to certain enactments relating to courts or judicial 
proceedings. 
Clause 13 Criteria for leave to appeal 
 
(1) The Supreme Court must not give leave to appeal to it unless it is satisfied that – 
(a) the proposed appeal involves a significant issue relating to the Treaty of Waitangi or 
tikanga Maori; or 
(b) the proposed appeal involves some other matter of general or public importance; or 
(c) a substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred, or may occur unless leave is 
given; or 
(d) the proposed appeal involves a matter of general commercial significance; or 
(e) it is necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the 
proposed appeal. [...] 
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Supreme Court  Act 2003 
Public Act 2003 No 53 
Date of assent 17 October 2003 
Section 2 Commencement 
This Act comes into force on 1 January 2004.  
Section 3 Purpose 
(1) The purpose of this Act is— 
(a) to establish within New Zealand a new court of final appeal comprising New 
Zealand judges— 
(i) to recognise that New Zealand is an independent nation with its own history and 
traditions; and 
(ii) to enable important legal matters, including legal matters relating to the Treaty of 
Waitangi, to be resolved with an understanding of New Zealand conditions, 
history, and traditions; and 
(iii) to improve access to justice; and 
(b) to provide for the court's jurisdiction and related matters; and 
(c) to end appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from decisions of New 
Zealand courts; and 
(d) to make related amendments to certain enactments relating to courts or judicial 
proceedings. 
(2) Nothing in this Act affects New Zealand's continuing commitment to the rule of law and 
the sovereignty of Parliament. 
Section 6 Supreme Court established 
This section establishes as the court of final appeal for New Zealand a court of record called 
the Supreme Court of New Zealand. 
Section 7 Constitution of Court 
(1) The Supreme Court comprises— 
(a) the Chief Justice; and 
(b) not fewer than 4 nor more than 5 other Judges, appointed by the Governor-General 
as Judges of the Supreme Court. 
(2) The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is not affected by a vacancy in the number of its 
Judges. 
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Section 13 Criteria for leave to appeal 
(1) The Supreme Court must not give leave to appeal to it unless it is satisfied that it is 
necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the proposed 
appeal. 
(2) It is necessary in the interests of justice for the Supreme Court to hear and determine a 
proposed appeal if— 
(a) the appeal involves a matter of general or public importance; or 
(b) a substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred, or may occur unless the appeal 
is heard; or 
(c) the appeal involves a matter of general commercial significance. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a significant issue relating to the Treaty of Waitangi is 
a matter of general or public importance. 
(4) The Supreme Court must not give leave to appeal to it against an order made by the 
Court of Appeal on an interlocutory application unless satisfied that it is necessary in the 
interests of justice for the Supreme Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal 
before the proceeding concerned is concluded. 
(5) Subsection (2) does not limit the generality of subsection (1); and subsection (3) does not 
limit the generality of subsection (2)(a). 
Section 18 Chief Justice, and seniority of Judges 
(1) The Chief Justice is the head of the New Zealand judiciary, and has seniority over the 
other Judges of the Supreme Court. 
(2) Other Judges of the Supreme Court appointed on different dates have seniority among 
themselves according to those dates. 
(3) Other Judges of the Supreme Court appointed on the same date have seniority among 
themselves as follows: 
(a) Judges who have been Judges of the Court of Appeal are senior to Judges who have 
not been Judges of the Court of Appeal: 
(b) Judges who have been Judges of the Court of Appeal have among themselves the 
seniority they would have if still Judges of the Court of Appeal: 
(c) Judges who have not been Judges of the Court of Appeal but have previously been 
Judges of the High Court have seniority among themselves according to their 
seniority as Judges of the High Court: 
(d) Judges who have not previously been Judges of the High Court but have previously 
held other judicial office in New Zealand are senior to Judges who have not 
previously held judicial office in New Zealand. 
(4) Judges of the Supreme Court are senior to the Judges of the Court of Appeal, and to the 
Judges of the High Court who are not Judges of the Supreme Court. 
(5) This section applies only to permanent Judges. 
Section 42 Ending of appeals to Her Majesty in Council 
(1) No appeal to Her Majesty in Council lies or may be brought from or in respect of any 
civil or criminal decision of a New Zealand court made after 31 December 2003— 
188 
 
 
 
(a) whether by leave or special leave of any court or of Her Majesty in Council, or 
otherwise; and 
(b) whether by virtue of any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or of New 
Zealand, or the Royal prerogative, or otherwise. 
(2) Subsection (1) is subject to section 50.  
189 
 
 
 
Appendix II 
Supreme Court Complex –Briefing Documents 
II.1 Chief Justice, Memorandum – Supreme Court Project PSG, Premises Brief 
Provisions (7 November 2003) 
II.2 Supreme Court Premises Brief Version 1 (24 March 2006) 
II.3 Office of the Minister for Courts, Memorandum for Cabinet Policy Committee (c. 
March 2006) 
II.4 Supreme Court Permanent Premises Project, Option C (Modified) Parameters (6 
April 2006) 
II.5 Supreme Court Premises Brief Version 2 (18 July 2006) 
II.6 Supreme Court Draft Premises Brief Version 3 (6 December 2006) 
II.7 Supreme Court Premises Brief Version 4 (28 March 2007) 
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Appendix III 
Supreme Court Conservation Report (excerpts) 
Prepared by Chris Cochran for The Ministry of Justice 
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Appendix IV 
Supreme Court Complex – Architectural Drawings 
Please note: Some drawings have been omitted from this set for security reasons. 
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REMOVE RADIATORS
REMOVE JOINERY UNIT
REMOVE JOINERY UNIT
REMOVE WHB
& CABINET
REMOVE FENCE & GATES
REMOVE FENCE & GATES
DEMOLISH SINGLE
STOREY BUILDING
FORM NEW OPENING
IN BRICK WALL
DG.17d
REMOVE
TIMBER SCREEN
DEMOLISH
TIMBER STAIRS
G.64
PUBLIC OFFICE
G.65
DEPUTY
REGISTRAR
DEMOLISH CONC.
SALLY PORT.
SALVAGE LAYLIGHTS
FORM
OPENING
REMOVE DOOR.
REMOVE CONC. STEPS
COMPLETE.
WG.01
WG.02
WG.03
WG.04
WG.05WG.06WG.07WG.08WG.09
WG.10
WG.11
WG.12
WG.13WG.14WG.15WG.16WG.17WG.18WG.19WG.20
WG.21 WG.22 WG.23 WG.24
WG.25
WG.26
WG.27WG.28WG.29
WG.30
WG.31
WG.32
WG.33
WG.34
WG.35
WG.36
WG.37
WG.38WG.39
WG.40
WG.41
WG.42 WG.43 WG.44
WG.45
WG.46 WG.47 WG.48
WG.49
WG.50
WG.51
WG.52 WG.53 WG.54 WG.55
WG.56
WG.57 WG.58
WG.59 WG.60 WG.61 WG.62 WG.63
WG.64
WG.65
WG.66
WG.67
WG.68
G.19
CORRIDOR
G.15
CORRIDOR
G.18
CORRIDOR
G.16
CORRIDOR
G.59
CORRIDOR
G.12
CORRIDOR
G.14
CORRIDOR
G.07
MALE WC
G.03
FOYER
REMOVE TIMBER RAMP
REMOVE
JOINERY FITTINGS
REMOVE ALL EXISTING
SANITARY FITTINGS
REMOVE ALL PLATFORMS, BENCHES
SEATING, DOCK,& SCREENS.
ALL TO BE SALVAGED, 
REFURBISHED AND REINSTATED
REMOVE ALL HVAC DUCTWORK
REMOVE PAIR OF WINDOWS COMPLETE.
FORM OPENINGS FOR NEW DOORS.
FORM OPENING FOR NEW DOOR.
R
E
M
O
V
E
 
R
A
D
IA
T
O
R
REMOVE TIMBER FRAMED PARTITIONS AND 
ASSOCIATED DOORS COMPLETE.
R
E
M
O
V
E
 
R
A
D
IA
T
O
R
2no CAST IRON COLUMNS
TO REMAIN IN POSITION
REMOVE ALL PLATFORMS, BENCHES, SEATING, DOCKS,
STAIR & BALDECCHINO. ALL TO BE SALVAGED,
REFURBISHED AND REINSTATED
REMOVE TIMBER PARTIONS 
DOORS & FRAMES.
REMOVE TIMBER FRAMED WALLS,
TOILET PARTITIONS
& SANITARY FITTINGS
REMOVE FENCE
REMOVE WINDOWS 01 & 68.
G.56
EXISTING TOILET BLOCK 
DEMOLISHED
REMOVE PLATFORM, BENCHES 
SEATING, DOCK, SCREENS AND 
PLACE IN STORAGE
REMOVE TOILET PARTITIONS
& SANITARY FITTINGS INCLUDING
WCs, WHBs, SHOWER & HWC
REMOVE ALL TIMBER 
FLOORING MARAI AND 
FLOOR JOISTS AND PLACE 
IN STORE
REMOVE
TIMBER SCREEN
REMOVE CONC. STEPS
SALVAGE NOSINGS TO
BE REINSTATED INCLUDING 
UNDER WC’S EACH SIDE
SALVAGE DOORS AND FRAMES, 
ARCHITRAVE’S AND CAST IRON 
FLOOR VENTS
SALVAGE DOORS AND FRAMES, 
ARCHITRAVE’S AND CAST IRON 
FLOOR VENTS
TEMPORARY TIMBER FRAMED 
WALL AND CORRUGATED IRON 
EXTERIOR CLADDING
DG.18a
DG.27a
DG.30
DG.40
REMOVE PORTION OF 
EXISTING WALL IN 
EXISTING STAIRCASE
REMOVE EXISTING ACCESS 
DOOR AND FRAME
PROTECT TIMBER STAIRS
REMOVE EXISTING CONC. 
STEPS
PROTECT TIMBER 
STAIRS
TIMBER STAIRS TO BE 
REFURBISHED IN PLACE.  PROP 
TIMBER STAIRS FROM WALL 
WHILE FLOOR IS REMOVED
REMOVE TIMBER FRAMED
WIND LOBBY COMPLETE.  
SALVAGE DADO, SKIRTINGS 
AND DOORS
PROTECT TIMBER 
STAIR TO REMAIN IN 
PLACE
REMOVE FIREPLACE
FORM OPENINGS FOR NEW DOORS.
REMOVE JOINERY FITTINGS
TO BE SALVAGED & REINSTATED
REMOVE SHELVING
REMOVE SHELVING
SALVAGE STRONG ROOM
DOOR & FRAME
DOCK AND STAIR 
TO BE SALVAGED 
FOR RE-USE
REMOVE BREASTWORK 
TO FIREPLACES
G.41
CHIEF JUSTICE’S 
ASSOCIATE
E01
E02
E03 E04 E06
E05 E07 E08 E10 E11 E12E09
EA
EB
EC
ED
EE
EF
EG
EH
EK
EM
EN
EP
EJ
EL
A3.002
05
A3.003
08
A3.001
04
A3.001
04
A3.000
02
A3.002
06
A3.000
02
A3.003
08
A3.002
06
A3.003
07
A3.001
03
A3.000
01
A3.003
07
A3.002
05
A3.001
03
A3.000
01
A 1.002 A
1:100
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3 13.04.07 QS ISSUE
4 25.05.07 FOR SCHEDULING
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ALL DIMENSIONS TO BE VERIFIED ON SITE BEFORE PRODUCING SHOP
DRAWINGS OR COMMENCING ANY WORK.
REVISIONS
DEMOLITION NOTES
REMOVE ALL TIMBER FLOORS & SUB FLOOR 
FRAMING INCLUDING PILES & INTERMEDIATE 
FOUNDATIONS GENERALLY THROUGHOUT.
REMOVE ALL TIMBER WINDOWS, DOORS &
FRAMES COMPLETE WITH ARCHITRAVES &
SALVAGE WHERE SCHEDULED
WINDOWS & DOORS NOT SHOWN DOTTED ARE
TO BE REINSTATED IN ORIGINAL LOCATIONS 
WHERE SHOWN.
REMOVE ALL TIMBER STAIRS & SALVAGE WHERE
SCHEDULED OR OTHERWISE SHOWN.
REMOVE TIMBER SKIRTINGS, DADO & PICTURE
RAILS & SLAVAGE WHERE SCHEDULED.
REMOVE ELECTRICAL OUTLETS & LIGHT FITTINGS
& SALVAGE WHERE SCHEDULED.
REFER ALSO TO 6 SERIES INTERIOR ELEVATIONS
FOR EXTENT OF DEMOLITION & SALVAGE WORK
F.19
SECRETARY TO 
CHIEF JUSTICE
F.24
SOLICITORS
ROBING ROOM
F.20 F.21 F.22
F.23
ASSOCIATE
F.25
F.26
JUDGE’S CHAMBERS
F.27
F.29
F.30
ASSOCIATE
F.18
F.15F.13
F.02
F.05 F.11
NO.3 COURTROOM
F.12
F.07
F.10
TEA 
ROOM
G.03 (UPPER)G.13 (UPPER) F.16 PUBLIC
GALLERY
G.17 (UPPER)
F.28
ASSOCIATE
F.01
ASSOCIATE
F.03
STAIRS
F.04
NO.2 JURY ROOM
D1.16
D1.26
D1.28a
D1.30D1.27
D1.24
D1.25
D1.23
D1.21D1.20
D1.19
D1.18
D1.15
D1.29a
D1.13
D1.10
D1.09a
D1.09bD1.09cD1.09d
D1.08
D1.11b
D1.06c
D1.06b
D1.04cD1.04b
D1.04a
D1.06a
D1.01
D1.05 D1.11a
F.14
NORTHERN GALLERY
F.17
SOUTHERN GALLERY
F.09
TOLIETS
F.08
REMOVE
GAS HEATER
REMOVE
GAS HEATER
REMOVE
GAS HEATER
REMOVE
GAS HEATER
REMOVE TIMBER PLATFORM
& JOINERY UNITS
REMOVE TIMBER FRAMED
WALLS & STAIRS
REMOVE TIMBER
STAIRS & SEATS
REMOVE TIMBER PARTITION
REMOVE SHELVING
REMOVE PARTICLE BD FLOORING
REMOVE PARTICLE BD FLOORING REMOVE SHELVING
REMOVE ALL HVAC DUCTWORK OVER
REMOVE TIMBER
PARTITION
REMOVE TIMBER
FRAMED WINDOWS &
FORM NEW OPENINGS
IN BRICK WALLS
REMOVE TIMBER
FRAMED WALLS
REMOVE SANITARY
FITTINGS
REMOVE TIMBER
FRAMED WALLS,
JOINERY FITTINGS
& SANITARY FITTINGS
REMOVE
TIMBER
STAIRS
REMOVE
TIMBER WINDOW
REMOVE LOWER CEILING BELOW
REMOVE BALDECCHINO BELOW
TO BE SALVAGED & REINSTATED
PROP GALLERY FLOOR
WHILE GROUND LEVEL
TIMBER FLOOR IS REMOVED
REMOVE TIMBER FRAMED
WALLS, JOINERY FITTINGS
& SANITARY FITTINGS
REMOVE TIMBER FRAMED
WALLS, JOINERY FITTINGS
& SANITARY FITTINGS
REMOVE
TIMBER WINDOW
REMOVE
TIMBER STEPS
REMOVE TIMBER
PARTITION
REMOVE TIMBER
FRAMED WALLS
REMOVE TIMBER
FRAMED WALL
REMOVE TIMBER WALL
REMOVE SHELVING UNITS
REMOVE
SHELVING
REMOVE RAISED
TIMBER FLOOR
FORM NEW OPENING
IN TIMBER FLOOR FORM NEW OPENING
IN TIMBER FLOOR
W1.01
W1.02
W1.03W1.04W1.05W1.06W1.07
W1.08
W1.09
W1.10
W1.11
W1.12W1.13W1.14W1.15
W1.16
W1.17
W1.18
W1.19 W1.20
W1.21W1.22
W1.23
W1.24
W1.25
W1.26
W1.27
W1.28
W1.29
W1.30
W1.31
W1.32 W1.33 W1.34
W1.35
W1.36
W1.37
W1.38
W1.39 W1.40 W1.41 W1.42 W1.43
W1.44
W1.45W1.46W1.47W1.48W1.49
W1.50
W1.51
W1.52 W1.53 W1.54 W1.55 W1.56
W1.57
W1.58
W1.59
PROTECT TIMBER
STAIRS
F.06
NO.1 JURY ROOM
PROTECT
TIMBER STAIRS
RE-INSTATE ORIGINAL 
OPENING IN BRICK WALL 
AND PREPARE FOR NEW 
WINDOW
PROTECT TIMBER STAIRS
TO BE REFURBISHED IN PLACE
PROTECT TIMBER
STAIRS
E01
E02
E03 E04 E06
E05 E07 E08 E10 E11 E12E09
EA
EB
EC
ED
EE
EF
EG
EH
EK
EM
EN
EP
EJ
EL
A3.002
05
A3.003
08
A3.001
04
A3.001
04
A3.000
02
A3.002
06
A3.000
02
A3.003
08
A3.002
06
A3.003
07
A3.001
03
A3.000
01
A3.003
07
A3.002
05
A3.001
03
A3.000
01
A 3.229 F
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BRONZE SCREEN
DETAILS
FOR CONSTRUCTION
A 22.11.07 CONSTRUCTION ISSUE
B 06.03.08 PANEL FIXING AND CONNECTION
POINTS SETOUT ON ELEVATION
C 08.05.08 BRONZE PROFILE ALTERED
D 27.05.08 SCREEN PATTERN ADJUSTED
VOLUME TABLE REVISED
E 29.07.08 8mm PLATE LEAF
F 28.08.08 GLASS INSERT AMENDED
BG
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ALL DIMENSIONS TO BE VERIFIED ON SITE BEFORE PRODUCING SHOP
DRAWINGS OR COMMENCING ANY WORK.
REVISIONS
01
A2.201
01
A2.202
01
A2.203
01
A2.204cast bronze screen  panel elevation
plan section detail
02
-
typical screen  panel isometric view typical corner  panels isometric view
lower fixing point detail elevation lower fixing 
point plan 
detail
upper fixing point detail elevation upper fixing 
point plan 
detail
80 PANELS TOTAL
SITE WELD 6mm CAST BRONZE FIXING 
PLATES TO ADJACENT PANEL FRAME
13
5
18
6
main frame section
1:5 1:5
standard frame section
105mm DEEP CAST BRONZE STANDARD FRAME MEMBERS
135mm DEEP CAST BRONZE MAIN FRAME MEMBERS
135mm DEEP CAST BRONZE MAIN FRAME MEMBERS
105mm DEEP CAST BRONZE STANDARD FRAME MEMBERS
105mm DEEP CAST BRONZE STANDARD FRAME MEMBERS
135mm DEEP CAST BRONZE MAIN FRAME MEMBERS
105mm DEEP CAST BRONZE STANDARD FRAME MEMBERS
105mm DEEP CAST BRONZE STANDARD FRAME MEMBERS
8 PANELS TOTAL
135mm DEEP CAST BRONZE 
MAIN FRAME MEMBERS
105mm DEEP CAST BRONZE 
STANDARD FRAME MEMBERS
SITE WELD 6mm CAST BRONZE FIXING PLATES TO ADJACENT PANEL FRAME
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
105mm DEEP CAST BRONZE 
STANDARD FRAME MEMBERS
135mm DEEP CAST BRONZE MAIN FRAME MEMBERS
135mm DEEP CAST BRONZE 
MAIN FRAME MEMBERS
FULL SIZE SCREEN PATTERN TEMPLATES & OR CAD FILES TO BE PROVIDED BY 
THE ARCHITECT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTION BRONZE CASTING MOULDS.  
FINAL APPROVAL OF THE DESIGN TO BE OBTAINED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE 
ARCHITECT, ENGINEER & SUB-CONTRACTOR PRIOR TO CASTING
RED CAST GLASS INSERT PATTERN VARIES BETWEEN PANELS.   CAD FILES TO BE 
PROVIDED & SHOP DRAWINGS APPROVED BY THE ARCHITECT PRIOR TO PRIOR TO 
CONSTRUCTION.  REFER DRAWINGS A3.230 - A3.233 FOR OVERALL GLASS INSERT 
LAYOUTS
NOTE CAST BRONZE SCREEN PANEL MEMBER
12mm DIA. STAINLESS STEEL PIN
CONC. SLAB EDGE
1205
15
0
16
60
200
13
5
2
0
0
DRY PACK GROUT
1:5
1:2
glass insert detail
6
1:5
glass insert details
type 1 type 2
53
74R
43R
30
30
VIEW FROM OUTSIDE FACE.   GLASS SIZE IN REBATE SHOWN DOTTED
1477 OFF 616 OFF
DISTRIBUTION OF GLASS INSERTS AS SHOWN 
ON ELEVATIONS & TO BE CONFIRMED WITH 
THE ARCITECT PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION
NOTE:
CONFIRM ALL FIXING DETAILS WITH THE STRUCTURAL 
ENGINEER & ARCHITECT PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION
135mm DEEP MAIN FRAME
105mm STANDARD FRAME
6mm PLATE LEAF WORK
BRONZE ELEMENT VOLUME
0.0540 m3
0.0422 m3
0.0152 m3
TOTAL PER PANEL
6mm PLATE LEAF WORK
0.0543 m3
0.0388 m3
0.0143 m3
TOTAL PER PANEL
6mm PLATE LEAF WORK
0.0523 m3
0.0400 m3
0.0142 m3
TOTAL PER PANEL
OVERALL TOTAL
BRONZE VOLUMES
TYPICAL PANEL - 80 OFF
CORNER PANEL 01 - 4 OFF
CORNER PANEL 02 - 4 OFF
10
5
6
17
(FP.6, FP.7, FP.8)
300
STAINLESS STEEL ROD WITH M16 
THREAD GROUTED INTO CAST-IN 
DUCT
CAST-IN DUCT TO ENGINEERS 
DETAIL
40mm DIA BROZE ROD AND 
60mm DIA WASHER
6mm BRONZE CLEAT WELDED TO 
SCREEN MEMBER ( NOT VERTICAL 
BUT IN LINE). SITE DRILLED FOR 
12mm DIA STAINLESS STEEL PIN 
TO ROD END
SHIM
CAST-IN DUCT TO ENGINEERS 
DETAIL
7
5
300 200
16
CAST BRONZE SCREEN PANEL MEMBER
NOTE:
CONFIRM ALL FIXING DETAILS WITH THE STRUCTURAL 
ENGINEER & ARCHITECT PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION
CAST-IN DUCT TO ENGINEERS 
DETAIL
DRY PACK GROUT
CONC. SLAB EDGE
50
18
1:5
1:5
1:5
6mm RED CAST GLASS INSERT ADHESIVE 
FIXED IN REBATED BRONZE PLATE
6mm CAST BRONZE PLATE LASER CUT AS SHOWN
3
0
0
3
0
0
15
0
13
5
17
0
75
16
0
5
varies10 min
5mm HOLE CAST IN 
GLASS FOR SCREW 
FIXING
(FP.1, FP.2, FP.3, FP.4, FP.5)
135200
(FP.2, FP.3 ONLY)
15
FP = FIXING POINT
CP= CONNECTION POINT
40mm DIA BRONZE ROD AND 60mm 
DIA WASHER.  MACHINED REBATE AT 
FRONT FOR SCREEN CONNECTION
SITE WELD 6mm CAST BRONZE FIXING 
PLATES TO ADJACENT PANEL FRAME
SITE WELD 6mm CAST BRONZE FIXING 
PLATES TO ADJACENT PANEL FRAME
12mm PLATE LEAF WORK
12mm PLATE LEAF WORK
12mm PLATE LEAF WORK
135mm DEEP MAIN FRAME
105mm STANDARD FRAME
135mm DEEP MAIN FRAME
105mm STANDARD FRAME
0.0016 m3
0.113 m3
0.0014 m3
0.0014 m3
NOTE
ALL VOLUME FIGURES ARE INDICATIVE ONLY, 
EXTRACTED FROM THE COMPUTER MODEL.
FINAL VOLUMES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE 
CONTRACTOR.
INDICATED VOLUMES EXCLUDE VOIDS FOR GLASS 
INSERTS.
0.1088 m3
0.1079 m3
9.91 m3
18
4
6mm 75x75mm BRONZE ANGLE PRE 
DRILLED FOR M16 STAINLESS STEEL 
THREADED ROD WITH NUT
STAINLESS STEEL M16 THREADED ROD GROUTED IN 
54mm DIA DROSSBACH DUCT.  DUCT TO STOP 
50mm FROM SLAB EDGE WITH PVC SPACER TUBE
FABRICATED 6mm BRONZE CLEAT & TAPERED 
BASE PLATE WELDED TO BACK OF SCREEN
SHIM AS NECESSARY AND SITE DRILL 
FOR 6mm DIA. BRONZE SCREW FIX
FABRICATED 6mm BRONZE CLEAT & TAPERED 
BASE PLATE WELDED TO BACK OF SCREEN
2
5
0
ROOF LEVEL
RL 12.435
RL 8.235
LEVEL 01
90
185
170
NOTE BRACKET VARIATION 
AT FP.1 SHOWN DOTTED
SINGLE ANGLE SEATING 
BRACKET AT FP.2 & FP.3 
DOTTED
18
5
 
A
T
 
F
P
.
1 
O
N
L
Y
8mm STRUCTURAL PLATE LEAF
8mm STRUCTURAL PLATE LEAF
8mm STRUCTURAL PLATE LEAF
FOLDED BRONZE Z 
RETAINER CLIP 
6mm CAST BRONZE PLATE LEAF WITH LASER 
CUT REBATES FOR CAST GLASS INSERTS - 
REFER TO SHEETS A3.230-A3.233 FOR SETOUT8
2
0
0
RL 6.685
RL 14.885
RL 8.235
LEVEL 01
ROOF LEVEL
RL 12.435
15
0
2
5
0
6mm PLATE LEAF ON CENTRE LINE OF FRAMES
FP.1 FP.2 FP.3 FP.4 FP.5
FP.6 FP.7 FP.8
262403420875
205328473153606196
CP.A
CP.B
CP.C
CP.D
CP.E
CP.F
CP.G
CP.H
CP.I
CP.J
CP.K
CP.L
12mm PLATE x MINIMUM 120mm 
HEIGHT TO LEAF SECTIONS ALONG 
BOTTOM EDGE FOR CONTINUITY
12mm PLATE x MINIMUM 120mm 
HEIGHT TO LEAF SECTIONS ALONG 
TOP EDGE FOR CONTINUITY
FIXING POINTS TO BUILDING STRUCTURE
1960 MODULE - REFER TO ELEVATIONS FOR SETOUT
120 MIN. 
 
120
MIN.
6 6
1718
10
5
FULL STRENGTH MEMBER BOW TIE MAIN FRAME
STANDARD FRAME MEMBER
13
5
6mm PLATE LEAF ON CENTRE LINE OF FRAMES
ALIGN TO CENTRE
OVERLAPPING CONNECTION POINT 
BETWEEN PANELS.  REFER TO 
ENGINEERS DETAIL
8mm PLATE STRUCTURAL 
LEAF SHOWN HATCHED
RED CAST GLASS INSERTS
REFER TO SHEETS A3.230-A3.233 FOR SETOUT
02
.
A 4.014
RENOVATED 
A
1:20
INT
INT
BUILDING
GENERAL DETAILS
 
1 25.05.07 FOR SCHEDULING
1 16.07.07 TENDER ISSUE
2 17.07.07 QS REVIEW
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ALL DIMENSIONS TO BE VERIFIED ON SITE BEFORE PRODUCING SHOP
DRAWINGS OR COMMENCING ANY WORK.
REVISIONS
RL 3.510RL 3.510 RL 3.510
RL 2.350 RL 2.350 RL 2.330 RL 2.330 
EPEN
section
02
-
section
03
-
elevation
01
A2.100
W-G-23(R)W-G-24(R)
7
9
6
980
1120
9
0
7
0
13
0
3
0
8
9
1070
140
2
0
0
0
412
11
2
1
227
7
3
6
7
9
6
3
0
8
9
SHADED AREA INDICATES EXTENT 
OF NEW EXTERIOR BRICK WALL 
WITH SELECTED PLASTER FINISH 
AND EXTERIOR SCRIBING TO 
MATCH EXISTING FACADE
ALL DIMENSIONS TO BE 
CONFIRMED ON SITE
NEW CAST IRON EXTERIOR 
MOUNTED RAIN WATER OUTLETS 
WITH CAPPING HOODS TO MATCH 
EXISTING PROFILE AND SIZE.  
REFER TO DETAILED DRAWINGS
NEW PLASTER FORMED 5^ 
PARAPET CAPPING FALLING
NEW PORTION OF BRICK/ 
PLASTER PARAPET TO MATCH 
EXISTING PROFILE
NEW CAST IRON DOWN PIPES TO 
MATCH EXISTING PROFILE FIXED 
TO EXTERIOR FACADE WITH NEW 
FIXING BRACKETS TO MATCH 
EXISTING TRADITIONAL DESIGN
NEW DOUBLE HUNG SASH 
WINDOWS INSTALLED INTO NEW 
PORTION OF EXTERIOR WALL.  
WINDOWS TO BE INSTALLED AND 
FINISHED TO MATCH EXISTING 
WINDOWS.  CONFIRM ON SITE.  
REFER TO WINDOW SCHEDULE 
FOR NUMBER OF NEW WINDOWS 
AND ANY RELOCATED WINDOWS
NEW SELECTED FINISHING 
PLASTER SYSTEM APPLIED OVER 
EXISTING PLASTER AND FACADE 
OF BUILDING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH MANUFACTURER.  INSTALL 
NEW BASE PLASTER WHERE 
REQUIRED FOR PATCHING
EXISTING PLASTERED SILL SET 
TO FALL TO REMAIN.  APPLY 
NEW SELECTED FINISHING 
PLASTER SYSTEM AS PER 
MANUFACTURERS SPECIFICATION
INSTALL NEW PLASTER 
CEILING AT EXISTING CEILING 
HEIGHT.  REFER TO 
REFLECTED CEILING PLAN 
A1.107.  INSTALL ALL NEW 
CORNICES AS INDICATED ON 
MOULDING SCHEDULE
EXISTING TIMBER TRUSSES 
AND SECONDARY RAFTERS TO 
REMAIN.  REFER TO 
SPECIFICATION FOR 
INSPECTIONS OF EXISTING 
TIMBER CONDITION
SELECTED 40mm EXTERIOR 
PAVERS OVER 40mm 
COMPACTED BEDDING
EXISTING VENTILATION GRILLES 
POSITIONED IN REBATE TO SIDE 
OF CONCRETE BEAM.  NEW 
PLASTER MOULDINGS TO MATCH 
ORIGINAL PROFILE
48
6
8
6
171
622
16
3
2
3
7
9
5
6
0
16
2
 
c
o
s 124
220
230
2
4
5
4
7
2
6
5
6 7
6
2
366710365
3
2
0
3
2
0
3
2
0
3
15
2
5
3
3
0
3
2
0
3
2
0
3
2
0
3
2
0
3
2
0
3
14
2
4
413
707
277 462
715597715
725 715
129
268
2624
249
9
6
3
1241
1909571
771
3
8
5
8
8
9
2
3
3
7
0
2
2
1
R 
79
0
R
 560
1041
EXISTING VENTILATION GRILLES 
POSITIONED IN REBATE TO SIDE 
OF CONCRETE BEAM.  NEW 
PLASTER MOULDINGS TO MATCH 
ORIGINAL PROFILE
ALLOW 20mm MOVEMENT GAP
240mm PERIMETER FOUNDATION 
WALL .  PLASTER EXTERIOR 
EXPOSED FACE TO MATCH 
EXISTING.  REFER TO 
FOUNDATION DETAILS
50mm RECESS IN CONCRETE 
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Appendix IV 
Supreme Court Complex – Selected Credits and Awards 
Client 
The Ministry of Justice 
Location 
Wellington, New Zealand 
Completed 
2010 
Architects 
Old High Court Building  -  Pierre Finch Martineau Burrows (1880); John Campbell 
(alterations); Warren and Mahoney (2010) 
Supreme Court  -  Warren and Mahoney 
Professional Services 
Acoustics Consultant  
Ice Design Australia Pty Ltd  
Consultant Artist  
Neil Dawson  
Cost Consultant  
PHC  
Environmental Engineer  
Norman Disney & Young  
Heritage Architect Consultant  
Chris Cochran Conservation Architect  
Interior Designer  
Warren and Mahoney  
Landscape Architect  
Suppliers and Products 
Bronze Screen  
A&G Price Ltd  
Courtroom Beech Timber  
Lindsay & Dixon Ltd  
Curved Toughened Glass  
Metro Glasstech  
Elevators  
Kone Elevators  
Joinery  
Ferndale Furniture  
Plasterwork  
Sto European Plaster Systems  
Structural Steel  
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Boffa Miskell  
Lighting Consultant  
Norman Disney & Young  
Main Contractor  
Mainzeal Construction  
Mechanical Services  
Norman Disney & Young  
Project Manager  
The Building Intelligence Group  
Structural Engineer  
Holmes Consulting Group  
 
Croucher & Crowder Engineering  
Timber panelling  
Jones & Sandford Joinery Ltd  
Windows and doors  
Thermosash  
Zinc Roofing and Copper Cladding  
VM Zinc  
 
Awards 
2011 
 NZIA Architecture Award - Heritage 
 Property Council of New Zealand - Heritage and Adaptive Reuses, Excellence 
 NZIA Architecture Award - Interior Architecture 
 Property Council of New Zealand - Special Purpose, Excellence 
2010 
 NZIA Colour Award  
 NZIA Local Award - Interior Architecture 
 NZIA Local Award - Heritage 
 NZ Wood Timber Award - Interior Design 
 Registered Master Builders Wellington - Commercial Project of the Year  
 Registered Master Builders - Industrial and Infrastructure - National Gold Award, 
Commercial Project of the Year  
 World Architecture Festival Barcelona - Civic & Community, Shortlisted 
 Institution of Structural Engineers (IStructE) Award - Heritage, 
Building/Infrastructure 
 DINZ Best Design Award - Built Environment, Gold 
 Greater Wellington Regional Council - Historic Heritage Award  
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71. PMcC. 
72. PMcC. 
73. Dylan Owen, ATL, Dylan Owen collection, Reference No. PADL-000557. 
74. PMcC. 
75. Richard Rogers Partnership.  
http://www.richardrogers.co.uk/work/all_projects/bordeaux_law_courts/co
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77. Richard Rogers Partnership.  
http://www.richardrogers.co.uk/work/all_projects/bordeaux_law_courts/co
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78. Office of the Governor-General.  http://gg.govt.nz/content/speech-throne 
79. PMcC. 
80. Christchurch Art Gallery, Public Art in Central Christchurch. 
http://christchurchartgallery.org.nz/media/uploads/2010_07/PublicArt-
ChCh-1997.pdf 
81. Author’s photograph. 
82. University of Plymouth.  
http://www.tech.plym.ac.uk/sme/MATS324/MATS324C2%20fabrics.htm 
83. Land Information New Zealand.  http://www.linz.govt.nz/about-
linz/organisation/our-whakapapa/taonga-whakairo  
84. Te Papa Tongarewa/Museum of New Zealand.  
http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/the-new-zealanders/12/2 
85. Unitec Institute of Technology.  http://www.unitec.ac.nz/current-
students/maori/unitec-marae/unitec-marae_home.cfm 
86. NZ Tramping.  http://www.nztramping.com/new-zealand-flora/trees-
bigger-than-houses/ 
87. Melanie Lovell-Smith.  
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/photo/pohutukawa-flowers 
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88. Forest Flora.  
http://www.forestflora.co.nz/Plant%20profiles/Metrosideros%20fulgens.ht
m 
89. PMcC. 
90. Invivo Wines.  www.invivo.com 
91. Photographer unknown.  http://colnect.com/en/stamps/stamp/133590-
Pohutukawa_Flowers-Christmas-New_Zealand 
92. Cartoon by Garrick Tremain.  ATL, Garrick Tremain Collection, Reference 
No. H-671-012. 
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